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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
In 2005, about 75 percent of the German national income consisted of earned income. For 
wage earner households it even amounted to about 85 percent (source: Statistisches 
Bundesamt). Wages are thus the main contributor to an individual’s livelihood. They also 
function as a reference parameter, as each individual approximately knows his or her own 
wage, the rough wage of friends and relatives, and can read up on wages of persons standing 
in the public spotlight in newspapers. The great majority is thus able to compare wages and 
can reflect on issues such as fairness, opportunities and wage distribution in society. This is 
particularly relevant in Germany, where the wage acts as a proxy for the job-status or the 
general rank in society. In any case, a high wage can be converted into commodities that 
improve an individual’s general lifestyle, such as better food, better medical care, higher 
education, independence, and so on. 
For the individual and even at the household level, the net wage is most significant, as this is 
the amount of money available for consumption and investment. However, when dealing with 
economic questions, the gross hourly wage is more helpful, as it is not influenced by taxes, 
variation in working hours, or the wage of the spouse. For this reason the gross hourly wage is 
used as dependent variable as often as possible in the following chapters. 
Until the mid 1990s the wage distribution in Germany was relatively stable, particularly when 
compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. However, this was soon to change. What led to this 
change? Were all groups affected by the same amount or did some face larger wage changes? 
Were there opportunities of moving upwards on the wage distribution? Were these 
opportunities available to all persons? 
What can an individual do in order to earn higher wages? It is common sense that education, 
especially higher education, leads to higher wages and also to higher employment chances 
over one’s life-cycle, particularly in times of change, e.g. globalization, increasing 
international division of labour and skill-biased technical change. But by no means does every 
form of higher education offer the same opportunities. Graduates in the humanities field have 
been facing the lowest wages and the highest unemployment rates among all academics. 
Why? Is this a special phenomenon only occurring in Germany or is it the same in other 
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countries, e.g. Great Britain? 
Another group with an increasing population share in Germany and also of increasing public 
interest are persons with migration background. How many people does this group cover? 
How much do they earn? Is there wage discrimination? Does education achieved in the host 
country lead to higher wages compared to an education achieved in the home country? Do 
better language skills lead to higher wages? 
Using these questions and topics as guidelines, the dissertation at hand aims to give answers 
based on an empirical econometric approach, which looks at wages and their determining 
factors in Germany. 
1.2 Data and Methods 
Empirical studies win or lose validity with the quality of the underlying data. The following 
analyses are based on the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), the German Microcensus 
and the British Labour Force Survey. The results are also compared with studies using other 
German datasets like the IABS, the LIAB and the Quarterly Wage Survey of the German 
Federal Statistical Office. The SOEP is a representative panel survey consisting of about 
20,000 persons in 11,000 households in 2007. It was established in 1984 and a new wave is 
added every year. Along with a lot of socio-economic questionnaires on education, family 
background, migration status, occupation, job situation, language usage and so on, persons are 
asked about their gross wage in the last month and the hours worked. In this manner, it is 
possible to calculate gross hourly wages independent of overtime or part-time work. Although 
the SOEP is not restricted by the social security contribution ceiling, it also includes self-
employed workers as well as civil-servants; thus allowing to observe the whole wage 
distribution, which is not the case for the IABS and the LIAB data, two other big German 
micro datasets. While participation in the SOEP is voluntary, every year 1% of the German 
population have to participate in the Microcensus, so the advantage of this data is the higher 
number of persons, which allows for the analysis of small sub-groups such as humanities 
graduates. Unfortunately, as it is not possible to calculate gross hourly wages, only net 
monthly incomes are reported here. The British Labour Force Survey is designed analogously 
to the Microcensus and thus makes it possible to compare the situation in Germany with that 
of Great Britain. 
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To analyse the questions at hand I use a large toolbox of econometric methods, such as 
ordinary least squares estimation, maximum likelihood estimation, (ordered) probit 
estimation, panel estimation methods, as well as several wage decomposition techniques. I 
also control for selection in several steps. The decomposition of wage differentials between 
two groups subdivides the overall difference into a price and an endowment effect. Another 
application of this method is to decompose the wage gap of native Germans and persons with 
migration background. The problem in this case is that the sets of covariates are unequal in 
both groups (time of residence is equal to the age for all native Germans and thus has to be 
dropped for natives) and that one has to modify the decomposition method to observe an 
unbiased variance-covariance matrix - as done in chapter 6. Wages are only observable if 
persons participate (want to work) and are employed (find a job) on the labour market, so this 
is something of a double-hurdle that has to be overcome before it is possible to achieve a 
wage. Even if persons are employed, there is further selection into occupation and economic 
sector. Controlling for this 4-time selection is not trivial but seems to be important because 
former direct influences on wages, e.g. the language skills of foreigners, only affect wages 
indirectly via selection into better paid jobs after controlling for selection – this is done in 
chapter 7. 
1.3 Results 
The bracket that connects the six conceptual chapters is the individual wage; the topics in 
detail are wage distribution, wage mobility and wages for two special groups: graduates in the 
humanities field and persons with migration background. 
For a long time the wage distribution in Germany was characterized as more or less stable. 
This changed, beginning with the economic downturn in 1992/93 when wage inequality 
started to increase in both parts of Germany – in West Germany wage inequality was mainly 
driven below the median and in East Germany above. This increase affected all groups: 
females and males, foreigners, self-employed and even the core workforce of prime-age 
dependent employed male workers, but was significantly higher for persons with lower tenure 
or, in other words, for persons with less job experience or those who just entered the labour 
market. Up to 40 percent of this group faced real hourly wage losses between 1994 and 2005 
in West Germany. At the same time, wage mobility in Germany decreased. Thus, individuals 
faced a more stable wage distribution, with lower chances of moving upwards. However, 
mobility did exist for some groups: Younger workers, better educated workers and persons 
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not working in blue-collar occupations had higher chances of moving upwards. Joint 
explanation of mobility and inequality make for a good description of the situation on the 
German labour market – higher inequality coupled with lower mobility. This means that while 
the wage gap in the German society widened, the chances of moving upwards decreased. 
Highly educated persons, defined as persons with a degree from a university or a technical 
college, earn the highest wages in Germany and also have higher chances of moving upwards 
in the wage distribution. However, this group is heterogeneous in the sense of labour market 
outcomes. The group in the weakest position are humanities graduates; they earn the lowest 
wages of all academics, face the highest unemployment rates and are more often in precarious 
employment. This situation is comparable to Great Britain. 
An important sub-group of the population living in Germany are persons with migration 
background. First of all, the definition of this group is inconclusive. While in traditional 
immigration countries like the U.S. a lot of studies use ethnic categories such as blacks, 
whites and Hispanics, it has been common practice to use nationality in Germany. Beginning 
with the large inflow of resettlers from Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
as well as the new naturalization law in 2000, this definition does not suitably describe the 
whole group of interest. Nowadays about 19 percent of the population in Germany have a 
migration background, while only 9 percent are foreigners. This share will increase in the near 
future as about one third of the children below the age of six in Germany today have such a 
migration background. These are the future working (or unemployed) cohorts of the German 
labour market. With regard to their wage prospects, the group of German citizens with 
migration background is closer to foreigners than to native Germans – there are no significant 
wage differences between foreigners and the group encompassing all persons with migration 
background. Apart from this, there are significant wage differences between native Germans 
and foreigners and German citizens with migration background. These differences are mainly 
driven by price effects. Education has a strong influence on wages, persons with an 
apprenticeship degree earn higher wages than persons without any degree and persons with a 
university degree earn higher wages than persons with an apprenticeship degree. For persons 
with migration background, it is of particular importance in which country and in what form 
of education system the degree was achieved. Persons with a degree achieved in Germany can 
expect higher wages than persons with a degree from their home country. Another important 
prerequisite for participating successfully in the German labour market is the knowledge of 
the German language. Better language skills indirectly lead to higher wages through improved 
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participation and employment opportunities in better paying industries and occupations. 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation at hand consists of six parts. Each part is an autonomous paper written on my 
own or with the help of co-authors between 2006 and 2009 during my time at the ZEW. The 
first part, “Rising Wage Inequality in Germany”, takes a look at the development of wage 
inequality in Germany between 1984 and 2005. This period saw an increase in wage 
inequality, mainly below the median for West Germany. The chapter was written together 
with Friedhelm Pfeiffer and is published in the Journal of Economics and Statistics 
(Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik). The second part, “Decreasing Wage 
Mobility in Germany”, is published as a ZEW Discussion Paper (status: December 20091). 
Mobility in Germany seems to decrease while inequality increases simultaneously. The third 
part, “Soziale Ungleichheit von Geisteswissenschaftlern im Beruf”, written in German 
together with Michael Gebel reveals that within the group of persons with a university or a 
technical college degree, the humanities graduates achieve the lowest wages and also face 
insecure employment situations. This part is published in the anthology “Findigkeit in 
unsicheren Zeiten, Ergebnisse des Expertisenwettbewerbs Arts and Figures – 
GeisteswissenschaftlerInnen im Beruf“, edited by Heike Solga, Denis Huschka, Patricia 
Eilsberger and Gert G. Wagner. The fourth part, “Wage Prospects for People with Migration 
Background in Germany”, gives a definition of persons with migration background in 
Germany and their wage prospects compared to native Germans, and within the group of 
migrants. This part is a joint work, written with Alisher Aldashev and Stephan L. Thomsen, 
and is a revision of a ZEW Discussion Paper (status: December 2009). The fifth part, “The 
Immigrant Wage Gap in Germany”, written together with Alisher Aldashev and Stephan L. 
Thomsen decomposes wage differences between native Germans and immigrants. This part 
has been published as a ZEW Discussion Paper (status: December 2009). The last part, 
“Language Usage, Participation, Employment and Earnings – Evidence for Foreigners in 
West Germany with Multiple Sources of Selection”, analyses the effect of German language 
skills on wages for foreigners. This part is also a joint work with Alisher Aldashev and 
Stephan L. Thomsen and has been published in Labour Economics. 
                                                          
1 All papers which have not yet been published in a refereed journal or in an anthology (3 out of 6) have been 
sent to a journal, decision pending; status: December 2009. 
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2. Rising Wage Inequality in Germany 
This part is joint work with Friedhelm Pfeiffer and is published in the Journal of Economics 
and Statistics 227 (4), 358-380. 
Abstract: The paper investigates the evolution of wages and wage inequality in Germany 
based on samples from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1984 to 2005. Real gross 
hourly wages for prime age dependent male workers increased on average by 23 percent 
between 1984 and 1994 in West Germany and the wage distribution was fairly stable. 
Between 1994 and 2005 average wages increased by 7 percent in West Germany and 18 
percent in East Germany. In this period wage inequality, measured by the ratio of the ninetieth 
to tenth percentile of the wage distribution, increased from 2.5 to 3.1 in West Germany and 
from 2.4 to 3.2 in East Germany. In West Germany rising wage inequality occurred mainly in 
the lower part of the wage distribution, whereas in East Germany wage inequality 
predominantly increased in the upper part of the wage distribution. In West Germany the 
group of workers with low tenure experienced higher increases in wage inequality compared 
to the group of workers with high tenure. 
Keywords: Wage Inequality, Skill Structure, Real Wages, Tenure. 
JEL-classification: J21, J24, J31 
Acknowledgements: Friedhelm Pfeiffer acknowledges financial support from the German 
Research Foundation under grants PF 331/2, PF 331/4 (“Microeconometric Methods to 
Assess Heterogeneous Returns to Education”) and PF 331/3 (“Wages, Rent-Sharing and 
Collective Wage Bargaining”). For helpful comments we would like to thank Denis Beninger, 
Bernhard Boockmann, Alfred Garloff, Blaise Melly, Grit Mühler, Reinhold Schnabel, 
participants at AIEL, EALE, EEA, ESPE and Verein für Socialpolitik conferences as well as 
two anonymous referees. For fine research assistance we thank Gunhild Berg, Philipp 
Eisenhauer and Tim Landvoigt. Remaining errors are ours. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The issue of rising wage inequality has attracted a considerable amount of research in 
international labour economics.2 For a long time rising wage inequality in Great Britain and 
the U.S. has been contrasted with a stable wage distribution in Europe and especially in 
Germany. The issue has been highlighted by Krugman (1994) who argued that rising wage 
inequality and low unemployment rates in the U.S. and rising unemployment combined with a 
stable wage distribution in Europe are the two sides of the same coin. It was suggested that 
the stability of the German wage distribution might reflect institutional factors such as social 
transfers, union bargaining power in the German system of central wage bargaining or the 
public educational expansion of the seventies. 
However, as a result of its strong trade orientation, Germany experienced an increase in the 
demand for high skilled workers and a decrease in the demand for the low skilled, which is a 
development common to most industrialized countries. Findings by Fitzenberger (1999), 
Franz and Steiner (2000) and Möller (2005) among others (compare the summary of studies 
on wage inequality in Germany in the appendix) suggest that wages in Germany have always 
been flexible to some degree. More specifically in the recent decades wages below the median 
seem to have experienced a higher dispersion and inequality increased in East Germany after 
unification. 
In this paper we analyse the evolution of wage inequality based on the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1984 to 2005. Our contribution to the literature on rising wage 
inequality is threefold: First, the paper provides evidence for the recent clear increase in wage 
inequality (the ratio of wages of high wage workers as measured by the ninetieth percentile of 
the wage distribution and low wage workers as measured by the tenth percentile of the wage 
distribution for all workers was 2.47 in 1994, 2.76 in 2000 and 3.08 in 2005 in West 
Germany) and discusses some possible explanations. Second, we separately investigate the 
evolution of wage inequality both for East and for West Germany in order to account for the 
different economic transition processes after unification. Third, based on the Juhn et al. 
(1993) decomposition method, the role of tenure, self-employment, education, nationality and 
gender for the rise in inequality in each part of Germany is analysed. To the best of our 
knowledge the relationship between tenure and rising inequality has not been investigated so 
far, although it seems to be central from an economic point of view. Point estimates of price 
                                                          
2 See Acemoglu (2002, 2003), Autor et al. (2005, 2008), Blau and Kahn (1996), DiNardo et al. (1996), 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Juhn et al. (1993), Katz and Autor (1999) and Prasad (2004), among others. 
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and composition effects are presented, together with confidence intervals. 
Still the majority of studies on wage inequality in Germany are based on various samples 
taken either from the two percent sample of the social pension fund register data (so called 
IABS) or from the SOEP. Both data have pros and cons which shall be sketched briefly.3 One 
advantage of the SOEP is that it includes all groups of workers (wage and self-employed 
workers as well as civil servants) and information on hours of work is available. One 
disadvantage is that the number of observations is low (compared to the IABS). Studies for 
specific groups of workers such as the top one percentile ones or physicians are not possible. 
Another concern is representativeness. For instance, successful or high wage worker 
information on hours and earnings may be missing more often (high wage workers may 
shrink away from specifying their earnings, successful workers may have higher opportunity 
costs from participation in a survey) which can result in an underestimation of inequality in 
the upper part of the wage distribution. 
One advantage of the IABS is that it is a large representative sample of dependent wage 
workers starting in 1975. One disadvantage is that hours of work are not available. Therefore 
studies based on the IABS focus on daily instead of hourly wages. This may result in an 
overestimation of wage inequality if hours of work become more dispersed over time. 
Another limitation is that periods as a self-employed worker or a civil servant are not 
available in the IABS, as a rule. In Germany about 20 percent of employed workers are either 
self-employed or civil servants. They are not obliged to join the social pension fund and 
therefore are not in the IABS data. It is beyond the scope of our paper to evaluate the pros and 
cons of these two or other data (such as the Structure of Earnings Surveys or the Taxpayer 
Panel) for the analysis of wage inequality. Nevertheless on occasion we will discuss 
similarities and differences taking samples from the SOEP that are alike the IABS. Keeping in 
mind the pros and cons of the SOEP mentioned above is helpful for comparison reasons.4 
Our measures of wage inequality are the ninetieth to tenth percentile of the real gross hourly 
wage, as well as its two sub-intervals, the ninetieth to fiftieth, and fiftieth to tenth percentile of 
                                                          
3 A detailed comparison is not intended here in order to save space. The interested reader may find more 
information on the IABS in Bender et al. (2000) and on the SOEP in Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). For 
further discussion of pros and cons compare Dustmann et al. (2009), Fitzenberger (1999) or Pfeiffer (2003), 
among others. 
4 Comparing results with national and international studies based on incomplete data can be exhausting. For 
example, in the U.S. wage inequality is higher (the ninetieth to tenth percentile of real gross hourly wage was 4.4 
in 2004), but remained stable between 1994 and 2004 (Mishel et al., 2006). In Spain inequality is also higher 
(3.6 in 2002), although it has been decreasing since 1995 (Izquierdo and Lacuesta, 2006). The role of data design 
for understanding international differences needs some more research, see also Part 2.4 below.  
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the wage distribution (see section 2.2 below). Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show the evolution of 
wages between 1984 and 2005 for West Germany and between 1994 and 2005 for East 
Germany, respectively. 
Figure 2.1: The Evolution of Real Wages at the 10th- 50th- and 90th-Percentile, West 
German Workers 1984-2005 
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Source: SOEP 1984-2005; own calculations based on cross-section weights; all wages for the three percentiles 
are normalized to 1 in 1984. Real wages at the tenth percentile increased from 5.77 € in 1984 over 7.48 € in 1994 
to 6.91 € in 2005 for all workers and from 7.48 € in 1984 over 9.37 € in 1994 to 9.03 € in 2005 for prime age 
dependent males. At the fiftieth percentile wages grew from 9.36 € in 1984 over 11.74 € in 1994 to 12.86 € in 
2005 for all workers and from 10.48 € in 1984 over 13.23 € in 1994 to 14.69 in 2005 for prime age males. At the 
ninetieth percentile wages increased from 14.97 € in 1984 over 18.45 € in 1994 to 21.25 € in 2005 for the full 
sample and from 16.04 € in 1984 over 19.77 € in 1994 to 22.67 € in 2005 for the prime age dependent males. 
 
Two samples of workers have been drawn from the SOEP, one comprising all workers 
including the self-employed, and one only for the group of prime age dependent male workers 
(age group 25 to 55; the latter can be compared more easily with results from the IABS; for 
more details see section 2.2). The findings suggest that wage inequality in Germany started to 
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increase after the economic downturn 1992/93.5 The significant rise in wage inequality in 
Germany is a phenomenon that seems not to be exclusive to specific groups of workers as for 
example the self-employed, women or foreigners. However, the increase in wage inequality 
was higher for workers with lower tenure compared to workers with higher tenure. Wages 
therefore seem to react more flexible for entrants and workers with low tenure compared to 
incumbent workers, which is in line with the literature on wage rigidity in Germany, see Franz 
and Pfeiffer (2005, 2006), among others. 
Between 1994 and 2005 the average hourly wage of prime age dependent male workers 
increased by 23.4 percent in East Germany and by 9.8 percent in West Germany. For this 
group, the ratio of the ninetieth to the tenth percentile of the wage distribution increased from 
2.3 to 2.9 in East Germany and from 2.1 to 2.5 in West Germany. With respect to West 
Germany, this implies a strong increase in inequality in a period with only very moderate 
average wage growth. Between 1984 and 1994 the wage distribution was stable even though 
average wage growth was 23.7 percent for prime age dependent males. 
Based on samples taken from the SOEP the evolution of wages and wage inequality in East 
Germany differs considerably from that in West Germany. During the transition process 
towards a market economy, mean wages as well as wage dispersion rose faster. In East 
Germany, rising inequality mainly concerns wages above the median wage, while in West 
Germany dispersion forces were stronger below the median. This is in line with an 
explanation that rising wage inequality in East Germany to a greater extent results from firm 
competition for (high) qualified workers who else might migrate to West Germany. Wage 
inequality in West Germany seems to be, to a greater extent, the result from an increased 
supply of low wage workers. This is a careful interpretation from the findings based on the 
SOEP. Clearly more research is needed that should be directed to assess recent wage 
dynamics with better data especially for the top deciles of the wage distribution. 
                                                          
5 After the unification boom the German economy experienced a severe recession with employment losses in the 
private sector of 1.97 percent in 1992/93, 1.56 percent in 1993/94 and 1 percent in 1994/95 (Pfeiffer (2003) 
based upon “DIW Vierteljährliche Gesamtrechnung”). 
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Figure 2.2: The Evolution of Real Wages at the 10th- 50th- and 90th-Percentile, East 
German Workers 1994-2005 
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Source: SOEP 1994-2005; own calculations based on cross-section weights; all wages for the three percentiles 
are normalized to 1 in 1994. Real wages at the tenth percentile was 5.31 € in 1994 and in 2005 for all workers 
and increased from 5.74 € in 1994 to 6.01 € in 2005 for prime age dependent males. At the fiftieth percentile 
wages grew from 8.38 € in 1994 to 9.56 € in 2005 for all workers and from 8.58 € in 1994 to 9.88 in 2005 for 
prime age males. At the ninetieth percentile wages increased from 12.75 € in 1994 to 17.00 € in 2005 for the full 
sample and from 12.99 € in 1994 to 17.62 € in 2005 for the prime age dependent males. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the samples taken from the 
SOEP, undertakes some comparisons with the Quarterly Wage Survey of the German Federal 
Statistical Office and introduces to major changes in the structure of the German workforce. 
Section 2.3 discusses the evolution of wages and wage inequality while section 2.4 focuses on 
the findings from the decomposition of wage changes. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Data and Changes in the Structure of the German Workforce 
Two samples were drawn from the 22 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 
see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005) 1984 to 2005, both separately for West and for East 
Germany. First, a full sample was taken containing all workers aged 16 to 65 years including 
the self-employed. All observations with missing information on at least one variable of 
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interest were dropped. The variable real gross hourly wage is obtained for all workers 
including the self-employed by calculating the ratio of last months’ salary and hours worked. 
All wages are deflated with the Consumer Price Index for Germany (base year 2000, source: 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). Hourly wages are trimmed at the two percent highest and 
lowest observations to reduce the risk of measurement error from extreme values. Further 
issues in reported hours for measured wage inequality are discussed in section 2.4 below. 
With this sample the evolution of wage inequality in Germany is analysed based on all 
individuals participating in the workforce, including women, part-time workers and the self-
employed. 
Second, a restricted sample was drawn containing only prime age dependent male workers, at 
the age between 25 and 55 years (about 45 percent of the full sample). Table 2.A2 in the 
appendix contains detailed summary statistics on wages, hours and earnings for the chosen 
samples for West Germany, and Table 2.A3 for East Germany. This restricted sample is 
chosen to facilitate comparisons with previous studies which concentrate on the populations 
of dependent workers who are part of the German system of social pension fund (for instance 
Dustmann et al., 2009; Kohn, 2006; Möller, 2000, 2005). Furthermore we would like to 
answer the question whether rising wage inequality is also prevalent in the group of workers 
with the highest commitment to the labour market which are prime age dependent males. For 
those (see Table 2.A2), average hourly wages in West Germany were 11.27 € in 1984 
(compared to 10.00 € in sample one), 13.94 € in 1994 (12.38 € in sample one) and 15.31 € in 
2005 (13.61 € in sample one). Weekly hours worked were 43.45 in 1984 (40.53 in sample 
one), 42.15 in 1994 (38.80 in sample one) and 43.20 in 2005 (37.41 in sample one). 
A comparison of our results based on the SOEP with the Quarterly Wage Survey of the 
German Federal Statistical Office (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 1995, 2006) reveals similar 
trends in wage inequality. The Quarterly Wage Survey contains average wages for blue-collar 
unskilled workers and blue-collar skilled workers and wages for white-collar skilled and 
unskilled workers from manufacturing. Between 1994 and 2004 the wage gap of male blue-
collar skilled and unskilled workers increased from 26.5 percent in 1994 to 33.3 percent in 
2004 in West Germany and from 19.5 percent to 29.4 percent in East Germany, confirming 
rising wage inequality. Furthermore, the wage gap of male white-collar skilled and unskilled 
workers increased from 53.5 percent in 1994 to 62.6 percent in 2004 in West Germany and 
from 40.2 percent to 63.6 percent in East Germany. 
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In the subsequent econometric analysis (section 2.4 below) it is necessary to estimate wages 
as a function of educational qualification, tenure, potential experience, sex (female), self-
employment and nationality (foreigner) of workers. The evolution of these variables reflects 
changes in the socio-economic composition of the German workforce. In West Germany the 
share of highly educated workers6 doubled between 1984 and 2005. Prime age dependent 
male workers are better educated compared to workers in the full sample. In both samples, the 
average duration of years of schooling increased by about 1 year (to 12.30 years in sample 
one and to 12.35 in the sample of prime age dependent males in 2005). 
Female participation increased from 37 to 47 percent, while the share of foreigners fluctuates 
around 8 percent. About 6 percent of the workers in the overall sample are self-employed.7 
Self-employment has been rising continously since 1994. The share of people whose tenure is 
seven years (the median) or longer (“high tenure”) decreased in the sample of prime age 
dependent West German males from 64 percent in 1984 to 58 percent in 2005. In this sample 
the average years of tenure was 11.46 in 1984 and 11.77 in 2005. For workers with high 
tenure, average wages increased by 42 percent between 1984 and 2005 (1984: 11.57 €, 1994: 
14.61 €, 2005: 16.43 €), while for workers with low tenure, average wages increased by 28 
percent between 1984 and 2005 (1984: 10.73 €, 1994: 12.88 €, 2005: 13.74 €). 
In East Germany average wages in 2005 amount to 77 percent (71 percent in 1994) of average 
wages in West Germany in sample one and to 72 percent (64 percent in 1994) in the sample 
of prime age dependent male workers.8 East German prime age dependent males work on 
average 1.4 hours more than West Germans, while in the sample of all workers the difference 
is 3.8 hours in 2005. Compared to West Germany there are more workers with high 
education. Female participation rates are higher, although the West German ones are 
converging to East German levels. The share of foreigners in East Germany does not exceed 
one percent. 
There was a continuous rise in the share of self-employed workers (3.68 percent in 1994, 7.09 
percent in 2005) after the transition to a market economy and the permission of private 
enterprises in East Germany. The share of individuals with high tenure increased by about 50 
percent in the sample of prime age dependent males (1994: 26 percent; 2005: 37 percent). Not 
                                                          
6 These are workers with a degree from a technical college or university. 
7 Shares for weighted data with cross sectional weights. 
8 In sample one, average wages in East Germany (West Germany) amount to 8.82 € (12.38 €) in 1994 and to 
10.52 € (13.61 €) in 2005. For prime age dependent males average wages amount to 8.96 € (13.94 €) in 1994 and 
to 11.06 € (15.31 €) in 2005 in East Germany (West Germany), see Table 2.A2 and 2.A3 in the appendix. 
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surprisingly the average number of tenure (9.90 for the full sample in 2005) is still lower 
compared to West Germany. The ratio of the officially registered unemployed in the 
workforce9 increased from 15.7 percent in 1994 to 20.6 percent in 2005 in East Germany and 
from 9.1 percent in 1984 and 1994 to 11.0 percent in 2005 in West Germany. 
2.3 The Evolution of Wage Inequality 
West Germany 1984, 1994, 2005 
This section presents the evidence on the development of wage inequality in the SOEP 
samples for West Germany. Table 2.1 displays the central measure for wage inequality, the 
ratio of the ninetieth to tenth percentile in the wage distribution. In the sample of all workers 
the measure of inequality first decreased from 2.59 in 1984 to 2.47 in 1994, indicating a 
moderate wage compression, and than increased to 3.08 in 2005, indicating rising inequality. 
According to the 95 percent confidence interval this difference is significant (Table 2.1, in 
brackets). 
Wage inequality is lower in the sample of prime age dependent male workers and for 
foreigners, although the increase in wage inequality is also present in those subgroups. The 
ninetieth to tenth percentile in the group of prime age dependent male workers was 2.11 in 
1994 and 2.51 in 2005. To compare the basic finding of rising wage inequality in the group of 
dependent male workers from the SOEP with results from Kohn (2006) based on the IABS 
the eightieth to twentieth wage percentile was calculated. Between 1992 and 2001 this ratio 
increased by 5 log points, in this SOEP sample. According to Kohn (2006) in this period the 
eightieth to twentieth wage percentile of daily wages increased by 9 log points. As argued 
above (see the introduction) the comparison suggests that the finding based on the SOEP may 
underestimate the rise in wage inequality. The increase might have been 9 instead of 5 log 
points. However, one needs to keep in mind that the IABS findings refer to daily and not 
hourly wages. According to the SOEP data in that period the dispersion (standard deviation) 
of hours of work increased from 7.19 (1992) to 7.71 (2001), with a slight rise in the mean 
(42.58; 43.17) (see Table 2.A2). Therefore, the IABS may overestimate the rise in (hourly) 
wage inequality (while the SOEP may underestimate it). 
Wage inequality is highest for the self-employed, but the numbers do not indicate a clear 
                                                          
9 Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), unemployment rate for dependent employed civil workers. 
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trend in the period under investigation. Wage inequality is significantly lower for workers 
with seven or more years of tenure (see “high tenure” in Table 2.1). For the group of workers 
with “low tenure” the tendency of rising wage inequality since 1994 is strongest. 
Table 2.1: Wage Inequality in West Germany: 90th to 10th Wage Percentiles 
 All Worker Prime Age Dependent Male Worker 
 1984 1994 2005 1984 1994 2005 
All 2.59 
(2.52 – 2.67) 
N=4,772 
2.47 
(2.39 – 2.54) 
N=3,913 
3.08 
(3.00 – 3.15) 
N=5,522 
2.14 
(2.07 – 2.22) 
N=2,322 
2.11 
(2.04 – 2.18) 
N=1,797 
2.51 
(2.42 – 2.60) 
N=2,298 
Females 2.46 
(2.32 – 2.60) 
N=1,752 
2.37 
(2.28 – 2.45) 
N=1,619 
3.16 
(3.03 – 3.30) 
N=2,576 
. . . 
Foreigners 2.13 
(2.03 – 2.23) 
N=1,306 
2.07 
(1.95 – 2.19) 
N=860 
2.92 
(2.60 – 3.23) 
N=554 
1.74 
(1.64 – 1.85) 
N=652 
1.83 
(1.71 – 1.95) 
N=399 
2.28 
(2.20 – 2.95) 
N=253 
Self-employed 5.25 
(4.51 – 5.99) 
N=223 
3.63 
(3.21 – 4.06) 
N=182 
4.28 
(3.65 – 4.92) 
N=338 
. . . 
       
High tenure 2.39 
(2.29 – 2.48) 
N=2,625 
2.26 
(2.16 – 2.36) 
N=2,051 
2.60 
(2.50 – 2.71) 
N=3,009 
2.07 
(2.00 – 2.14) 
N=1,506 
1.99 
(1.92 – 2.05) 
N=1,099 
2.25 
(2.15 – 2.35) 
N=1,344 
Low tenure 2.57 
(2.48 – 2.66) 
N=2,147 
2.46 
(2.33 – 2.58) 
N=1,862 
3.32 
(3.16 – 3.47) 
N=2,513 
2.13 
(2.02 – 2.25) 
N=816 
2.18 
(2.06 – 2.29) 
N=698 
2.86 
(2.69 – 3.03) 
N=954 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2005, see text; in brackets: 95% bootstrapped confidence interval with 1,000 
replications, N= number of observations; own calculations. 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the wage distributions for workers in the overall and in the restricted 
samples for the years 1984, 1994 and 2005. For 1984 and, to some degree, for 1994 the 
figures indicate the well-known compressed distribution of German wages which is skewed to 
the right and shaped like a log-normal distribution. The 2005 figure, however, shows more 
dispersion and symmetry. Apparently, compared to 1994, a higher share of workers receives 
both very low and also relatively high wages. 
A comparison between twenty percentiles of the wage distribution for 1994 and 2005 in the 
full sample (Figure 2.4) reveals that real wages below the twenty-fifth percentile decreased, 
and that wages above the median grew at roughly similar rates. This suggests that the rise in 
inequality has been stronger below the median, which is in line with findings from Kohn 
(2006) and Möller (2005). In the group of prime age dependent male workers real wages 
below the twentieth percentile decreased (see Figure 2.4) while the rise was highest for the 
top percentile. For self-employed workers wage growth was more diverse at all percentiles. 
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Foreigners experienced a rise in inequality which confirms the findings of Riphahn (2003). 
Figure 2.3: The Distribution of Wages in West Germany 1984, 1994, 2005 
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Source: SOEP 1984-2005 (for the samples see chapter 2.2); weighted data; based on kernel density estimation; 
own calculation. 
 
Figure 2.4: Wage Growth by Percentile, West Germany 1994-2005 
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 L
og
 R
ea
l W
ag
e
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
All Workers
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 L
og
 R
ea
l W
ag
e
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile
Prime Age Dependent Male Workers
 
Source: SOEP 1994-2005 (for the samples see chapter 2.2); weighted data; own calculation. 
 
Interestingly, however, wage growth for workers with low and high tenure differs to a higher 
degree. Between 1994 and 2005 wage growth for the “high tenure” group of workers exceeds 
growth rates for the “low tenure” group in all percentiles below the seventieth percentile of 
the wage distribution and in the subgroup for prime age dependent males in all percentiles, 
Figure 2.5. 
1984 
1994 1994 
2005 
2005 
1984 
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Figure 2.5: Wage Growth by Percentile, High vs. Low Tenure, West Germany 1994-
2005 
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Source: SOEP 1994-2005; weighted data; own calculations. 
 
The differences are significant. There is no percentile with a wage decrease for the “high 
tenure” group of prime age dependent males. In comparison, real wages of workers with low 
tenure decreased below the fortieth percentile of the wage distribution. According to these 
results tenure seems to be an important dimension of wage inequality and wage flexibility. 
Wage growth in the group of workers with low tenure shows more inequality and dispersion 
compared to the “high tenure” group. These results suggest that the adjustment of wages to 
labour market conditions primarily takes place among entrants to the labour market. In the 
group of workers with high tenure, adjustment to market conditions for labour mainly takes 
place through reduction of employment or hours of work, not primarily through wage cuts. 
East Germany 1994, 2005 
This section reports our results on the evolution of wages and wage inequality in East 
Germany. To allow a direct comparison with the findings on West Germany, the period of 
observation is 1994 to 2005. Figure 2.6 illustrates the evolution of wages in East Germany for 
the whole wage distributions and Figure 2.7 shows the wage growth for twenty percentiles. 
Rising wage inequality is present and concentrated to some extent in the upper tail of the 
wage distribution. 
low tenure 
high tenure high tenure 
low tenure 
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Figure 2.6: The Distribution of Wages in East Germany, 1994, 2005 
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Source: SOEP 1994-2005 (for the samples see chapter 2.2); weighted data; based on kernel density estimation; 
own calculation. 
 
Figure 2.7: Wage Growth by Percentile, East Germany 
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Source: SOEP 1994-2005 (for the samples see chapter 2.2); weighted data; own calculation. 
 
Table 2.2 reports wage inequality as measured by the ninetieth to tenth percentile for the 
different samples and subgroups of workers (females, self-employed, low and high tenure), 
including 95 percent confidence intervals. In the first sample, the ninetieth to tenth percentile 
was 2.40 in 1994 and 3.20 in 2005. The 95 percent confidence intervals do not overlap, 
indicating rising wage inequality. 
For males and females the increase in wage inequality is rather similar. As in West Germany, 
wage inequality is highest among the self-employed. Along the tenure dimension results differ 
in East and West Germany. In East Germany inequality is similar in the “high tenure” and 
“low tenure” groups. Tenure is still lower in East Germany, since firm foundation emerged 
2005 
1994 1994 
2005 
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after unification, only 14 years ago. Firms are smaller in East Germany and smaller firms 
show a higher degree of employment volatility and a lower inclination in central wage 
bargaining (see Pfeiffer, 2003). This may explain why the tenure differences found for West 
Germany are not yet visible in the East German samples. 
Table 2.2: Wage Inequality in East Germany: 90th to 10th Wage Percentiles 
 All Workers Prime Age Dependent Male Workers 
 1984 1994 2005 1984 1994 2005 
All . 2.40 
(2.32 – 2.48) 
N=1,710 
3.20 
(3.07 – 3.34) 
N=1,820 
. 2.26 
(2.15 – 2.38) 
N=797 
2.93 
(2.73 – 3.14) 
N=698 
Females . 2.42 
(2.30 – 2.53) 
N=769 
3.04 
(2.83 – 3.26) 
N=886 
. . . 
Self-employed . 4.79 
(n.a.) 
N=63 
4.42 
(3.78 – 5.06) 
N=129 
. . . 
       
High tenure . 2.24 
(2.10 – 2.37) 
N=596 
3.10 
(2.90 – 3.29) 
N=1,025 
. 2.21 
(2.02 – 2.40) 
N=285 
2.90 
(2.64 – 3.16) 
N=386 
Low tenure . 2.40 
(2.29 – 2.52) 
N=1,114 
2.91 
(2.74 – 3.08) 
N=795 
. 2.27 
(2.12 – 2.43) 
N=512 
2.70 
(2.45- 2.96) 
N=312 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1994-2005, see text; in brackets: 95% confidence interval, calculated by 
bootstrapping (1,000 replications), N= number of observations, own calculations. Since the share of foreigners is 
very low in this sample, they are excluded in the table. 
 
2.4 Findings from Decomposition 
This section presents the findings from a decomposition analysis based on the method 
introduced by Juhn et al. (1993). Changes in wage inequality are decomposed into changes in 
prices for observable characteristics (in our study: age, tenure, educational qualification, sex, 
self-employment and foreigner), changes in the composition of the workforce concerning 
these variables over time and unobserved or residual wage inequality. For this purpose, linear 
wage equations are estimated with the SOEP. The estimated coefficients are interpreted as 
returns to the observable variables, and changes in the observables over time are interpreted as 
changes in the composition of the workforce. In real data the counterfactual decomposition 
results do not need to add up to one. Therefore the residual component is calculated as the 
difference between the observed percentage change in wage inequality and the estimated price 
and quantity components from the wage equation. To obtain reasonable results for this 
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decomposition analysis the error term has to be independent and normally distributed.10 
Growing residual wage inequality might result from increasing inequality in the distribution 
of unobserved skills. For instance in the U.S. a rise in the variances of wages occurred 
primarily for high educated workers (Lemieux, 2006). Unlike the U.S., in the West German 
sample from the SOEP the variance of real wages increased in all education groups, from 
10.15 in 1994 to 20.82 in 2004 for individuals with the lowest educational degree and from 
25.92 to 35.53 for individuals with a degree from a (technical) university. 
Increasing residual wage inequality might also result from growing measurement errors in the 
hours of work available in the data. For instance, recent studies by Autor et al. (2005) and 
Lemieux (2006) indicate a different quality of hours and wage information in different U.S. 
surveys. The IABS contains no information on hours worked and daily earning might be an 
incomplete or misleading measure of wages (see section 2.2 above). In the SOEP data wages 
are calculated as the ratio of self-reported monthly earnings and hours worked. Self-reported 
hours of work may contain errors. One question then is whether these errors changed over 
time. The standard deviation of hours of work in the sample of West German prime age 
dependent male workers increased from 7.4 in 1984 to 7.7 in 2005 (see Table 2.A2 in the 
appendix), while the standard deviation of monthly earning strongly increased. The findings 
from official wage statistics and from this study therefore indicate that the rise in wage 
inequality is not just the result of a rise in the error of reported hours of work. 
We try to confirm the argument with a simulation exercise. In this exercise a normal error 
with a continuously rising standard deviation was added to the reported hours of work in the 
sample from 1984 and the corresponding wage inequality was calculated. To increase the 
ratio of the ninetieth to the tenth wage percentile from 2 in 1994 to 2.5 (the value in 2005) the 
standard deviation of the hours (actual plus simulated error) has to increase to 11. Compared 
to this huge increase in the variation of hours, a rise to 7.7 (the value from the sample 2005) 
had only a minor impact on the ratio of ninetieth to tenth wage percentile. 
In order to get a reasonable empirical wage equation non-linearities are allowed for. Tenure is 
divided into thirteen11, potential experience into seventeen categories12. All wage equations 
                                                          
10 If the location model is inappropriate the decomposition can produce misleading results. For alternatives to 
this approach, like the quantile decomposition methods see Dustman et al. (2009), Kohn (2006), Machado and 
Mata (2005), Melly (2006) or for a kernel reweighting approach see DiNardo et al. (1996), among others. For 
quantile decomposition methods number of observations needs to be appropriate. 
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have been estimated separately for East and West Germany, for the full sample and the 
restricted sample of prime age dependent male workers as well as for various subgroups, for 
example workers with low and high tenure.13 The following discussion of the empirical 
findings concentrates on the ninetieth to tenth wage differentials as well as its two sub-groups, 
the ninetieth to fiftieth and the fiftieth to tenth differentials. 
West Germany 1984, 1994, 2005 
The decomposition confirms findings on wage inequality from section 2.3 and may be helpful 
in clarifying the role of some explanatory factors for rising wage inequality. Table 2.3 
summarizes the findings for the full sample and the restricted sample of prime age dependent 
male workers. To read Table 2.3, look, for example, at its first row: The wage dispersion 
between the ninetieth and the tenth percentile (column one) decreased in total (column two) 
by 0.050 log points or 4.88 percent ( 88.4100)1( 05.0 −=∗−−e ). The total wage growth is 
decomposed into a quantity effect (column 3), a price effect (column 4) and a residual effect 
(column 5). 
The findings can be summarized as follows: 
• Even though wage inequality increased significantly over the whole period, the increase 
was concentrated on the period between 1994 and 2005. For the period between 1984 and 
1994 our findings confirm the stability of the German wage distribution. 
• In the full sample of workers there is an asymmetry in the increase of wage inequality 
between 1994 and 2005: Wage inequality increased somewhat in the upper part of the 
wage distribution. The total increase in the ninetieth to fiftieth percentile was 0.050 log 
points. Compared to that the increase is quantitatively more pronounced in the lower part 
of the wage distribution. The total increase in the fiftieth to tenth percentile that is in the 
lower part of the wage distribution was 0.171 log points. These results are in line with 
findings by Möller (2005) for West Germany, based on the IABS 1984 to 2001. 
• In the period of stability, the decade 1984 to 1994, composition effects alone would have 
caused increasing wage inequality while in total wage inequality decreases. So price and 
composition forces seem to have worked in the opposite direction. In the period of rising 
inequality, the decade 1994 to 2005, the estimated composition effects have been 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 The groups range from 0-3 years over 3-6 years to 33-36 years, the group with highest duration are those 
employees who stayed with the same employer for more than 36 years. 
12 The groups range from 0-3 years over 3-6 years to 45-48 years, the highest group is “more than 48 years”. 
13 All wage equations are available from the authors upon request. 
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responsible for moderate changes in the evolution of wages in the sample of prime age 
dependent males. Price effects dominate. Price changes for observed characteristics 
explain one quarter to one third of overall rising inequality. 
• For prime age males with low tenure prices have the highest influence for changes 
between the 90th and 10th and above the median. 
• Results differ between the full sample of all workers, including the self-employed and 
women, and the restricted sample of prime age dependent male workers. However, these 
differences are moderate. There was slightly less wage dispersion in the period between 
1994 and 2005 in the sample of prime age dependent male workers. For woman in the 
overall sample composite and price effects are quantitatively similar, while price effects 
are more important in the sample of male dependent worker (assessed by the point 
estimates). 
• According to Kohn (2006) the increase in wage inequality below the median (between 
1992 and 2001) is predominantly concentrated among women. In our analysis this is not 
the case. Even if we restrict our observation period from 1992 to 2001 and estimate the 
wage equation separately for women and men, increasing wage inequality is concentrated 
below the median for males and females (results available upon request). 
• According to the best of our knowledge confidence intervals are not reported for others 
decompositions studies for Germany. The reported confidence intervals suggest that the 
distinction between price, composition and residual effects has a moderate degree of 
statistical explanation power. One reason for the moderate precision is presumably the 
relatively low number of observations in the SOEP. 
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Table 2.3: Decomposition Results for West Germany 
All Workers 
Differential Total Composition Prices Unobserved 
1984-1994 (base year 1984) 
90-10 -0.050 
(-0.093 – -0.006) 
0.020 
(-0.012 – 0.058) 
-0.043 
(-0.074 – -0.016) 
-0.027 
(-0.053 – -0.002) 
90-50 -0.018 
(-0.036 – 0.000) 
0.037 
(0.012 – 0.066) 
-0.033 
(-0.059 – -0.011) 
-0.022 
(-0.037 – -0.008) 
50-10 -0.032 
(-0.072 – 0.009) 
-0.017 
(-0.046 – 0.014) 
-0.010 
(-0.029 – 0.009) 
-0.005 
(-0.022 – 0.012) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994) 
90-10 0.221 
(0.181 – 0.261) 
0.018 
(-0.009 – 0.046) 
0.060 
(0.032 – 0.087) 
0.143 
(0.115 – 0.170) 
90-50 0.050 
(0.027 – 0.073) 
-0.025 
(-0.047 – -0.003) 
0.017 
(-0.004 – 0.038) 
0.058 
(0.040 – 0.076) 
50-10 0.171 
(0.135 – 0.207) 
0.043 
(0.018 – 0.069) 
0.043 
(0.024 – 0.062) 
0.085 
(0.064 – 0.106) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994), only females 
90-10 0.286 
(0.230 – 0.341) 
0.053 
(0.010 – 0.095) 
0.066 
(0.022 – 0.112) 
0.167 
(0.120 – 0.212) 
90-50 0.098 
(0.057 – 0.139) 
0.014 
(-0.023 – 0.051) 
0.026 
(-0.011 – 0.065) 
0.058 
(0.033 – 0.080) 
50-10 0.188 
(0.146 – 0.229) 
0.038 
(0.006 – 0.070) 
0.040 
(0.013 – 0.067) 
0.109 
(0.073 – 0.146) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994), only foreigners 
90-10 0.342 
(0.221 – 0.463) 
0.036 
(-0.029 – 0.102) 
0.150 
(0.060 – 0.238) 
0.156 
(0.068 – 0.246) 
90-50 0.132 
(0.068 – 0.196) 
0.030 
(-0.026 – 0.086) 
0.045 
(-0.026 – 0.116) 
0.057 
(0.017 – 0.098) 
50-10 0.210 
(0.103 – 0.317) 
0.006 
(-0.058 – 0.070) 
0.105 
(0.039 – 0.169) 
0.099 
(0.024 – 0.175) 
     
Prime Age Dependent Male Workers 
Differential Total Composition Prices Unobserved 
1984-1994 (base year 1984) 
90-10 -0.016 
(-0.067 – 0.034) 
0.030 
(-0.007 – 0.067) 
-0.022 
(-0.055 – 0.014) 
-0.024 
(-0.054 – 0.003) 
90-50 -0.025 
(-0.064 – 0.013) 
0.015 
(-0.019 – 0.050) 
-0.021 
(-0.050 – 0.011) 
-0.019 
(-0.040 – -0.001) 
50-10 0.009 
(-0.026 – 0.043) 
0.015 
(-0.014 – 0.044) 
-0.001 
(-0.022 – 0.020) 
-0.005 
(-0.024 – 0.015) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994) 
90-10 0.173 
(0.123 – 0.224) 
-0.014 
(-0.049 – 0.021) 
0.080 
(0.038 – 0.120) 
0.107 
(0.076 – 0.140) 
90-50 0.031 
(-0.010 – 0.073) 
-0.016 
(-0.049 – 0.017) 
0.016 
(-0.013 – 0.045) 
0.031 
(0.011 – 0.051) 
50-10 0.142 
(0.103 – 0.181) 
0.002 
(-0.024 – 0.028) 
0.064 
(0.035 – 0.091) 
0.076 
(0.048 – 0.106) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994), only “low tenure” 
90-10 0.273 
(0.194 – 0.351) 
0.038 
(-0.015 – 0.090) 
0.118 
(0.048 – 0.188) 
0.117 
(0.060 – 0.174) 
90-50 0.074 
(0.016 – 0.131) 
-0.003 
(-0.050 – 0.048) 
0.056 
(-0.004 – 0.109) 
0.021 
(-0.008 – 0.052) 
50-10 0.199 
(0.141 – 0.258) 
0.041 
(-0.006 – 0.083) 
0.063 
(0.020 – 0.110) 
0.095 
(0.048 – 0.143) 
Source: SOEP 1984-2005 (for the samples see chapter 2.2); Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition method; in 
brackets: 95% confidence interval; calculated by bootstrapping (1,000 replications); own calculations. 
 
A comparison with studies based on the IABS that use quantile decomposition techniques 
 32
may be helpful here. For instance, according to Dustmann et al. (2009) changes in the 
composition of the workforce can explain 40 percent of the increase in wage inequality in the 
upper part of the wage distribution (that is between the eighty-fifth percentile and the median) 
and 15 percent in the lower part of the wage distribution (that is between the median and 
fifteenth percentile). 
Based on the SOEP our study indicates significant rising wage inequality, thus adding to the 
evidence that the increased wage dispersion in Germany is not a spurious empirical effect. 
The findings are in line with evidence from recent studies based on larger samples of German 
register data for dependent workers, although there are some qualifications. Increasing wage 
inequality in West Germany seems to be neither the result of rising participation of women or 
self-employment workers nor of changes in the share of foreigners. In addition we find that a 
larger part of the rise in inequality occurred in the group of workers with low tenure which 
has not been reported so far for Germany (confirming however findings from Spain, Izquierdo 
and Lacuesta, 2006). This result is in line with empirical research on downward wage rigidity 
in recessions. In Germany incumbent workers enjoy a higher degree of protection against 
wage competition. Adjustment takes place to a greater extent through reductions in hours and 
labour while wage reductions more often occur in the group of entrants and workers with low 
tenure (see Fehr and Götte, 2005; Kaiser and Pfeiffer, 2001; Pfeiffer, 2003; among others). 
East Germany 1994, 2005 
Which factors account for rising wage inequality in East Germany? Are there differences 
between East and West Germany? The results of the decomposition (see Table 2.4) can be 
summarized as follows: 
• The overall measure (ninetieth to tenth differential) indicates a slightly stronger rise in 
wage inequality in the sample of East compared to West German workers, Table 2.4, 
which is in line with Kohn (2006). This is a consequence of the transition from a socialist 
to a market economy after unification. The process of adjustment and convergence to the 
West German wage distribution is still not complete, and its consequences for the 
evolution of wage inequality are still unfolding (see also Franz and Steiner, 2000). 
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Table 2.4: Decomposition Results for East Germany 1994-2005 
All Workers 
Differential Total Composition Prices Unobserved 
1994-2005 (base year 1994) 
90-10 0.288 
(0.236 – 0.340) 
0.016 
(-0.022 – 0.054) 
0.105 
(0.054 – 0.155) 
0.167 
(0.125 – 0.210) 
90-50 0.155 
(0.109 – 0.202) 
0.006 
(-0.029 – 0.043) 
0.079 
(0.036 – 0.120) 
0.071 
(0.041 – 0.100) 
50-10 0.132 
(0.089 – 0.176) 
0.010 
(-0.027 – 0.045) 
0.027 
(-0.007 – 0.060) 
0.096 
(0.068 – 0.126) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994), only females 
90-10 0.230 
(0.145 – 0.314) 
0.017 
(-0.042 – 0.087) 
0.084 
(0.002 – 0.159) 
0.129 
(0.064 – 0.189) 
90-50 0.107 
(0.027 – 0.187) 
0.032 
(-0.022 – 0.100) 
0.043 
(-0.030 – 0.107) 
0.031 
(-0.016 – 0.075) 
50-10 0.123 
(0.054 – 0.192) 
-0.015 
(-0.073 – 0.040) 
0.040 
(-0.016 – 0.100) 
0.095 
(0.052 – 0.143) 
     
Prime Age Dependent Male Workers 
Differential Total Composition Prices Unobserved 
1994-2005 (base year 1994) 
90-10 0.259 
(0.175 – 0.343) 
-0.010 
(-0.060 – 0.038) 
0.189 
(0.112 – 0.265) 
0.080 
(0.020 – 0.144) 
90-50 0.165 
(0.097 – 0.233) 
-0.023 
(-0.073 – 0.027) 
0.158 
(0.095 – 0.219) 
0.030 
(-0.006 – 0.067) 
50-10 0.094 
(0.026 – 0.163) 
0.014 
(-0.036 – 0.060) 
0.031 
(-0.022 – 0.084) 
0.050 
(0.006 – 0.097) 
1994-2005 (base year 1994), only “low tenure” 
90-10 0.174 
(0.057 – 0.291) 
0.004 
(-0.072 – 0.081) 
0.149 
(0.044 – 0.254) 
0.021 
(-0.063 – 0.105) 
90-50 0.103 
(0.010 – 0.195) 
-0.038 
(-0.118 – 0.041) 
0.136 
(0.044 – 0.224) 
0.005 
(-0.046 – 0.059) 
50-10 0.071 
(-0.014 – 0.156) 
0.042 
(-0.028 – 0.112) 
0.013 
(-0.057 – 0.087) 
0.016 
(-0.053 – 0.081) 
Source: SOEP 1994-2005 (for the selection of samples see chapter 2.2); since the share of foreigners is very low 
in this sample, they are excluded in the table; in brackets: 95% confidence interval, calculated by bootstrapping 
(1,000 replications); own calculations. 
 
• In contrast to West Germany a large part of rising inequality occurred in the upper tail of 
the wage distribution, 54 in comparison to 23 percent in West Germany (for the full 
sample). The total increase in the ninetieth to fiftieth percentile of the wage distribution 
for prime age dependent males was 0.165 log points; the total increase in the fiftieth to 
tenth percentile of the wage distribution was 0.094 log points. 
• Composition effects seem to be of minor importance in the East German samples with the 
exception of the lower part of the distribution for prime age dependent males. Price 
effects are significant especially in the upper part of the wage distribution (assessed by 
point estimates). For prime age dependent male workers decomposition results suggest 
that price effects are quantitatively more important than residual effects. 
• The differences in wage inequality between tenure groups are less pronounced in East 
compared to West Germany. 
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• Again the reported confidence intervals suggest that the distinction between price, 
composition and residual effects has a moderate degree of statistical explanation power. 
One economic explanation for the finding that there is no tenure difference in the East 
German data and a strong tenure difference in the West German data is the competition for 
high wage workers between both German regions. This competition together with the well 
known mobility of high wage workers (especially from East to West Germany) contributed to 
wage dynamics and inequality in the upper part of the wage distribution in East Germany. The 
relatively higher degree of rising wage inequality in East compared to West Germany seems 
to be due to a higher extent of wage inequality in the upper part of the wage distribution in 
East Germany. Interestingly the pattern of wage inequality in East Germany after unification 
has some similarities with the period of rising wage inequality in the U.S. that started after the 
computer revolution in the seventies (see Juhn et al., 1993). 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on international trends in wage inequality. Based 
on the SOEP from 1984 to 2005 the evolution of wage inequality is investigated separately for 
East and West Germany. Despite the strong trade orientation of the German economy and 
rising wage inequality abroad, the German wage distribution was fairly stable for a long time. 
However, our findings, based on the SOEP data, hint at rising wage inequality which started 
after the economic downturn 1992/93 in both parts of Germany. 
The recent significant increase in wage inequality in Germany, measured with the SOEP, 
seems to be a robust phenomenon, unrelated to specific groups of workers, for example the 
self-employed, women or foreigners, although there is a need for differentiation. Our 
decomposition results indicate that price effects are more important for East compared to 
West German workers, assessed by the point estimates. Rising wage inequality in East 
Germany seems to be quantitatively more pronounced among high wage workers and in West 
Germany among workers with low tenure. In times of high unemployment firms’ adjustment 
takes place primarily through reductions of employment and hours of work. Competition 
through high unemployment in West Germany seems to have had a stronger impact on wage 
inequality among entrants and workers with low tenure. In East Germany rising inequality 
seems to be due to a higher extent of wage inequality for high wage workers, which 
presumably is a result of competition for (highly) qualified workers who otherwise migrate to 
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West Germany. 
Prominent additional explanations in the literature on rising wage inequality refer to the non-
neutral nature of technical change, a rising demand for cognitive, non-routine abilities, to 
world-wide factor competition, decreasing social transfers and union power (German unions 
lost 2.8 million of their members between 1994 and 2004), changes in unobserved skills and 
rising inequality in abilities resulting from the German educational system of early tracking. 
The computer revolution fostered general education and analytical and cognitive non-routine 
skills while vocational education and non-cognitive manual and routine skills lost ground.  
Future research could be directed more specifically to these different explanations and reasons 
for the evolution of wages and inequality in Germany. In addition more research is needed to 
assess recent wage dynamics with better data especially for the top deciles of the wage 
distribution. Since residual wage changes account for two thirds of the rise in wage inequality 
in West Germany, future research is needed with improved information on hitherto not 
observed characteristics. For instance, the content of the chosen categories of education might 
differ over time as well as the economic value of tenure in an employee-employer 
relationship. Last but not least, the consequences of rising wage inequality for individual well-
being, for employment as well as for the evolution of unemployment need to be investigated 
in greater detail. 
2.6 References for Chapter 2 
Acemoglu, D. (2002), Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market, Journal of 
Economic Literature 40 (1), 7-72. 
Acemoglu, D. (2003), Cross-Country Inequality Trends, The Economic Journal 113, F121-
F149. 
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, M. S. Kearney (2005), Rising Wage Inequality: The Role of 
Composition and Price, NBER Working Paper 11628. 
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, M. S. Kearney (2008), Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the 
Revisionists, Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (2), 300-323. 
Bellmann, L., H. Gartner (2003), Fakten zur Entwicklung der qualifikatorischen und 
sektoralen Lohnstruktur, Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 36 (4), 
493-508. 
Bender, S., J. Hizeldegen, G. Rohwer, H. Rudolph (2000), Die IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe 
1975 – 1990, BeitrAB 197, Nürnberg. 
Blau, F. D., L. M. Kahn (1996), International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: 
Institutions versus Market Forces, The Journal of Political Economy 104 (4), 791-837. 
 36
DiNardo, J., N. M. Fortin, T. Lemieux (1996), Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution 
of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach, Econometrica 64 (5), 1001-1044. 
Dustmann, C., J. Ludsteck, U. Schönberg (2009), Revisiting the German Wage Structure, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (2), 843-881. 
Fehr, E., L. Götte (2005), Robustness, Real Consequences of Nominal Wage Rigidity, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (4), 779-804. 
Fitzenberger, B. (1999), Wages and Employment across Skill Groups: An Analysis for West 
Germany, Physica, Heidelberg. 
Fitzenberger, B., R. Hujer, T. E. MaCurdy, R. Schnabel (2001), Testing for uniform wage 
trends in West-Germany: A cohort analysis using quantile regressions for censored data, 
Empirical Economics 26 (1), 41-86. 
Franz, W., F. Pfeiffer (2005), A Note on Labor Contracts and Wage Rigidities: An Empirical 
Investigation Using Survey Data, Applied Economics Quarterly 51 (2), 219-228. 
Franz, W., F. Pfeiffer (2006), Reasons for Wage Rigidity in Germany, LABOUR - Review of 
Labour Economics and Industrial Relations 20(2), 255-284. 
Franz, W., V. Steiner (2000), Wages in the East German Transition Process: Facts and 
Explanations, German Economic Review 1 (3), 241-269. 
Gottschalk, P., T. M. Smeeding (1997), Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income 
Inequality, Journal of Economic Literature 35 (2), 633-687. 
Haisken-DeNew, J., J. R. Frick (2005), DTC Desktop Companion to the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), DIW Berlin. 
Izquierdo, M., A. Lacuesta (2006), Wage Inequality in Spain: Recent Developments, 
Documentos de Trabajo 0615, Banco de Espana. 
Juhn, C., K. M. Murphy, B. Pierce (1993), Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill, 
The Journal of Political Economy 101 (3), 410-442. 
Kaiser, U., F. Pfeiffer (2001), Collective Wage Agreements and Firms’ Employment Policies. 
LABOUR - Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations 15 (2), 319-341. 
Katz, L., D. Autor (1999), Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality, in: O. 
Ashenfelter, D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics 3A, Amsterdam, 1463-1555 
Kohn, K. (2006), Rising Wage Dispersion, After All! The German Wage Structure at the Turn 
of the Century, ZEW Discussion Paper 06-031. 
Krugman, P. (1994), Past and Prospective Causes of High Unemployment. Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 23-43. 
Lemieux, T. (2006), Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Effects, Noisy Data, 
or Rising Demand for Skill? American Economic Review 96 (3), 461-498. 
Machado, J., J. Mata (2005), Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in Wage 
Distributions Using Quantile Regression, Journal of Applied Econometrics 20 (4), 445-
465. 
Melly, B. (2006), Estimation of Counterfactual Distributions using Quantile Regression, 
Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research Working 
Paper, St. Gallen. 
Mishel, L., J. Bernstein, S. Allegretto (2006). The State of Working America 2006/2007, The 
Economic Policy Institute. 
 37
Möller, J. (2000), Technological Change, Unemployment and Recent Trends, in: M. 
Landesmann, K. Pichelmann (eds.), Unemployment in Europe, Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 
121-147. 
Möller, J. (2005), Die Entwicklung der Lohnspreizung in West- und Ostdeutschland, in: L. 
Bellmann, O. Huebler, W. Meyer, G. Stephan (eds.), Institutionen, Löhne und 
Beschäftigung, Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, Band 294, IAB 
Nürnberg, 47-63. 
Pfeiffer, F. (2003), Lohnrigiditäten im gemischten Lohnbildungssystem, ZEW 
Wirtschaftsanalysen 65, Baden-Baden. 
Prasad, E. S. (2004), The Unbearable Stability of the German Wage Structure: Evidence and 
Interpretation, IMF Staff Papers 51 (2), 354-285. 
Riphahn, R. T. (2003), Bruttoeinkommensverteilung in Deutschland 1984-1999 und 
Ungleichheit unter ausländischen Erwerbstätigen, in: W. Schmähl (ed.), 
Wechselwirkungen zwischen Arbeitsmarkt und Sozialer Sicherung II, Schriften des 
Vereins für Socialpolitik, Band 294, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 135-174. 
Statistisches Bundesamt (1995), Statistisches Jahrbuch 1995 für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), Statistisches Jahrbuch 2005 für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. 
Steiner, V., T. Hölzle (2000), The Development of Wages in Germany in the 1990s – 
Descriptions and Explanations, in: R. Hauser, I. Becker (eds.), The Personal Distribution 
of Income in an International Perspective, Berlin, 7-30. 
Steiner, V., K. Wagner (1998), Has Earnings Inequality in Germany Changed in the 1980’s? 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 118, 29-59. 
 38
2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2 
Table 2.A1: Selected Studies on Wage Inequality in Germany 
Study Time Data Results 
Bellmann and Gartner 
(2003) 
1975-2000 IABS, 
BLH 
Increasing wage dispersion in the 1990s in West 
Germany, especially within high wage sectors. 
Dustmann, Ludsteck 
and Schönberg (2009) 
1975-2004 IABS, 
LIAB 
Increasing Wage Inequality in the 1980s, but only at 
the top of the wage distribution, in the early 1990s 
wage inequality also started to increase below the 
median. 
Fitzenberger (1999) 1975-1990 IABS The wage dispersion within skill groups is stable 
over time for low skilled workers but increases for 
medium and high skilled workers. After controlling 
for age and cohort effects there is increasing wage 
inequality within the group of low skilled workers. 
Fitzenberger, Hujer, 
MaCurdy and Schnabel 
(2001) 
1976-1984 IABS Wage compression at the lower part of the wage 
distribution which seems constant over the surveyed 
time. The main findings are that wages of workers 
with intermediate education levels, among them 
especially those of young workers, deteriorated 
slightly relative to high and low education levels. 
Franz and Steiner 
(2000) 
1990-1997 SOEP In East Germany wage distribution was compressed 
under socialism. After unification there is rising 
wage inequality in East Germany, strongest in the 
first years. 
Kohn (2006) 1975-2001 IABS Rising wage inequality, especially in East Germany, 
starting in the mid 1990s. 
Möller (2005) 1975-2001 IABS Rising wage inequality, especially below the 
median, starting in the mid 1990s. 
Pfeiffer (2003) 1975-1995 IABS Wage rigidity is present due to central wage 
bargaining; for 50 percent of workers wages would 
have been lower without rigidity; the wage sweep-
up is higher for German workers in large firms, 
rises with tenure and is higher in the middle part of 
the wage distribution. 
Prasad (2004) 1984-1997 SOEP Relatively stable wage distribution in Germany. 
Returns to education and experience remained 
stable. Some evidence for a modest increase in 
wage inequality at mid 1990s. 
Steiner and Hölzle 
(2000) 
1990-1997 SOEP Relatively stable wage distribution in Germany. 
Earnings and wage inequality in East Germany 
increased after reunification. 
Steiner and Wagner 
(1998) 
1984-1990 SOEP, 
IABS 
Modest increase in earnings inequality when 
calculated on the basis of the IABS, while earnings 
remained constant or slightly decreased on the basis 
of the SOEP. 
 
 39
Table 2.A2: Means of Real Wages and Hours, West Germany 
 All Workers Prime Age Dependent Male Workers 
 Obser-
vations 
Real gross 
monthly 
salary 
Weekly 
hours 
worked 
Real 
gross 
hourly 
wage 
Obser-
vations 
Real gross 
monthly 
salary 
Weekly 
hours 
worked 
Real gross 
hourly 
wage 
2005 5,522 
 
2,285.65 
(1,275.54) 
37.41 
(12.77) 
13.61 
(5.56) 
2,298 2,867.47 
(1,107.58) 
43.20 
(7.71) 
15.31 
(5.32) 
2004 5,799 
 
2,337.45 
(1,309.48) 
37.55 
(12.65) 
13.88 
(5.64) 
2,467 2,926.00 
(1,136.93) 
43.09 
(7.64) 
15.66 
(5.40) 
2003 5,994 2,346.46 
(1,312.35) 
37.49 
(12.64) 
13.93 
(5.61) 
2,560 2,945.67 
(1,134.20) 
42.89 
(7.75) 
15.80 
(5.30) 
2002 6,266 2,301.85 
(1,269.00) 
37.83 
(12.65) 
13.58 
(5.42) 
2,698 2,861.53 
(1,088.89) 
43.16 
(7.42) 
15.27 
(5.12) 
2001 6,773 2,244.55 
(1,196.82) 
38.08 
(12.57) 
13.19 
(5.03) 
2,981 2,774.87 
(1,023.93) 
43.17 
(7.71) 
14.83 
(4.76) 
2000 7,490 2,257.83 
(1,194.23) 
38.31 
(12.44) 
13.22 
(5.06) 
3,333 2,765.09 
(1,031.04) 
43.24 
(7.55) 
14.75 
(4.79) 
1999 4,123 2,239.72 
(1,138.00) 
38.52 
(11.79) 
13.08 
(4.94) 
1,857 2,683.38 
(986.05) 
42.69 
(7.32) 
14,49 
(4.74) 
1998 3,946 2,237.40 
(1,089.29) 
38.97 
(11.42) 
12.99 
(4.75) 
1,814 2,674.92 
(966.30) 
42.97 
(7.65) 
14.39 
(4.59) 
1997 3,732 2,187.06 
(1,046.01) 
38.95 
(11.41) 
12.71 
(4.54) 
1,686 2,626.61 
(899.89) 
42.74 
(7.51) 
14.22 
(4.25) 
1996 3,801 2,197.03 
(1,054.24) 
38.68 
(10.99) 
12.85 
(4.63) 
1,720 2,626.61 
(930.44) 
42.36 
(7.52) 
14.33 
(4.45) 
1995 3,880 2,179.26 
(1,024.08) 
39.03 
(10.98) 
12.68 
(4.67) 
1,790 2,606.06 
(919.42) 
42.57 
(7.54) 
14.17 
(4.45) 
1994 3,913 2,120.33 
(983.24) 
38.80 
(10.71) 
12.38 
(4.27) 
1,797 2,540.88 
(829.60) 
42.15 
(7.00) 
13.94 
(4.07) 
1993 4,017 2,107.15 
(982.96) 
38.82 
(10.71) 
12.33 
(4.39) 
1,810 2,549.52 
(858.18) 
42.22 
(7.20) 
13.97 
(4.16) 
1992 4,002 2,094.90 
(954.47) 
39.01 
(10.58) 
12.22 
(4.35) 
1,825 2,546.29 
(813.98) 
42.58 
(7.19) 
13.85 
(4.02) 
1991 4,124 2,048.40 
(941.38) 
39.21 
(10.78) 
11.88 
(4.26) 
1,892 2,493.01 
(800.44) 
42.65 
(7.33) 
13.55 
(3.97) 
1990 4,072 1,955.06 
(911.89) 
39.47 
(10.00) 
11.27 
(4.14) 
1,943 2,345.79 
(818.53) 
42.60 
(6.94) 
12.72 
(4.00) 
1989 4,160 1,920,93 
(884.29) 
40.20 
(10.11) 
10.88 
(3.95) 
1,956 2,312.31 
(794.47) 
43.36 
(6.95) 
12.33 
(3.78) 
1988 4,147 1,938.64 
(995.41) 
39.86 
(10.67) 
11.19 
(4.92) 
1,947 2,332.27 
(883.92) 
43.08 
(7.01) 
12.60 
(4.66) 
1987 4,371 1,854.53 
(897.42) 
40.04 
(10.44) 
10.54 
(3.98) 
2,011 2,242.45 
(811.94) 
43.27 
(6.98) 
11.98 
(3.86) 
1986 4,240 1,854.13 
(929.45) 
40.55 
(10.58) 
10.58 
(4.81) 
2,004 2,222.76 
(850.81) 
43.60 
(7.47) 
11.91 
(4.60) 
1985 4,347 1,800.09 
(912.00) 
40.61 
(10.97) 
10.32 
(5.02) 
2,061 2,139.69 
(808.08) 
43.59 
(7.71) 
11.58 
(4.89) 
1984 4,772 1,766.44 
(846.17) 
40.53 
(10.55) 
10.00 
(3.96) 
2,322 2,109.10 
(726.22) 
43.45 
(7.35) 
11.27 
(3.65) 
Standard deviation in brackets. 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2005, see text; own calculations. 
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Table 2.A3: Means of Real Wages and Hours, East Germany  
 All Workers Prime Age Dependent Male Workers 
 Obser-
vations 
Real gross 
monthly 
salary 
Weekly 
hours 
worked 
Real gross 
hourly 
wage 
Obser-
vations 
Real gross 
monthly 
salary 
Weekly 
hours 
worked 
Real gross 
hourly 
wage 
2005 1,820 1,878.80 
(961.29) 
41.25 
(10.09) 
10.52 
(4.78) 
698 2,124.25 
(925.17) 
44.58 
(7.39) 
11.06 
(4.63) 
2004 1,923 1,930.98 
(979.70) 
41.54 
(10.16) 
10.70 
(4.72) 
739 2,174.55 
(981.13) 
44.54 
(7.68) 
11.30 
(4.68) 
2003 1,967 1,931.36 
(947.14) 
41.81 
(9.79) 
10.64 
(4.57) 
761 2,167.30 
(928.19) 
44.78 
(7.15) 
11.23 
(4.56) 
2002 2,050 1,882.83 
(890.51) 
42.15 
(9.81) 
10.30 
(4.29) 
802 2,084.13 
(876.38) 
44.97 
(7.71) 
10.73 
(4.20) 
2001 2,220 1,831.92 
(856.01) 
42.33 
(10.12) 
10.04 
(4.16) 
882 2,016.24 
(806.59) 
45.31 
(7.57) 
10.38 
(4.02) 
2000 2,336 1,812.73 
(830.79) 
42.46 
(10.11) 
9.90 
(4.01) 
931 1,984.44 
(804.70) 
45.43 
(7.88) 
10.14 
(3.80) 
1999 1,668 1,792.09 
(762.24) 
42.80 
(9.52) 
9.71 
(3.78) 
691 1,919.96 
(715.47) 
45.56 
(8.16) 
9.83 
(3.58) 
1998 1,632 1,785.58 
(738.21) 
43.02 
(9.38) 
9.67 
(3.77) 
694 1,937.78 
(693.97) 
45.62 
(8.04) 
9.93 
(3.55) 
1997 1,610 1,793.09 
(739.08) 
43.62 
(9.32) 
9.56 
(3.61) 
690 1,922.98 
(683.73) 
46.15 
(7.92) 
9.73 
(3.32) 
1996 1,673 1,762.72 
(720.55) 
43.16 
(9.31) 
9.50 
(3.53) 
728 1,893.92 
(648.47) 
46.00 
(7.72) 
9.63 
(3.27) 
1995 1,749 1,697.36 
(699.52) 
43.36 
(9.63) 
9.12 
(3.45) 
770 1,831.71 
(659.33) 
46.23 
(7.96) 
9.24 
(3.13) 
1994 1,710 1,653.03 
(647.18) 
43.45 
(8.63) 
8.82 
(3.12) 
797 1,762.10 
(592.33) 
45.71 
(7.21) 
8.96 
(2.85) 
Standard deviation in brackets. 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1994-2005, see text; own calculations. 
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3. Decreasing Wage Mobility in Germany 
This part is published in a former version as ZEW Discussion Paper 09-044. 
Abstract: Using data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1984 to 
2007, this paper analyses the amount, the development and the explanations of wage mobility, 
as well as volatility in West Germany, measured by ranks in the wage distribution. Individual 
wage mobility decreased between 1984/1987 and 2004/2007, while inequality increased 
steadily from the mid 1990s onwards. Mobility is highest in the middle section of the 
distribution. Better qualified persons, younger persons and employees of larger firms have 
higher chances of moving upwards. Wages are more volatile in the low-wage sector and for 
individuals moving downwards in the wage distribution. 
Keywords: Wage Mobility, Ranks, Inequality, Distribution, SOEP. 
JEL-classification: J31, J60, D31 
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my colleagues from the ZEW who participated at 
an internal seminar for their helpful comments, especially Nicole Gürtzgen and Friedhelm 
Pfeiffer for several additional hints. For fine research assistance I thank Heidi Hellerich, Falco 
Möller, Ana Maria Montoya Gomez and Ruben Seiberlich. All remaining errors are my own. 
3.1. Introduction 
Inequality is a topic of wide interest in the economic literature and in the public discussion. 
While wage inequality in the U.S. started to increase rapidly in the mid 1980s (see e.g. 
Acemoglu, 2002, 2003; Autor et al., 2008; DiNardo et al., 1996), the situation in continental 
Europe, especially in Germany, was characterised as more or less stable for a long time. This 
changed, in the mid 1990s, when wage inequality began to increase there, as well (see e.g. 
Dustmann et al., 2009; Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007; Kohn, 2006). These studies look at 
sequences of cross-section wage inequality and thus provide sequences of snapshots of the 
inequality measured. Although they try to analyse the reasons behind the evolution of 
inequality over time with decomposition methods, such methods may have some 
shortcomings in the face of unobserved individual effects. Therefore in this paper, I try to 
investigate wage mobility more directly, looking at selected longitudinal samples of workers. 
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One shortcoming of such snapshots is that they do not encompass a wide range of an 
individual’s options, particularly the chance to move, e.g. to leave low-wage areas. This raises 
the question of wage mobility. How much mobility is there? What opportunities for wage 
mobility did there exist in Germany during the last years? Wage mobility can at least partly 
offset the increase in cross-section inequality and thus leads to a better understanding of 
inequality and poverty in a society. If wages are immobile, rising cross-section inequality is 
associated with a rising inequality of lifetime earnings. On the other hand, the extreme case of 
total mobility would resemble a lottery re-starting at the beginning of every time period and 
repositioning the individual at random in the wage distribution – hence, apart from potential 
credit crunches, “snapshot inequality” would be no problem. Thus, mobility could lead to 
shared inequality among persons. In general, mobility can be regarded as positive because it 
reduces inequality. The downside, however, is that it leads to insecurity of further income and 
this potentially influences investment decisions, e.g. in education or family planning. 
Several ways to measure wage mobility are practicable. One way is to calculate individual 
wage growth from one period to another e.g. from year to year. There is an extensive debate 
about wage rigidities in the sense that if wages as a whole are not flexible, downside wage 
rigidities are likely to occur. Cornelißen and Hübler (2008) use the SOEP from 1984 to 2004 
and observe an annual nominal mean wage growth of 4.1%. Without downside wage rigidity, 
this would be only 0.9%. Pfeiffer (2003) uses the IABS from 1975 to 1995 and establishes 
individual nominal wage growth rates between 3% and 8%, which decrease over the time 
period. Another line in the literature is to analyse intergenerational wage mobility, e.g. how 
the wage of the son is related to the wage of his father (see e.g. Solon (1992) for the U.S. and 
Eisenhauer and Pfeiffer (2008) for Germany). These studies report a wage elasticity from 
about 0.3 in Germany and about 0.4 in the U.S. 
It is not only the absolute amount of the wage that seems to be of importance for the 
individual but also the relative wage compared to other workers, e.g. measured by ranks 
within the wage distribution. Summers (1988) argues, and thus reinforces Keynes (1936), that 
the employee’s productivity is affected by the absolute wage and also by the relative wage. 
Add on the so-called Easterlin paradox (Easterlin, 1974, 1995) that over the last decades, the 
real average income in Western industrialized countries increased substantially, while on the 
other hand, average satisfaction or happiness remained stable; it is established that the relative 
income position has a significant influence for individual happiness – a higher relative wage 
is positively correlated with happiness (see e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Clark and Oswald, 1996; 
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Luttmer, 2005). Using British labour data, as well as an experimental approach, Brown et al. 
(2008) find that the ordinal rank also has a significant effect on well-being. Thus, it is useful 
to look at the whole wage distribution. Besides the Easterlin paradox, Brown et al. (2008) 
provide two additional intuitive arguments: the first is derived from evolutionary biology, 
which states that females favour a mate within a hierarchy of possible sexual partners, ordered 
according to the possession of resources that will be available for offspring. Second, casual 
observations in the world of human beings show that people are interested in rankings, e.g. 
sport outcomes, incomes as described in newspapers, “rich lists” or even lists of economists 
(as in repec.org or in the German Handelsblatt ranking). In this sense, the absolute difference 
between the ranks is not so important for individuals - e.g. a gold medal for rank 1, nothing 
for rank 4 independent of the absolute output difference. On a labour market with continuous 
and repeated valuations of wage and effort combinations these intuitive arguments could be 
seen with a grain of salt. 
The paper at hand follows this last approach: Wage mobility is measured by the degree to 
which ranks are reversed over time. The goal is to look at the individual turnover of persons 
within the wage distribution at the micro level to identify properties affecting wage mobility. I 
examine the wage position of individuals in the wage distribution which is divided into 100 
wage percentiles, each percentile representing a rank. Finally, I look at the overall situation 
during 24 years (1984-2007) and the developments that have taken place over time. The main 
findings show that wage mobility has decreased over time, while inequality has increased. 
Mobility is highest in the middle section of the distribution and highest for persons aged 30-
39 years. Individual upgrades in the wage distribution are more likely to occur for university 
graduates, younger workers and for persons working in the public sector, as well as for white-
collar workers and less likely for persons who faced an unemployment period in the time of 
observation. Wages are more volatile in the low-wage sector and for individuals moving 
downwards in the wage distribution. 
I begin with a literature overview (chapter 3.2) and a description of the data set used for the 
empirical part: the SOEP from 1984 to 2007 (chapter 3.3). I then look at three stages of 
mobility: absolute mobility measured by real wage development (chapter 3.4), relative 
mobility measured by individual movement upwards or downwards in the wage distribution 
(chapter 3.5) and finally, the income risk associated with mobility measured by wage 
volatility (chapter 3.6). Chapter 3.7 concludes and gives a short outlook. While the main part 
of the paper focuses on males, an additional part in the appendix gives some insights into the 
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situation for females. 
3.2 Literature 
There is evidence that well-being and happiness are not only affected by absolute wages but 
also by relative wages and the individual rank within the wage distribution. The first part of 
this chapter supports this approach using the argumentation of Brown et al. (2008) as a basis, 
while the second part reports empirical results of international comparative studies about 
wage mobility in Germany. 
Textbook economics (e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004; Franz, 2006) assume an individual 
utility function u, depending on the absolute wage (wabs), hours (h) worked, characteristics of 
the individual worker (i) and characteristics of the job (j). 
(3.1) ),,,( jihwuu abs=  
Based on this, some studies argue that it is not only the absolute wage, but also the relative 
wage that affects the utility, which is why individuals additionally compare their wages with 
the mean wage (wmean) of a comparison group (see e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 
2005). 
(3.2) ),,,,( jihwwuu meanabs=  
Based on the range frequency theory model (see Parducci, 1965, 1995), Brown et al. (2008) 
argue in a further step, that the ordinal position and the position within a wage distribution are 
also important. Individuals seem to be influenced by the end points and the variance of a wage 
distribution. Brown et al. (2008) use an empirical approach, using British labour data and, 
additionally, by conducting a laboratory experiment with students. In the experimental design, 
potential wages are arranged in such a manner that they create conceivable situations with the 
same utility, measured via equation (3.2) but with a different utility perception by the relevant 
individuals. 
The situation in Figure 3.1, where the utility of wages X and Y in distribution A and B 
measured via equation (3.2) is identical, provides an ostensive example. In nearly all 
experimental situations, the test subjects favoured distribution A for wage Y and distribution 
B for wage X. While wage X in distribution B has the same absolute amount as wage X in 
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distribution A, and the mean wage in both distributions is also identical, the individual utility 
in the lower distribution is higher because more persons face lower absolute wages (only one 
person in distribution A to four persons in distribution B).  
Figure 3.1: Hypothetical Wage Distributions 
Distribution A 
               
   
X      Y    
Distribution B 
               
   
X      Y    
Source: Brown et al. (2008) 
 
Thus, one needs to expand the utility function by the range (wrange), measuring the position 
within the distribution and with the rank (wrank), measuring the ordinal position in the wage 
distribution.  
(3.3) ),,,,,,( jihwwwwuu rangerankmeanabs=  
Thus, the rank of the individual in the wage distribution has a positive effect on individual 
utility, with higher ranks characterizing a higher position in the wage distribution. In the study 
at hand, ranks are measured via 100 wage percentiles. 
There exist some studies about wage mobility in Germany and in comparison with other 
countries. A first group compares Germany with the U.S. All studies in the group discussed 
here use the SOEP for Germany and the PSID for the U.S. as a data base. Higher mobility in 
the U.S. compared to Germany is established by van Kerm (2004), who looks at annual 
household income after tax and transfers between 1985 and 1997. Burkhauser et al. (1997) 
compare annual labour earnings mobility in Germany and in the U.S. in the 1980s. They 
report similar global mobility rates, as measured by quintile to quintile transition rates. 
Mobility is only higher for women in the U.S. In general, Burkhauser et al. (1997) report an 
“inverted-u” shape for mobility across initial wage quintiles. Jenkins and van Kerm (2006) for 
the period from 1985 to 1992, as well as Burkhauser and Poupore (1997) for the years 1983 to 
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1988 report a higher annual household net income mobility in Germany. Gottschalk and 
Spolaore (2002) analyse post tax and transfer family income between 1984 and 1993 and take 
a look at intergenerational family income mobility. They observe a higher mobility in 
Germany. 
A second group compares Germany within Europe. The data base used in all of these studies 
is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), the German part of this data set is 
based, once again, on the SOEP. Ayala and Sastre (2008) compare the mobility of the annual 
household income after tax and transfers for five European countries14, with Germany 
positioned below the mean. An expanded group of European countries15 is analysed by 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2008) and the European Commission (2004). Pavlopoulos et al. (2008) 
take a macroeconomically motivated look and try to explain the impact of economic 
conditions, welfare state regimes and employment regulation on wage mobility. For Germany, 
they determine a decreasing probability to move more than one decile in the annual labour 
earnings distribution between 1994/95 and 1999/00 – in other words, they find decreasing 
mobility. The study of the European Commission (2004) looks at gross hourly wages and 
establishes an average mobility in Germany.16 Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009) analyse the 
same 14 European countries using the ECHP for 1994 to 2001, focusing on real hourly wages 
for males born between 1940 and 1981. In their study mobility is measured by the ratio 
between permanent and transitory17 inequality and they analyse the development and not the 
absolute amount of the wage mobility as the study from the European Commission (2004) 
did. Once again, they establish decreasing wage mobility during the observation period in 
Germany.18 
A last group looks at the situation in Germany exclusively, focusing on the development over 
time. Uhlendorff (2006) looks at gross hourly wages from 1998 to 2003, using the SOEP. He 
analyses mobility between the conditions of high pay, low pay and no pay (unemployed), and 
finds a “low pay no pay” circle. Hauser and Fabig (1999), also using the SOEP from 1990 to 
1995, compare income mobility, as measured by monthly gross and net individual labour 
                                                          
14 Spain, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France. 
15 Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Spain, 
Greece, Portugal, France and Belgium. 
16 They arrange the countries in 3 groups: High Mobility is observed in Great Britain, Luxembourg, Denmark 
and Finland; lowest mobility in Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, France and Belgium; and average mobility in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Austria. 
17 Permanent earnings reflect personal characteristics, education and training while transitory earnings reflect 
factors which only affect earnings during a certain period, such as temporary shocks. 
18 And also decreasing mobility in Austria, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal 
and Finland while wage mobility increases in Denmark, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands. 
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income, between East and West Germany. They depict higher wage mobility in East 
Germany, in particular for the first years after unification. They argue that the tax and benefit 
system in Germany serves to reduce income mobility. Kaltenborn and Klös (2000) examine 
gross monthly labour income using the SOEP from 1984 to 1996. They find that it is easier to 
move upwards than downwards, especially for younger people – another result of the study at 
hand. Low-wage earners also have a chance to leave this sector – a probability which 
increased between 1984 and 1996. Additionally, there are several short reports from the IAB, 
mostly written in German (e.g. Schank et al., 2009), which use official German Labour Data 
from the Agency of Labour. The main topics discussed here are the low-wage sector and 
potential minimum wages. Schank et al. (2009) use the administrative linked employer-
employee data (LIAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency. They establish that only 
one out of eight employees who earned a low wage in 1998/99 left this sector in 2005. 
Younger and better qualified persons have a particularly good chance to move upwards, while 
women are less successful. Company size and job changes positively affect the chance to 
move upwards. While these results are exclusive for the low-wage sector, the study at hand 
confirms higher upward mobility for younger and better qualified employees and also for 
persons employed in larger firms over the whole wage distribution. 
The paper at hand ties in with these studies by looking at a longer time period, using 24 waves 
of the SOEP from 1984 to 2007 and thus analysing wage mobility and development over 
time. The trend of decreasing wage mobility in Germany, reported in the literature so far, is 
confirmed. Moreover, the paper at hand will analyse individual socio-economic and 
environmental conditions for all persons of the wage distribution and their effect on wage 
mobility, as this has been lacking in the literature for Germany to the best of my knowledge. 
While most of the cited studies are restricted to males, I also analyse wage mobility for 
females in a separate section in the appendix. 
The contribution of this empirical work is motivated by a paper by Raferzeder and Winter-
Ebmer (2007) about wage mobility and mobility risk in Austria. I attempt to replicate their 
estimation design for Germany, thus the results are comparable. Additionally, the paper at 
hand exploits some advantage of the German data set (the SOEP), which allows to observe 
not only employment spells, but also periods of unemployment. Raferzeder and Winter-
Ebmer (2007) use Austrian data for the period 1994-2001, concentrating on a balanced panel 
of males who were employed in every period under observation. The initial position in the 
wage distribution is important. The lower the starting position, the higher is the chance to 
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move upwards in Austria. Moreover, wages are more volatile at the lower end of the 
distribution and most stable in the highest quintile. Workers in larger firms and white-collar 
employees are more likely to move upwards. Job changes increase an individual’s wage 
mobility. 
3.3 Data 
The data base is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1984 to 2007. The SOEP is 
a representative national longitudinal data set, which surveys households and individuals 
(Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005; Wagner et al., 2007). In 2007, there are about 11,000 
households with more than 20,000 persons sampled in the SOEP. An advantage of this survey 
data compared to administrative data like the IABS, the LIAB or the data Raferzeder and 
Winter-Ebmer (2007) used is first, that wages are not censored by the social security 
contribution ceiling and so here it is possible to observe the whole wage distribution and 
second, the chance to calculate hourly wages and so it is possible to account for part-time 
employees on the one hand and overtime worked on the other hand. 
I restrict the data to West German males aged between 20 and 65 years who participate in the 
labour market. This procedure has been chosen for several reasons: Firstly, persons below 20 
are often still in education and males older than 65 are normally retired. Secondly, the goal of 
this paper is to compare wage mobility over a long period of time. Before 1990, there were no 
observations of East-Germans in the SOEP and in the years after unification there existed an 
exceeding wage mobility caused by the transformation from a former socialistic economy to a 
capitalistic market economy. However, the analysis of this transformation is not the purpose 
of this paper. Thirdly, the main part focuses on males only because my aim is to compare 
these results to those of Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007). With regard to females, one 
would have to control for factors such as family situation and children, which are responsible 
for female career paths diverging from those of males. Despite that I use the advantage of the 
SOEP data and expand the approach by Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007). I take a look at 
the situation for females in a separate step in the appendix, where I conduct the same analysis 
as for males. Moreover, I exclude persons who are still in the education system, interns, 
already retired persons, or those cooperating in a family business, because their wages, even if 
they are observed, are not comparable over time, particularly not with normal working 
periods. As output variable the real gross hourly wage is analysed. The hourly wage is 
obtained for all workers, including the self-employed, by dividing the gross wage in the 
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month prior to the interview by the reported working hours of the last week, which are then 
extrapolated to monthly hours. I deflate all wages by the consumer price index to the price 
level of 2005 (source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008). To avoid problems of potential 
misreporting of hours worked and/or self-reported wages, I exclude all persons with hourly 
wages of less than € 1 and more than € 100.19 For all analyses, I arrange the data in 4-year 
time periods (1984/1987, 1988/1991, 1992/1995, 1996/1999, 2000/2003, 2004/2007) and treat 
these periods as balanced panels. The challenge is to choose a time period which is not too 
short, in order to observe the development and adjustment processes for individuals. 
However, due to the design of the balanced panels, one loses observations via panel mortality 
with every further time period. 4-year periods seem to meet these two requirements. Thus it is 
possible to observe a wage, or at least an unemployment spell, for every person in every year. 
A potential problem in analysing wage mobility lies in the selection into employment, in the 
sense that, particularly with regard to the low-wage sector, one observes wage changes for a 
positively selected group of workers who are employed at least at the beginning and the end 
of the observation period because only for these persons wages are observable in the data. 
Hence, decreases are only observable if the worker is still employed, but the transition to 
unemployment could also be registered as a form of wage reduction – to zero wages.20 7.5% 
(2.8%) of the low- (high-) wage workers in 2004 were unemployed in 2007. Nevertheless, the 
wage structure in this sense seems to be relatively stable; in all groups, the main part remains 
unchanged between 2004 and 2007 (see Table 3.1). In the other periods, there is some 
movement, especially from low-wage to high-wage (see Tables 3.A1a-e in the appendix). In 
the data, the transition to unemployment is lowest in 1988/1991 and highest in 1992/1995.21 
The low-wage barrier is defined as 2/3 of the median in the 4-year time periods and is about € 
11 per hour in 2004/2007. 
A look at the job status and the changes between 2004 and 2007 shows a relatively stable 
situation (see Table 3.2). Public sector employees in particular do not change their 
occupation, about 98% stay in their sector. Blue-collar, white-collar, or self-employed 
workers have persistent rates at approximately 85% to 88%. Being unemployed in 2004 
provided the highest probability to leave this status compared to the other occupations and a 
                                                          
19 In 2004/2007 I lose 21 of 2,771 persons due to this restriction. In the other time periods it is about the same 
range. 
20 Unemployment benefits are not included in wages. 
21 This is in line with the annual unemployment rates in West Germany: 8.1% in 1984, 7.9% in 1987, 7.9% in 
1988, 5.9% in 1991, 5.9% in 1992, 8.1% in 1995, 8.9% in 1996, 8.6% in 1999, 7.6% in 2000, 8.4% in 2003, 
8.5% in 2004 and 7.5% in 2007 (Sachverständigenrat, 2008). 
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switch to employment, mostly to the blue-collar sector, but hardly ever to the public sector. 
The situation in other periods is comparable to the one above (see Tables 3.A2a-e in the 
appendix). 
Table 3.1: Wage and Employment Status 2004 vs. 2007 
2007  
Unemployed Low-wage High-wage 
 Unemployed 133 (58.85%) 
59 
(26.11%) 
34 
(15.04%) 
2004 Low-wage 26 (7.49%) 
224 
(64.55%) 
97 
(27.95%) 
 High-wage 61 (2.80%) 
153 
(7.03%) 
1963 
(90.17%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.2: Job Status 2004 vs. 2007 
2007  
Unemployed Blue-collar White-collar Public 
Sector 
Self-
employed 
 Unemployed 133 (58.85%) 
63 
(27.88%) 
20 
(8.85%) 
1 
(0.44%) 
9 
(3.98%) 
 Blue-collar 43 (4.66%) 
815 
(88.39%) 
52 
(5.64%) 
1 
(0.11%) 
11 
(1.19%) 
2004 White-collar 35 (3.10%) 
70 
(6.21%) 
993 
(88.03%) 
6 
(0.53%) 
24 
(2.13%) 
 Public Sector 0 1 (0.36%) 
3 
(1.08%) 
273 
(98.20%) 
1 
(0.36%) 
 Self-employed 
9 
(4.59%) 
8 
(4.08%) 
11 
(5.61%) 
0 168 
(85.71%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
3.4 Absolute Mobility, Wage Development 
Before analysing rank mobility and volatility in detail, this chapter gives a short overview of 
the real gross hourly wage development from 1984 to 2007 for West German males aged 
between 20 and 65 years.22 
Figure 3.2 shows the wage development difference between three percentiles (10th, 50th and 
90th percentile). While wages increase at the top of the distribution, wages are stable and even 
decrease from the mid-nineties on for the 10th percentile, which can be identified as rising 
wage inequality. The real hourly wage at the 10th percentile amounted to € 9.82 in 1995 and 
then decreased to € 7.57 in 2007, representing a real wage loss of 25%, while the wage at the 
90th percentile increased from € 24.56 to € 26.90 (plus 10%) during the same time period. The 
                                                          
22 Data is restricted in the same way as described in the data section, with the exception of the 4-year balanced 
panel restriction, which is not necessary here. 
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real median wage remained fairly stable in this time, with a slight increase from € 14.41 to 
€ 14.77.23 
Figure 3.2: Wage Development between 1984 and 2007 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; weighted data; own calculation, see text. 
 
These findings suggest that wage inequality in Germany started to increase after the economic 
downturn in 1992/93 and also wage mobility started to decrease at that time (see Table 3.3 in 
the next chapter) - the ratio of the ninetieth to tenth percentile increased from 2.5 in 1995, to 
3.1 in 2005, to 3.5 in 2007, while the standard deviation of rank differences as a proxy for 
mobility decreased from 21.51 in 1992/1995 to 17.06 in 2004/2007. This constitutes a 
stretching of the wage distribution, and chances for upward mobility are reduced. 
3.5 Wage Mobility 
Wage mobility is defined as the number of ranks through which a person moves between the 
start and the end year of a period. For example, if a person’s wage is in percentile 20 in 2004 
and in percentile 35 in 2007, there is an upward movement of 15 percentiles, or ranks, 
respectively. The difference varies, by definition, between plus 99 for a jump from the bottom 
to the top of the distribution and minus 99 for the opposite direction. In total, it is clear that 
for every person moving up in the relative wage distribution, there must be another person 
moving down, so the mean difference is around 0. By definition, to observe this mobility 
                                                          
23 All wages are deflated to the 2005 price level. 
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measure there has to be a wage reported in the first year as well as in the last year.24 The 100 
ranks are unequal concerning the range from the highest to the lowest wage. A potential 
problem in this sense is that absolute wage differences within ranks are larger at the ranks on 
the tails of the distribution. Therefore, one has to be careful in interpreting wage mobility in 
these areas because one needs a higher absolute wage change for a rank change. For example, 
in 2004 the wages between € 1.07 and € 5.26 are attached to the first rank and wages between 
€ 50.00 and € 86.67 to the highest rank. Anyhow, in the middle of the distribution the ranks 
are much smaller. Hence the difference within the 8th and 95th rank is always below 5 
percent, and for 31 out of these 87 ranks, the difference lies below 1 percent. These “small” 
ranks are distributed unsystematically all over the distribution and there are no more than 
three small ranks neighboured – thus there is no trend towards particular small ranks in the 
middle.25 In absolute values these differences are about € 0.25 at the mean between the 8th 
and 95th rank.26 
Figure 3.3: Earnings Mobility between 2004 and 2007 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.3 gives an overview of this difference for the period between 2004 and 2007 (for all 
other periods, see Figures 3.A3a-e in the appendix). The figures show a trend towards more 
                                                          
24 I tried to model the transfer into unemployment in the last year as a selection, via a two-step Heckman 
selection procedure. The result showed no selection at all, coefficients did not change, either. In addition, I 
allocated a fictive 0th percentile to all unemployed persons, and repeated the estimation. Once again, there was 
no evidence of a selection in unemployment. 
25 Ranks with a difference below 1% in 2004: 8, 14, 17, 20, 23-25, 27-28, 30, 32-33, 36-37, 39, 42-43, 48, 50-52, 
54-55, 58, 60-62, 64-66, 71. 
26 Ranks with an absolute wage difference below € 0.10 in 2004: 8, 14, 17, 20, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 43, 
48. Above the median absolute wage differences are larger; the following ranks show wage differences below € 
0.25: 50-58, 60-69, 71, 72. 
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compressed distributions over time. While there do exist some extreme values, 80% of the 
persons show wage leaps between minus 17 and plus 19 ranks with a mass point at zero. 
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the wage development, employment rates and the standard 
deviation of the wage rank difference – as a proxy for mobility. While median wages and also 
wage inequality increase, wage mobility decreases over time. The standard deviation was 
22.66 between 1984 and 1987 and only 17.06 between 2004 and 2007. In 1992/1995 with 
21.51 the standard deviation shows the second highest level, and this is also the period where 
wage inequality started to increase. Afterwards, the decrease from the mid-nineties till now is 
constant. Employment rates in the sample decrease slightly from 93% to 89%. 
Table 3.3: Mobility in Several Time Periods 
Time Period 
Yearly 
Observations 
(Balanced Panel) 
Employment 
Rate 
Real Gross 
Hourly Wage, 
Median 
Standard Deviation of 
Rank Differences, 
Mobility 
2004-2007 2,750 0.89 16.11 17.06 
2000-2003 2,900 0.91 16.02 18.94 
1996-1999 1,986 0.91 15.18 19.75 
1992-1995 1,831 0.91 14.75 21.51 
1988-1991 2,006 0.94 14.09 20.77 
1984-1987 1,910 0.93 13.04 22.66 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; weighted data; own calculation, see text. 
 
After documenting these stylized facts, the next and even more interesting questions are: 
What drives wage mobility? Are special groups predetermined for relative wage gains or 
losses? Does every employee in Germany have the same opportunities, e.g. is the “American 
Dream” possible; to turn from dishwasher to millionaire? 
Tables 3.4 and 3.A4 in the appendix show the relation of explaining variables like age, age 
squared, the starting wage percentile, industry, occupation, job changes, firm size, 
unemployment, job status and migration background on the chances and the extent of a jump 
within ranks in the relative wage distribution between the start and the end year. The first 
column of Table 3.4 shows the results for the latest observable time period (2004/2007), the 
second column is a subsample of these data, restricted only to prime age dependent and 
always employed persons (PADAE) for a sensitivity check, the third column shows the results 
for 1992/1995 and the fourth column the results for the first period observable in the SOEP 
data (1984/1987). Like Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007), I adapt a simple ordinary least 
squares regression technique to do this. For the possibility and the extent of a jump, the 
starting position is important. Hence, I control for all percentiles (results are not reported in 
Table 3.4 but are portrayed graphically in Figure 3.4). The results are not surprising; starting 
at the bottom the only possibility is to remain in the same place or to move upwards and the 
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opposite applies to those positioned at the top of the distribution (see Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4: Coefficients for the Wage Percentiles 2004/2007, Base Category: 50th 
Percentile 
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Positive jumps are particularly common for persons in their thirties. The coefficient of 2.31 
for the period 2004/2007 shows that, compared to the reference group of persons above the 
age of 50, persons aged between 30 and 39 years move an average of 2.31 ranks upwards in 
the wage distribution compared to the reference group - not necessarily at the cost of the older 
groups. Persons who have an academic education defined as a university or technical college 
degree also have higher chances of climbing up the relative wage distribution by about 4 
ranks in 2004/2007. 
With regard to industries and occupations, there is a clear picture: industries making high 
demands on their employees also seem to provide better opportunities of upgrading the 
individual position in the wage distribution. The same holds true for occupations. Here the 
highest chances of moving upwards are observed for professionals, while elementary 
occupations lead to a downward move of 8 ranks compared to professionals. This is the same 
tendency for all time periods from 1984 onwards while effects are more pronounced in earlier 
periods. 
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The effect of a job change is inconclusive. In general, the opportunity of moving upwards is 
higher in larger firms. Working in a firm with more than 200 employees increases the chances 
of moving upwards significantly, by about two and a half ranks, compared to workers with 
less than 19 colleagues. An unemployment disruption between the start and the end year has a 
high negative conjunction on the flow. Unemployment in the second year (e.g. 2005 in the 
period 2004/2007) leads to downward movement of 9.80 ranks and unemployment in the third 
year (e.g. 2006 in the period 2004/2007) to a downward movement of 16.29 ranks in contrast 
to the reference group of employed persons, in other words, unemployment in both middle 
years leads to a downward movement of about 25 ranks in the time period 2004/2007. Job 
status also has a significant effect on mobility. Compared to blue-collar workers, the chances 
of moving upwards in the period 2004/2007 are higher for white-collar workers (3.57 ranks), 
for employees of the public sector (5.18 ranks) and for self-employed persons (7.60 ranks). 
Migration background has no significant effect in the time period of 2004/2007. 
For a sensitivity check, I restrict the group of interest to dependent employees of prime age 
(25-55 years), who are employed throughout all periods (reported only for 2004/2007). The 
relation of the variables (now excluding by definition unemployment and self-employment) 
on the change in the relative income distribution does not change – the 95 percent confidence 
intervals overlap (not reported in the table), see the second column in Table 3.4. 
Results for other time periods are in line and show, with a few exceptions, the same direction 
(Table 3.4 and Table 3.A4 in the appendix). While the job status and industry sector is not 
significant in early periods, the migrational background significantly leads to a downwards 
slip of the wage distribution of 5.77 ranks in 1984/1987 and 2.74 ranks in 1992/1995. In all 
years, an academic education leads to significantly higher chances of upward movement but 
the impact of the effect is highest in 1984/1987 with 9.38 ranks, decreases to 2.78 in 
2000/2003 and then increases again to 4.26 in the last period but is still only about half as 
strong compared to the beginning. One reason for this could be the increasing supply of 
academically trained workers in this time caused by the so-called educational expansion in 
Germany beginning in the 1960s. 
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Table 3.4: Change in Relative Income Position 
 2004/2007 2004/2007 1992/ 1995 1984/1987 
   PADAE     
Wage Percentile (Starting Year) (Base: 50th) nr  nr  nr  nr  
Age (Base: 50-)     
-29 -1.15  -1.63  1.31  -0.55  
30-39 2.31 *** 1.52  2.10  3.21 ** 
40-49 1.08  0.75  1.89  3.14 ** 
Academic Education 4.26 *** 4.59 *** 6.12 *** 9.38 *** 
Industry (Base: Administration, Education)     
High-tech Industry 4.26 *** 5.06 *** 0.32  4.49 * 
Traffic, Distribution 3.88 ** 4.59 *** -3.97  -3.17  
Financial Services 4.08 ** 5.15 *** -0.26  7.60 ** 
Others nr  nr  nr  nr  
Occupation (Base: Professionals)     
Clerks -5.38 *** -5.45 *** -5.58 ** -6.57 ** 
Service Workers -7.37 *** -6.33 *** -8.70 ** -9.53 ** 
Craft Workers -6.34 *** -6.81 *** -8.46 *** -5.41 * 
Plant and Machine Operators -7.72 *** -8.08 *** -10.29 *** -8.00 ** 
Elementary -7.98 *** -8.30 *** -10.79 *** -11.30 *** 
Others nr  nr  nr  nr  
Job Change in     
Year 1 -0.08  -1.15  -1.65  -  
Year 2 -2.34 * -1.68  2.46  -0.22  
Year 3 1.58  2.13  -3.87  -1.82  
Year 4 -2.03  -0.91  1.79  -  
Firm Size (Base: -19)     
20-199 0.27  0.13  1.43  3.20 * 
200-1999 2.74 ** 2.48 ** 1.02  6.40 *** 
2000- 2.59 ** 2.72 ** 2.79  9.19 *** 
Unemployed in     
Year 2 -9.80 *** -  -7.39  -4.17  
Year 3 -16.29 *** -  -12.60 *** -6.08  
Job Status (Base: Blue-collar)     
White-collar 3.57 *** 3.01 ** 3.22 * 5.96 *** 
Public sector 5.18 *** 4.69 ** -1.84  2.72  
Self-employed 7.60 *** -  -3.80  5.41  
Migration Background 0.32  -0.31  -2.74 ** -5.77 *** 
Constant 0.84  1.16  4.43  19.12  
N 2,291  1,871  1,497  1,486  
Adj. R-squared 0.21  0.19  0.25  0.33  
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; nr – results not reported in the table; PADAE - Prime age dependent 
(in starting year) and always employed; Others – all other groups are separately accounted for in the estimation; 
*** - significant at the 1% level, ** - at the 5% level, * - at the 10% level; own calculation, see text. 
 
Comparisons between countries are difficult because the amount of the wage inequality 
influences the absolute borders of the percentiles. Hence, in countries with a narrow wage 
distribution, smaller absolute wage changes are necessary to move several relative wage 
percentiles. Overall, the OECD (2008a) reports a 90th to 10th wage percentile ratio of 3.27 
for Austria and 3.98 for Germany in the 2000s, so the wage distribution is more compressed 
in Austria. Nevertheless, it is feasible to compare the results at hand with those of Raferzeder 
and Winter-Ebmer (2007) for Austria between 1994 and 2001. They use the same methodical 
approach as does the study at hand. The most significant predictors for upward mobility in 
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Austria are age, education, and the status at the beginning of the period. In Austria, the 
youngest workers (below 29) have the highest chances of moving upwards (plus 12 ranks); in 
Germany the highest chances are observed in the older group of males aged 30-39 years. This 
could be caused by an earlier entry to the labour market in Austria. While the amount of 
tertiary educated persons is comparable in both countries, persons are aged between 22 and 26 
in Austria and 24 to 27 in Germany when they graduate (OECD, 2008b) and so Austrians face 
a higher job experience in earlier ages. Academic education also leads to an upgrade of 6 
ranks, comparable to the situation in Germany. Firm size also has the same effect as in 
Germany – larger firms offer better opportunities of moving upwards. Likewise, the status at 
the beginning of the period tells the same story as in Germany, a start at the bottom offers 
higher chances of moving upwards, despite that Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007) only 
control for wage quartiles in Austria. A disadvantage of the Austrian study is that 
unemployment spells are not included in the data set and so no comparison of the results 
concerning this point is possible. 
3.6 Wage Volatility 
The next logical step would be to ask how stable these jumps are in the wage distribution. 
How much volatility is there? Volatility measures the wage fluctuations occurring during a 
period of four years, e.g. between 2004 and 2007. One has to bear in mind that here wage 
volatility is measured in terms of rank positions.27 Thus, it could be possible for a person to 
start and end in the same rank, in this case one would observe no mobility, but rather, jumps 
in the wage distribution within the period, which is defined as volatility here. Volatility could 
be interpreted as a proxy for insecurity with potential impact on some long lasting investment 
decisions such as education or family planning – it thus captures the more negative side of 
earnings mobility, especially if one assumes that employees are risk averse, which seems 
plausible (see Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979). 
To measure volatility one has to sum up the absolute (abs) rank change (rc) of the wage 
distribution in the 4-year period (e.g. for 2004/2007: 2004 to 2005, 2005 to 2006 and 2006 to 
2007) plus 1 and divide it by the absolute rank change between the start and the end year (e.g. 
for 2004/2007: 2004 to 2007) plus 1. 
                                                          
27 So changes in the upper part of the distribution require a larger change of absolute wage compared to the 
bottom of the distribution because wage percentiles, and therefore ranks in my definition, are more expanded at 
the top. This was also discussed in more detail at the beginning of the last chapter and does not seem to be a 
general problem. 
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By definition, wage volatility must be at least 1 for showing no volatility. For the period of 
2004/2007, I observe values ranging from 1 to 193. Higher values represent higher wage 
volatility. Volatility is equal to 1 if wage development in the time period (e.g. between 2004 
and 2007) maintains the same direction or occurs only in one year. Volatility is also 1 if there 
is no wage mobility in the sense that the individual rank is the same in every year. 
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the log volatility for the period 2004/2007 (for all other 
periods, see Figure 3.A5a-e in the appendix). About 20% of the persons in the sample at hand 
face no volatility. 
Figure 3.5: Log. Wage Volatility 2004-2007 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
In Germany volatility is highest in the first period 1984/1987, then decreases, increases again 
in the period of an economic downturn in 1992/1995 and then stabilizes between 4 and 4.2. 
Persons with downward mobility are affected by a higher volatility than persons moving 
upwards in all periods, the only exception being the period 2000/2003. This means that the 
way down is more volatile while the way up is more straightforward. On comparing low-wage 
earners and the rest of the employees, there seems to be higher volatility in the low-wage 
sector with one exception in 1988/1991 (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5: Volatility in 4-year Periods 
 84/87 88/91 92/95 96/99 00/03 04/07 
Overall 4.85 4.08 4.56 4.01 4.19 4.17 
Low-wage 5.41 3.81 5.83 4.59 4.76 4.77 
High-wage 5.12 4.36 4.30 4.18 4.08 4.12 
Moving Upwards 3.89 3.66 3.70 3.30 3.84 3.50 
Moving Downwards 4.67 4.01 4.33 4.02 3.57 3.74 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Once again, results are compared with those of the Austrian study by Raferzeder and Winter-
Ebmer (2007). In Austria, workers in the lowest income quartiles face the highest earnings 
volatility over time – this result is in line with the findings of this paper for Germany. The 
authors further assume that higher volatility in this lower part is mainly caused by persons 
who climb the job ladder, which does not seem to be the case for Germany, as the study at 
hand observes a higher volatility for persons moving downward. For the U.S., Shin and Solon 
(2008) report that earnings volatility is countercyclical with a higher volatility during the 
recession, a finding that is in line with the results for Germany if one identifies the period of 
1992/1995 as a recession period. Earnings volatility for male workers increased during the 
1970s, showed no clear tendency afterwards and increased again in the 2000s in the U.S. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The study at hand takes a look at wage mobility and volatility as measured by individual 
ranks in the wage distribution. In addition to the absolute wage and the mean wage in a group, 
the relative position within the wage distribution also affects an individual’s well-being and 
thus constitutes a further component in a wider defined utility function. Higher mobility could 
diminish the effects of rising wage inequality. 
The empirical results are based on SOEP data which has the advantage, among others, of 
allowing one to observe unemployment periods. It is these unemployment periods between 
jobs in particular that are responsible for downward mobility. In Germany, individual wage 
mobility decreased between 1984/1987 and 2004/2007, particularly after the economic 
downturn in 1992/1993. Wage inequality, however, has increased steadily from this time 
onwards. Hence, it seems that changes in wage mobility intensify cross-section inequality, 
which potentially leads to even higher life time inequality or in other words, as the wage 
distribution widens, the individual’s mobility is reduced. However, one has to be careful 
comparing the results of this chapter with these of chapter 2 because used methods and 
definitions are different. While chapter 2 focuses on absolute hourly wages at the 10th, the 
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50th and the 90th wage percentile in several cross-sections, this chapter looks at hourly wage 
rank mobility over 100 percentiles in several 4-year balanced panels. 
Mobility is highest in the middle section of the distribution, while wages seem to be more 
stable at the bottom and the top of the distribution. Mobility is highest for persons aged 
between 30-39 years. Individual upgrades in the wage distribution are more likely to occur for 
younger workers and for persons working in the public sector, as well as for white-collar 
workers and persons with academic education. Overall wage volatility decreases and wages 
are more volatile in the low-wage sector and for individuals moving downwards in the wage 
distribution. 
This could be of political interest as persons who are discouraged or even concerned about 
their future chances may not invest optimally into their human capital. On the other hand, the 
results show that education is still a means of moving upwards via an academic degree or 
indirectly by working in a professional occupation or outside the blue-collar sector, which 
motivates individuals to embark on further education in order to progress upwards. Another 
point is that the mere subjective feeling of unfairness can lead to confusion and concern in a 
society. Thus, politics are obliged to offer equal chances for everyone. An indicator for such 
chances could be wage mobility, particularly in times of rising wage inequality. 
Further empirical research for the time period after the economic recession in 2008/2009 on 
the effects of the crisis on wages, particularly with regard to inequality and mobility would be 
highly interesting. Moreover, the reforms of the German labour market (e.g. Hartz IV from 
January 2005 on) with effects especially in the low-wage sector are potentially better to 
identify in new data waves; particularly with regard to wage mobility over time for persons 
affected by these treatments. This would provide insight into whether these persons are locked 
in the low-wage sector or whether the reform chances allow for a new start in the labour 
market, thus enabling them to leave the low-wage sector after some time. 
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3.9 Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3A: Tables and Figures 
Table 3.A1a: Wage and Employment Status 2000 vs. 2003 
2003  
Unemployed Low-wage High-wage 
 Unemployed 127 (66.84%) 
31  
(16.32%) 
32 
(16.84%) 
2000 Low-wage 49 (13.07%) 
148 
(39.47%) 
178 
(47.47%) 
 High-wage 109 (4.67%) 
94 
(4.03%) 
2,132 
(91.31%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A1b: Wage and Employment Status 1996 vs. 1999 
1999  
Unemployed Low-wage High-wage 
 Unemployed 80 (47.62%) 
29 
(17.26%) 
59 
(35.12%) 
1996 Low-wage 21 (11.48%) 
70 
(38.25%) 
92 
(50.27%) 
 High-wage 79 (4.83%) 
63 
(3.85%) 
1,493 
(91.31%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A1c: Wage and Employment Status 1992 vs. 1995 
1995  
Unemployed Low-wage High-wage 
 Unemployed 66 (70.97%) 
8  
(8.60%) 
19 
(20.43%) 
1992 Low-wage 16 (12.90%) 
40 
(32.26%) 
68 
(54.84%) 
 High-wage 105 (6.51%) 
44 
(2.73%) 
1,465 
(90.77%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A1d: Wage and Employment Status 1988 vs. 1991 
1991  
Unemployed Low-wage High-wage 
 Unemployed 67 (49.63%) 
13 
(9.63%) 
55 
(40.74%) 
1988 Low-wage 2 (1.24%) 
37 
(22.98%) 
122 
(75.78%) 
 High-wage 52 (3.04%) 
38 
(2.22%) 
1,620 
(94.74%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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Table 3.A1e: Wage and Employment Status 1984 vs. 1987 
1987  
Unemployed Low-wage High-wage 
 Unemployed 68  (52.31%) 
13 
(10.00%) 
49 
(37.69%) 
1984 Low-wage 5 (3.62%) 
34 
(24.64%) 
99 
(71.74%) 
 High-wage 63 (3.84%) 
53 
(3.23%) 
1,526 
(92.94%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A2a: Job Status 2000 vs. 2003 
2003  
Unemployed Blue-collar White-collar Public 
Sector 
Self-
employed 
 Unemployed 127 (66.84%) 
42 
(22.11%) 
14 
(7.37%) 
2 
(1.05%) 
5 
(2.63%) 
 Blue-collar 112 (9.28%) 
986 
(81.69%) 
98 
(8.12%) 
0 11 
(0.91%) 
2000 White-collar 42 (3.86%) 
59 
(5.42%) 
960 
(88.15%) 
7 
(0.64%) 
21 
(1.93%) 
 Public Sector 0 1 (0.38%) 
7 
(2.69%) 
252 
(96.92%) 
0 
 Self-employed 
4 
(2.60%) 
5 
(3.25%) 
18 
(11.69%) 
0 127 
(82.47%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A2b: Job Status 1996 vs. 1999 
1999  
Unemployed Blue-collar White-collar Public 
Sector 
Self-
employed 
 Unemployed 80 (47.62%) 
57 
(33.93%) 
25 
(14.88%) 
1 
(0.60%) 
5 
(2.98%) 
 Blue-collar 82 (8.60%) 
813 
(85.22%) 
47 
(4.93%) 
3 
(0.31%) 
9 
(0.94%) 
1996 White-collar 16 (2.62%) 
39 
(6.39%) 
534 
(87.54%) 
2 
(0.33%) 
19 
(3.11%) 
 Public Sector 1 (0.63%) 
0 1 
(0.63%) 
156 
(98.11%) 
1 
(0.63%) 
 Self-employed 
1 
(1.14%) 
8 
(9.09%) 
14 
(15.91%) 
0 65 
(73.86%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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Table 3.A2c: Job Status 1992 vs. 1995 
1995  
Unemployed Blue-collar White-collar Public 
Sector 
Self-
employed 
 Unemployed 66 (70.97%) 
22 
(23.66%) 
3 
(3.23%) 
1 
(1.08%) 
1 
(1.08%) 
 Blue-collar 92 (9.78%) 
777 
(82.57%) 
58 
(6.16%) 
2 
(0.21%) 
12 
(1.28%) 
1992 White-collar 26 (4.59%) 
42 
(7.42%) 
479 
(84.63%) 
5 
(0.88%) 
14 
(2.47%) 
 Public Sector 1 (0.59%) 
2 
(1.18%) 
5 
(2.96%) 
160 
(94.67%) 
1 
(0.59%) 
 Self-employed 
1 
(1.85%) 
7 
(12.96%) 
7 
(12.96%) 
0 39 
(72.22%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A2d: Job Status 1988 vs. 1991 
1991  
Unemployed Blue-collar White-collar Public 
Sector 
Self-
employed 
 Unemployed 67 (49.63%) 
54 
(40.00%) 
12 
(8.89%) 
1 
(0.74%) 
1 
(0.74%) 
 Blue-collar 41 (3.75%) 
987 
(90.30%) 
57 
(5.22%) 
2 
(0.18%) 
6 
(0.55%) 
1988 White-collar 12 (2.52%) 
25 
(5.24%) 
426 
(89.31%) 
6 
(1.26%) 
8 
(1.68%) 
 Public Sector 0 0 5 (2.40%) 
203 
(97.60%) 
0 
 Self-employed 
1 
(2.22%) 
1 
(2.22%) 
9 
(20.00%) 
0 34 
(75.56%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A2e: Job Status 1984 vs. 1987 
1987  
Unemployed Blue-collar White-collar Public 
Sector 
Self-
employed 
 Unemployed 68 (52.31%) 
45 
(34.62%) 
 16 
(12.31%) 
0 1 
(0.77%) 
 Blue-collar 55 (5.31%) 
926 
(89.38%) 
47 
(4.54%) 
1 
(0.10%) 
7 
(0.68%) 
1984 White-collar 11 (2.28%) 
35 
(7.26%) 
427 
(88.59%) 
4 
(0.83%) 
5 
(1.04%) 
 Public Sector 0 3 (1.45%) 
2 
(0.97%) 
202 
(97.58%) 
0 
 Self-employed 
2 
(3.64%) 
5 
(9.09%) 
4 
(7.27%) 
0 44 
(80.00%) 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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Figure 3.A3a: Earnings Mobility between 1984 and 1987 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.A3b: Earnings Mobility between 1988 and 1991 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.A3c: Earnings Mobility between 1992 and 1995 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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Figure 3.A3d: Earnings Mobility between 1996 and 1999 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.A3e: Earnings Mobility between 2000 and 2003 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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Table 3.A4a: Change in Relative Income Position 
 1988/1991 1996/1999 2000/2003 
Wage Percentile (Start Year) (Base: 50th) nr  nr  nr  
Age (Base: 50-)    
-29 2.31  1.11  -0.29  
30-39 1.12  1.94  0.28  
40-49 0.84  -0.00  -0.34  
Academic Education 4.76 ** 3.08 * 2.78 ** 
Industry (Base: Administration, Education)    
High-tech Industry 5.27 ** 4.24 ** 4.25 ** 
Traffic, Distribution 1.49  -0.68  -0.62  
Financial Services 3.90  6.82 *** 3.89 ** 
Others nr  nr  nr  
Occupation (Base: Professionals)    
Clerks -6.94 *** -5.51 ** -4.30 ** 
Service Workers -8.03 *** -15.69 *** -9.97 *** 
Craft Workers -3.12  -7.11 *** -9.14 *** 
Plant and Machine Operators -8.28 *** -6.07 ** -8.77 *** 
Elementary -8.65 *** -8.98 *** -8.99 *** 
Others nr  nr  nr  
Job Change in    
Year 1 -1.33  -1.92  -3.16 ** 
Year 2 2.33  -1.26  3.94 *** 
Year 3 -0.22  -3.07 * 2.02  
Year 4 1.09  2.82  -1.39  
Firm Size (Base: -19)    
20-199 3.58 ** 4.86 *** 0.04  
200-1999 5.52 *** 6.33 *** 1.43  
2000- 7.09 *** 7.55 *** 3.77 *** 
Unemployed in    
Year 2 -26.81 *** -3.88  0.85  
Year 3 13.32 ** -16.10 ** -9.20 ** 
Job Status (Base: Blue-collar)    
White-collar 5.07 *** 3.76 ** 1.13  
Public sector 2.63  5.46 ** -1.24  
Self-employed 9.14 ** 0.61  3.88 * 
Migrational Background -1.40  -1.90 * 0.64  
Constant -14.45  -8.19  1.93  
N 1,485  1,561  2,339  
Adj. R-squared 0.32  0.20  0.19  
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; nr – results not reported in the table; Others – all other groups are 
separately accounted for in the estimation; *** - significant at the 1% level, ** - at the 5% level, * - at the 10% 
level; own calculation, see text. 
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Figure 3.A5a: Log. Wage Volatility 1984-1987 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.A5b: Log. Wage Volatility 1988-1991 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.A5c: Log. Wage Volatility 1992-1995 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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Figure 3.A5d: Log. Wage Volatility 1996-1999 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Figure 3.A5e: Log. Wage Volatility 2000-2003 
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Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
 
Appendix 3B: Wage Mobility and Volatility for Females 
In contrast to the study of Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007), the data at hand also allows 
to analyse females and to compare the results with those for males. I adopt the same 
definitions and procedures described in the former sections. Employment rates for females are 
far below the levels for males. Nevertheless, they increased sharply from 45% in 1984/1987 
to 66% in 2004/2007, while employment rates for males decreased slightly from 93% to 89% 
during this time. In absolute terms, there are more females in the data, but with regard to the 
lower employment rates, particularly in the 1980s, there are fewer observations of wages, 
resulting in higher confidence intervals and thus in several insignificant coefficients for the 
change in relative income positions in Table 3.A7. The main result in the sense of this study is 
that wage mobility, measured by the standard deviation of the rank wage differences, also 
decreases for females by about 4 points, compared to about 5.5 points for males. While in the 
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first four time periods mobility is higher for males, in 2000/2003 and 2004/2007 mobility is 
higher for females. 
Table 3.A6a: Mobility in Several Time Periods, Females 
Time Period 
Yearly 
Observations 
(Balanced Panel) 
Employment 
Rate 
Real Gross 
Hourly Wage, 
Median 
Standard Deviation of 
Rank Differences, 
Mobility 
2004-2007 3,141 0.66 12.44 18.52 
2000-2003 3,375 0.63 12.40 19.60 
1996-1999 2,165 0.60 12.12 18.53 
1992-1995 2,078 0.58 11.61 20.12 
1988-1991 2,101 0.54 10.85 20.50 
1984-1987 2,234 0.45   9.98 22.41 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; weighted data; own calculation, see text. 
 
I iterate the regression of characteristics to the amount of wage mobility as done in section 3.5 
for males. The age effect is higher for females. Compared to the reference group of persons 
older than 50, younger females face higher upward moves than males. Academic education 
also leads to upward mobility for females, highest in the period 1992/1995 with about 10 
ranks and then decreasing to about 4 while it is not significant in 1996/1999 and the two 
earliest periods. Industry effects and occupation effects have the same signs as for males but 
are more pronounced. Particularly females doing elementary jobs face a 14 ranks (compared 
to 8 ranks for males) higher downward movement compared to females with a professional 
occupation in 2004/2007. Females also face higher chances of moving upwards in larger 
firms, the effect being highest in the second largest group, with a firm size between 200 and 
1,999 employees, while for males, the effects are highest in firms with more than 2,000 
employees. At least in 2004/2007 not being a blue-collar worker has a higher effect for 
females compared to males. 
Overall, wage volatility for females lies at the same level as for males in most years, and in 
some time periods (1988/1991, 1992/1995 and 1996/1999) it is slightly higher. It also 
decreases over time. Volatility is higher for low-wage earners in all time periods and even 
higher compared to males in 1984/1987 and 1988/1991. The wage volatility for females 
moving upwards is higher compared to males in all periods, with the exception of 1988/1991. 
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Table 3.A7a: Change in Relative Income Position, Females 
 2004/2007 2004/2007 1992/ 1995 1984/1987 
  PADAE   
Wage Percentile (Starting Year) (Base: 50th) nr  nr  nr  nr  
Age (Base: 50-)     
-29 2.74 * 3.57 ** 0.99  1.68  
30-39 3.75 *** 2.02  3.37 * 3.80  
40-49 2.32 ** 1.75  4.44 ** 2.08  
Academic Education 4.27 *** 4.23 *** 9.74 *** 4.52  
Industry (Base: Administration, Education)     
High-tech Industry 6.73 *** 5.51 *** 2.07  6.07 * 
Traffic, Distribution 5.63 *** 5.78 *** 10.60 *** -0.69  
Financial Services 6.39 *** 4.78 ** 1.58  4.33  
Others nr  nr  nr  nr  
Occupation (Base: Professionals)     
Clerks -6.33 *** -7.65 *** -8.02 ** -9.33 * 
Service Workers -10.27 *** -11.21 *** -12.69 *** -18.01 *** 
Craft Workers -9.95 *** -7.43 ** -9.21 * -13.86 ** 
Plant and Machine Operators -9.89 *** -10.16 *** -12.07 ** -20.00 *** 
Elementary -14.13 *** -15.63 *** -15.11 *** -23.01 *** 
Others nr  nr  nr  nr  
Job Change in     
Year 1 -1.94  -1.94  -2.02  -  
Year 2 1.33  1.29  5.12 ** 4.31  
Year 3 -2.96 * -1.06  -0.91  -1.54  
Year 4 -3.36 ** -3.48 * -1.35  -  
Firm Size (Base: -19)     
20-199 -0.90  0.47  6.27 *** 3.50 * 
200-1999 3.37 *** 4.23 *** 9.11 *** 6.81 *** 
2000- 1.57  2.58 ** 6.75 *** 6.47 *** 
Unemployed in     
Year 2 -12.41 *** -  12.47 ** 3.01  
Year 3 -0.80  -  -13.55 *** -7.87 * 
Job Status (Base: Blue-collar)     
White-collar 4.14 *** 5.27 *** 4.41 * 3.28  
Public sector 6.88 *** 5.00 ** 2.28  -0.85  
Self-employed 9.03 *** -  19.30 *** -12.14  
Migration Background -1.81  -1.62  -3.06 * -1.24  
Constant -2.82  -1.77  -1.40  -10.80  
N 1,823  1,520  875  718  
Adj. R-squared 0.26  0.25  0.33  0.36  
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; nr – results not reported in the table; PADAE - Prime age dependent 
(in starting year) and always employed; Others – all other groups are separately accounted for in the estimation; 
*** - significant at the 1% level, ** - at the 5% level, * - at the 10% level; own calculation, see text. 
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Table 3.A7b: Change in Relative Income Position, Females 
 1988/1991 1996/1999 2000/2003 
Wage Percentile (Start Year) (Base: 50th) nr  nr  nr  
Age (Base: 50-)       
-29 2.49  3.91 ** 4.16 *** 
30-39 2.69  2.74  4.18 *** 
40-49 1.65  2.21  3.06 ** 
Academic Education 1.53  0.94  4.65 *** 
Industry (Base: Administration, Education)    
High-tech Industry -1.17  0.92  3.86  
Traffic, Distribution -1.99  3.03  4.61 * 
Financial Services 3.52  0.18  4.07 * 
Others nr  nr  nr  
Occupation (Base: Professionals)    
Clerks -11.64 ** -5.66 ** -7.17 *** 
Service Workers -12.36 ** -8.76 ** -10.27 *** 
Craft Workers -16.37 *** -7.67 * -12.01 *** 
Plant and Machine Operators -18.41 *** -9.31 ** -12.75 *** 
Elementary -20.61 *** -9.78 *** -12.23 *** 
Others nr  nr  nr  
Job Change in    
Year 1 -1.17  1.40  -2.81 * 
Year 2 0.31  5.59 ** 2.88 * 
Year 3 3.27  -10.00 *** 1.84  
Year 4 3.46  -2.47  1.87  
Firm Size (Base: -19)    
20-199 6.43 *** 1.62  3.36 *** 
200-1999 9.12 *** 3.58 ** 5.52 *** 
2000- 7.96 *** 5.63 *** 5.81 *** 
Unemployed in    
Year 2 -12.53 * -0.51  -12.99 *** 
Year 3 0.76  -8.52 * -6.50 ** 
Job Status (Base: Blue-collar)    
White-collar 5.58 * 3.98 ** 5.48 *** 
Public sector 5.60  3.37  5.58 ** 
Self-employed 4.72  3.25  4.21  
Migrational Background -2.32  0.92  0.84  
Constant 7.17  -5.67  2.07  
N 581  947  1,626  
Adj. R-squared 0.35  0.22  0.25  
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; nr – results not reported in the table; Others – all other groups are 
separately accounted for in the estimation; *** - significant at the 1% level, ** - at the 5% level, * - at the 10% 
level; own calculation, see text. 
 
Table 3.A8a: Volatility in 4-year Periods, Females 
 84/87 88/91 92/95 96/99 00/03 04/07 
Overall 4.85 4.51 4.89 4.85 4.18 4.24 
Low-wage 5.98 4.68 5.64 4.54 4.36 4.51 
High-wage 4.25 4.42 4.53 4.97 4.07 4.10 
Moving Upwards 4.01 3.35 4.13 3.85 3.89 3.54 
Moving Downwards 4.29 3.90 3.94 4.45 3.68 4.05 
Source: Samples from SOEP 1984-2007; own calculation, see text. 
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4. Soziale Ungleichheit von Geisteswissenschaftlern im Beruf 
Dieser Teil ist eine gemeinsame Arbeit mit Michael Gebel und wurde veröffentlicht in: Heike 
Solga, Denis Huschka, Patricia Eilsberger, Gert G. Wagner (Herausgeber), Findigkeit in 
unsicheren Zeiten, Ergebnisse des Expertisenwettbewerbs "Arts und Figures – 
GeisteswissenschaftlerInnen im Beruf", Opladen & Farmington Hills, 157-174. 
Zusammenfassung: Die Expertise befasst sich mit der Situation für Geisteswissenschaftler 
auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt im Vergleich zu anderen Akademikern und zum 
Arbeitsmarkt in Großbritannien. Datengrundlage sind der Mikrozensus und der British Labour 
Force Survey. Geisteswissenschaftler erzielen in Deutschland, auch wenn man auf 
individuelle Eigenschaften und institutionelle Gegebenheiten kontrolliert, niedrigere 
Nettoarbeitseinkommen als andere Akademiker. Darüber hinaus sind sie überproportional von 
Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen, sind zu einem hohen Anteil befristet beschäftigt und haben den 
zweithöchsten Teilzeitanteil aller Akademikergruppen. Das Risiko bildungsinadäquater 
Beschäftigung ist vergleichbar mit anderen Akademikergruppen. Bezüglich der relativen 
Einkommensposition und der relativen Betroffenheit von Arbeitslosigkeit sind 
Geisteswissenschaftler in Deutschland und Großbritannien vergleichbar. 
Schlüsselwörter: Löhne, Hochschulbildung, Lohnverteilung. 
JEL-Klassifikation: J31, I23, J24 
4.1 Einleitung 
Im Zentrum der folgenden Analyse stehen die Arbeitsmarktchancen von 
Geisteswissenschaftlern. Die bisherige akademische Forschung konzentriert sich insbesondere 
auf die Arbeitsmarktlage verschiedener Fachrichtungen im Vergleich und vermeidet einen 
expliziten Fokus auf eine spezifische Fachgruppe wie z.B. die der Geisteswissenschaftler (u.a. 
Daymont und Andrisani, 1984; Kalmijn und van der Lippe, 1997; van de Werfhorst und 
Kraaykamp, 2001). Absolventenstudien für einzelne Fachgruppen haben den Nachteil, dass 
sie sich auf eine oder wenige Universitäten und Abgangskohorten konzentrieren und damit an 
mangelnder Repräsentativität leiden. Die folgende Analyse soll daher durch eine möglichst 
repräsentative Studie der Arbeitsmarktchancen der Fachgruppe der Geisteswissenschaftler in 
Deutschland diese Forschungslücke schließen. 
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Wir evaluieren Arbeitsmarktchancen von Geisteswissenschaftlern anhand des erzielten 
Einkommens und des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos. In einem theoretischen Ansatz werden 
zunächst verschiedene Erklärungsansätze zur Arbeitsmarktlage von Geisteswissenschaftlern 
aus der neueren ökonomischen und soziologischen Forschung systematisch 
zusammengetragen. Zur empirischen Analyse werten wir den deutschen Mikrozensus für das 
Jahr 2005 aus. Um die Arbeitsmarktchancen von Geisteswissenschaftlern zusätzlich aus 
relativer Perspektive evaluieren zu können, verwenden wir zum einen andere 
Akademikergruppen innerhalb des deutschen Arbeitsmarktes als Vergleichsgruppe. Zum 
anderen soll ein europäischer Vergleich zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien Auskunft 
über die relative Positionierung von Geisteswissenschaftlern in Deutschland geben. 
Insbesondere versprechen die unterschiedlichen institutionellen Gegebenheiten im 
Bildungssystem und auf dem Arbeitsmarkt weitere Erkenntnisgewinne. 
Unser Forschungsbeitrag hat folgende Struktur: Im zweiten Kapitel (4.2) geben wir eine 
Übersicht über verschiedene theoretische Erklärungsansätze zu der Arbeitsmarktlage von 
Geisteswissenschaftlern. Kapitel 4.3 beschreibt die verwendeten Daten des Mikrozensus und 
gibt insbesondere Auskunft über deskriptive Charakteristika einzelner Subgruppen von 
Geisteswissenschaftlern. In Kapitel 4.4 wird die Arbeitsmarktsituation für 
Geisteswissenschaftler in Deutschland bezüglich Einkommen und Arbeitslosigkeit analysiert. 
Kapitel 4.5 vergleicht die Situation von Geisteswissenschaftlern in Deutschland mit 
Großbritannien. Eine abschließende Zusammenfassung findet sich in Kapitel 4.6. 
4.2 Theoretische Erklärungsansätze  
Während zahlreiche Theorien zum Zusammenhang zwischen Bildungsniveau und 
Arbeitsmarkterfolg existieren und getestet wurden (vgl. theoretische Übersicht von Bills, 
2003; empirische Übersicht von Card, 1999), sind die kausalen Mechanismen zwischen der 
Bildungsfachrichtung wie beispielsweise dem Studium der Geisteswissenschaften und dem 
späteren Arbeitsmarkterfolg weniger exakt nachgezeichnet. Es gibt jedoch einige empirische 
Forschungsarbeiten, die explizit zeigen, dass neben dem Bildungsniveau auch die 
Bildungsfachrichtung entscheidend für die soziale Ungleichheit auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ist 
(Daymont und Andrisani, 1984; Kalmijn und van der Lippe, 1997; van de Werfhorst und 
Kraaykamp, 2001). Während das Bildungsniveau die „vertikale Dimension“ zeichnet, 
differenziert die Bildungsfachrichtung entlang einer „horizontalen Dimension“ (Davies und 
Guppy, 1997: 1418-9). Unterschiede zwischen Fachrichtungen zeigen sich auf dem 
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Arbeitsmarkt und auch in anderen Lebensbereichen, z.B. bei politischen Einstellungen 
(Nilsson und Ekehammar, 1986), dem Lebensstil und Konsummustern (van de Werfhorst und 
Kraaykamp, 2001). Allerdings herrscht in der Forschung Uneinigkeit hinsichtlich der 
zugrundeliegenden Wirkungsmechanismen. 
Erstens lassen sich fachspezifische Arbeitsmarktchancen in Anlehnung an die 
Humankapitaltheorie (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974) erklären. Laut dieser Theorie erhöhen 
Bildungsinvestitionen die allgemeine Produktivität eines Individuums und damit dessen 
Arbeitsmarktchancen. Zwar differenziert die Humankapitaltheorie zwischen in der Schule 
erworbenem allgemeinem Humankapital und im Berufsleben „on the job“ akquiriertem 
spezifischen Humankapital, aber diese Unterscheidung wird der Heterogenität der 
Schulbildung in Form unterschiedlicher Studienfächer nicht gerecht. Als Erweiterung der 
Humankapitaltheorie wird angenommen, dass sich das erworbene Humankapital auch 
zwischen einzelnen Bildungsfachrichtungen unterscheidet (van de Werfhorst und Kraaykamp, 
2001). Demnach akquirieren die Individuen fachrichtungsspezifische Fähigkeiten in den 
einzelnen Fachrichtungen, die unterschiedliche Produktivitätseffekte und damit 
Arbeitsmarkterfolge induzieren. Gemäß Bourdieu (1984) sind beispielsweise 
sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengänge mit dem Erwerb von ökonomischem Humankapital 
assoziiert, während Geisteswissenschaftler kulturelles Humankapital akkumulieren. Während 
ökonomische Ressourcen leichter in ökonomischen Erfolg auf dem Arbeitsmarkt transferiert 
werden können, erleichtern kulturelle Ressourcen den intellektuellen kulturellen Konsum und 
helfen beim Zugang zum kulturellen Arbeitsmarktsegment, sind jedoch außerhalb dessen 
nicht förderlich für die Produktivität (van de Werfhorst, 2002). Folglich sind geringere 
Arbeitsmarkterfolge zu erwarten, da das kulturelle Arbeitsmarktsegment weniger ein hohes 
Einkommen bzw. Beschäftigungsstabilität sondern eher hohe kulturelle Renditen generiert. 
Des Weiteren unterscheiden van de Werfhorst und Kraaykamp (2001) kommunikatives 
Humankapital, das insbesondere in sozialen Berufen und in der Lehrerausbildung erworben 
wird sowie technisches Humankapital. Kommunikative Ressourcen erzeugen zwar stärkere 
„social skills“, aber ihr Arbeitsmarktwert ist ähnlich wie der des kulturellen Kapitals 
beschränkt. Technisches Humankapital hingegen, das insbesondere in den 
Naturwissenschaften und Ingenieurwissenschaften erworben wird, ist stark an der Nachfrage 
am Arbeitsmarkt orientiert und garantiert daher relativ höhere Löhne ähnlich wie das 
ökonomische Humankapital. 
Zweitens können fachspezifische Arbeitsmarkterfolge mit den arbeitsmarktrelevanten 
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Charakteristika der Studenten der einzelnen Fächer zusammenhängen. Wenn sich Studenten 
auf Basis ihrer individuellen Charakteristika wie z.B. ihrer Fähigkeiten oder ihrer Motivation 
in die Studiengänge selbst selektieren oder wenn Bildungsinstitutionen Studenten auf Basis 
dieser Charakteristika auswählen, dann ergeben sich Arbeitsmarktunterschiede nicht nur 
aufgrund des erlernten fachspezifischen Wissens sondern auch der individuellen Fähigkeiten, 
die bereits vor der Studienwahl ausgeprägt sind. Im Gegensatz zur Humankapitaltheorie, die 
von fachspezifischen Produktivitätseffekten ausgeht, nehmen diese „Signalling“- oder 
„Sorting“-Ansätze an, dass sich Studenten bereits ex ante hinsichtlich ihrer 
Arbeitsmarktfähigkeiten unterscheiden (Arrow, 1973; Riley, 2001; Spence, 1973). 
Beispielsweise zeigt Arcidiacono (2004) mit U.S.-Daten, dass Studenten der 
Naturwissenschaften höhere intellektuelle Fähigkeiten sowohl in Mathematik als auch in 
verbalen Tests haben als Studenten der Geisteswissenschaften. Selbstselektionseffekte werden 
dadurch begründet, dass fähigere Individuen mit größerer Wahrscheinlichkeit diejenigen 
Fächer wählen, die die höchsten Arbeitsmarkterträge versprechen bzw. sie sehen sich eher in 
der Lage, die relativ höheren psychischen Kosten anspruchsvollerer Studiengänge zu 
meistern. Sortiereffekte ergeben sich, wenn Institutionen ex ante versuchen, die besten 
Kandidaten herauszufiltern. Treten solche Selbstselektions- oder Sortiereffekte auf, dann kann 
es zu einer Intensivierung der Effekte durch statistische Diskriminierung kommen (Aigner 
und Cane, 1977; Arrow, 1973). Demnach schließen Arbeitgeber aufgrund einer niedrigeren 
mittleren Qualität von Absolventen einer Fachrichtung auf die Qualität aller Absolventen 
dieser Fachgruppe, soweit die individuellen Fähigkeiten nicht direkt beobachtbar sind. 
Drittens wird der unterschiedliche Arbeitsmarkterfolg von Geisteswissenschaftlern im 
Vergleich zu anderen Fächergruppen häufig mit dem einfachen ökonomischen 
Arbeitsangebots- und Arbeitsnachfrage-Modell erklärt. In diesem Modell ergeben sich ein 
niedriger Lohn bzw. schlechte Arbeitsmarktchancen durch ein relativ hohes Angebot von 
und/oder einer relativ niedrigen Nachfrage nach Absolventen einer bestimmten Fachrichtung. 
Existiert beispielsweise ein Überangebot an geisteswissenschaftlichen Absolventen im 
Vergleich zu den offenen Vakanzen für Geisteswissenschaftler, dann sind die 
Arbeitsmarktchancen schlechter als für Fachrichtungen mit weniger Absolventen pro Vakanz. 
Der Angebots- und Nachfragemechanismus kann durch institutionalisierte 
Zugangsbeschränkungen beeinflusst werden. In manchen Fachrichtungen, wie z.B. Medizin 
oder Jura, wird das Angebot an Studienplätzen künstlich verknappt durch Numeri clausi, 
Aufnahmeprüfungen oder höhere Studienkosten. Solche „sozialen Schließungsprozesse“ 
(Sorensen, 2000; Weeden, 2002) erlauben die Generierung von „Renten“ auf dem 
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Arbeitsmarkt, d.h. Erträge über dem markträumenden Lohn, der sich in Abwesenheit dieser 
institutionellen Beschränkungen bilden würde.  
4.3 Datengrundlage und Untersuchungsstichprobe 
Zur Analyse der Arbeitsmarktchancen von Geisteswissenschaftlern verwenden wir das 
„Scientific Usefile“ des Mikrozenus 2005. Beim Mikrozensus handelt es sich um eine 
repräsentative 1%-Haushaltsstichprobe der deutschen Wohnbevölkerung mit Informationen 
zu Bildung, Arbeitsmarktlage und weiteren sozialstrukturellen Merkmalen. Der große 
Stichprobenumfang erlaubt die Analyse kleiner Subpopulationen wie die der 
Geisteswissenschaftler.  
Hinsichtlich der Definition, welche Studiengänge dem Schwerpunkt Geisteswissenschaften 
zuzuordnen sind, gibt es verschiedene Auffassungen. Wir orientieren uns in unserer Analyse 
an der Definition des Wissenschaftsrats (Wissenschaftsrat, 2006: 122-123), die sich ihrerseits 
an der Systematik des Statistischen Bundesamtes orientiert.28 Demnach setzt sich die 
Studienrichtung Geisteswissenschaften aus den in Tabelle 4.1 aufgeführten Subgruppen 
zusammen. Die Zuordnung erfolgt auf Basis der im Mikrozensus verfügbaren Variable 
„Höchster beruflicher Abschluss: Hauptfachrichtung“. Generell wird die Analyse auf die 
Gruppe der Tertiärgebildeten, d.h. Fachhochschul- und Universitätsabsolventen beschränkt. 
Als Referenzgruppe zur Evaluation der relativen Arbeitsmarktlage von 
Geisteswissenschaftlern dienen alternative tertiäre Fachrichtungen. Bezüglich der Definition 
einzelner Fachrichtungen herrscht ebenfalls Uneinigkeit in der Literatur. Wir verwenden zur 
Abgrenzung die Fächerklassifikation des ISCED-97 Schemas (UNESCO, 1997), das zum 
einen die Fächer nicht ad hoc, sondern vor dem Hintergrund der institutionellen 
Begebenheiten, definiert und zum anderen den Vorteil internationaler Vergleichbarkeit 
aufweist. Geisteswissenschaftler stellen 9,2% der Tertiärgebildeten im Mikrozensus (vgl. 
Tabelle 4.2). Größere Studiengruppen sind die Ingenieurwissenschaften mit 22,9% und die 
Sozialwissenschaften mit 23,2%. Auffallend ist insbesondere der relativ hohe Frauenanteil in 
der Gruppe der Geisteswissenschaftler von 59%, der nur von den Erziehungswissenschaftlern 
(66%) übertroffen wird. Damit grenzen sich die Geisteswissenschaften und 
Erziehungswissenschaften von den Männerdomänen Ingenieurwissenschaften und 
                                                          
28 Im Gegensatz zur Definition des Statistischen Bundesamts erkennt der Wissenschaftsrat die Theologie nicht 
als Teil der Geisteswissenschaften an. 
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Naturwissenschaften ab. Trotz Bildungsexpansion, die insbesondere den Frauenanteil im 
Tertiärbildungsbereich ansteigen ließ und damit zu einer Reduktion der 
Geschlechterungleichheit bezüglich des vertikalen Bildungsniveaus führte, scheint die 
Geschlechtersegregation nach horizontalen Bildungsfachrichtungen fortzubestehen (Charles 
und Bradley, 2002). Diese Persistenz wird durch kulturell verankerte Vorstellungen und 
geschlechtsspezifische Sozialisationen im Bildungssystem erklärt, die nicht im Gegensatz zu 
Gleichberechtigungstendenzen stehen (Charles und Bradley, 2002).29  
Tabelle 4.1: Deskription der Geisteswissenschaftler, 2005 
 N  FH Uni Promo-
vierte 
Frauen Alter 
       
Alle Geisteswissenschaftler 3.582 12,7% 78,6% 8,7% 58,8% 48,0 
       
Sprach- und 
Kulturwissenschaften allg. 
43 7,0% 83,7% 9,3% 65,1% 47,8 
Philosophie 428 6,1% 76,6% 17,3% 30,8% 51.0 
Geschichte  250 3,2% 77,6% 19,2% 40,1% 48,1 
Bibliothekswissenschaft, 
Dokumentation, Publizistik 
169 68,6% 27,2% 4,1% 78,1% 48,1 
Allg. und vgleich. Literatur- 
und Sprachwissenschaft 
175 5,1% 80,6% 14,3% 69,1% 43,8 
Altphilologie, Neugriechisch 103 3,9% 79,6% 16,5% 59,2% 53,6 
Germanistik  563 5,7% 86,2% 8,2% 70,2% 46,4 
Anglistik, Amerikanistik 533 18,8% 77,3% 3,9% 76,9% 47,7 
Romanistik 96 9,4% 85,4% 5,2% 78,1% 49,9 
Slawistik, Baltistik, Finno-
Ugristik 
40 2,5% 85,0% 12,5% 75,0% 53,3 
Außereuropäische Sprach- 
und Kulturwissenschaften 
40 2,5% 82,5% 15,0% 57,5% 45,4 
Kulturwissenschaften i.e.S. 91 4,4% 89,0% 6,6% 68,1% 41,7 
Kunst, Kunstwissenschaft 
allg. 
128 3,1% 81,3% 15,6% 64,1% 44,9 
Bildende Kunst 163 18,4% 79,8% 1,8% 44,8% 48,3 
Gestaltung - - - - - - 
Darstellende Kunst, Film 
und Fernsehen, 
Theaterwissenschaft 
156 15,4% 81,4% 3,2% 49,4% 47,7 
Musik, Musikwissenschaft 604 13,9% 83,1% 3,0% 50,7% 49,2 
Quelle: Mikrozensus, eigene Berechnung. 
 
In Tabelle 4.1 werden detailliert die einzelnen geisteswissenschaftlichen Subgruppen nach 
Gesamtgröße, Bildungsniveau, Frauenanteil und Durchschnittsalter differenziert beschrieben. 
Insbesondere bei kleinen Fallzahlen sind jedoch die Ergebnisse mit Vorsicht zu interpretieren. 
Insgesamt können wir im Jahr 2005 3.582 Geisteswissenschaftler identifizieren. Große 
Untergruppen sind Philosophen, Germanisten und Musiker. In einigen Untergruppen 
übersteigt der Frauenanteil sogar 75 %. 
                                                          
29 So ist beispielsweise die Geschlechtersegregation in skandinavischen Ländern besonders ausgeprägt, obwohl 
diese durch ein hohes Niveau an Gleichberechtigung charakterisiert sind (Bradley, 2000: 8-9). 
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4.4 Die Arbeitsmarktlage von Geisteswissenschaftlern in Deutschland 
Zur Evaluation der Arbeitsmarktsituation von Geisteswissenschaftlern untersuchen wir neben 
der Arbeitslosenquote insbesondere das Einkommen als zentrale Dimension der sozialen 
Ungleichheit. Idealerweise dienen in empirischen Studien reale Bruttostundenlöhne als 
Verdienstgröße, da diese am wenigsten durch das Steuersystem beeinflusst werden. Im 
Mikrozensus werden jedoch nur Nettomonatseinkommen abgefragt. Arbeitsstundenangaben 
stehen im Mikrozensus zwar zur Verfügung, von einer Berechnung von Nettostundenlöhnen 
wird hier im Gegensatz zu anderen Studien (siehe z.B. Machin und Puhani, 2003) aber 
Abstand genommen, da begründet durch das Steuersystem der Einfluss einer zusätzlichen 
Arbeitsstunde auf das Nettoeinkommen nicht vergleichbar über die gesamte 
Einkommensverteilung ist. Aus diesem Grund betrachten wir in der weiteren Untersuchung 
zum Einkommen nur Personen, die Vollzeit erwerbstätig sind, unabhängig von den geleisteten 
Stunden.  
Ein weiteres Problem bei der Einkommensanalyse mit dem Mikrozensus ist, dass das 
berichtete Nettomonatseinkommen nicht einzelnen Einkommensarten wie Arbeitseinkommen, 
Renten, öffentlichen Zahlungen oder Einkommen aus Vermögen oder Vermietung 
zuzuordnen ist, sondern als Gesamtsumme abgefragt wird. Um dies zu berücksichtigen, 
betrachten wir im Folgenden nur Personen mit Arbeitseinkommen als alleiniger 
Einkommensart. Das in Bandbreiten angegebene Einkommen approximieren wir jeweils mit 
dem Gruppenmittelwert und in der obersten Kategorie mit dem Randwert plus 10%. 
Insbesondere im mittleren Bereich der Lohnverteilung ist diese Annahme gerechtfertigt und 
führt zu einer plausiblen Abbildung der zugrunde liegenden Verteilung (Stauder und Hüning, 
2004). Des Weiteren begrenzen wir die zu untersuchende Stichprobe auf Personen im Alter 
zwischen 25 und 55 Jahren. In dieser Phase ist von einer hohen Arbeitsmarktpartizipation 
auszugehen, insbesondere schließen wir so die Phase der Ausbildung und eventuelle 
Frühverrentungsphasen aus.  
Tabelle 4.2 zeigt die durchschnittlichen Nettomonatseinkommen, die von verschiedenen 
Fachgruppen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt erzielt werden. Geisteswissenschaftler erhalten die 
niedrigsten Einkommen (1.874 €). Innerhalb der Gruppe der Geisteswissenschaftler weisen 
Absolventen philosophischer Studiengänge (2.114 €) und Geschichte (2.017 €) mit die 
höchsten Einkommen aus, wohingegen Absolventen bildender Künste die niedrigsten 
Einkommen erzielen (1.404 €). Ergänzend ist in Tabelle 4.2 die Arbeitslosenquote als weitere 
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Dimension der sozialen Ungleichheit auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ausgewiesen. So zeigt sich, dass 
Geisteswissenschaftler nicht nur bezüglich des Einkommens sondern auch bezüglich der 
Arbeitslosigkeit relativ schlecht abschneiden. Die Arbeitslosenquote der 
Geisteswissenschaftler ist mit 6,8% am höchsten und liegt 1,7 Prozentpunkte über dem 
Durchschnitt.  
Tabelle 4.2: Tertiäre Fachrichtungen in Deutschland im Jahr 2005 und deren Einkommen 
und Arbeitslosenquote 
  Anteil Einkommen (€) Arbeitslosenquote  
Alle 100,0% 2369 5,1% 
Agrarwissenschaften 3,2% 2032 6,3% 
Dienstleistung. 2,0% 2117 6,7% 
Erziehungswissenschaften 16,2% 2180 3,4% 
Geisteswissenschaften 9,2% 1874 6,8% 
Gesundheit 11,4% 2812 3,2% 
Ingenieurwissenschaften 22,9% 2333 6,6% 
Naturwissenschaften 11,0% 2411 5,0% 
Sozialwissenschaften 23,2% 2496 4,9% 
Theologie 0,9% 2104 0,9% 
Quelle: Mikrozensus, eigene Berechnungen. 
 
Abbildung 4.1 zeigt die gesamte Einkommensverteilung von Absolventen der 
Geisteswissenschaften im Vergleich zu den beiden größten Absolventengruppen 
Ingenieurwissenschaften und Sozialwissenschaften. So verdienen etwa nur ein Drittel aller 
Ingenieurwissenschaftler und Sozialwissenschaftler weniger als 1700 €, wohingegen dies für 
über die Hälfte der Geisteswissenschaftler der Fall ist. Am oberen Ende der Verteilung ist das 
Bild ähnlich. So haben lediglich 10% der Geisteswissenschaftler ein Einkommen von 3.100 € 
oder mehr, während bei Ingenieurwissenschaftlern und Sozialwissenschaftlern dieser Anteil 
mit 20% doppelt so hoch ist. 
Somit scheint ein durchschnittlicher Einkommensunterschied zwischen 
Geisteswissenschaftlern und anderen Akademikergruppen gemäß den ersten deskriptiven 
Analysen als empirisch belegt. Eine Regression nach der Methode der kleinsten Quadrate des 
logarithmierten Einkommens auf die verschieden Studiengruppen ohne weitere 
Kontrollgrößen zeigt, dass Geisteswissenschaftler im Jahr 2005 23% weniger verdienen als 
Absolventen der Ingenieurwissenschaften, wohingegen Sozialwissenschaftler ein um 4% 
höheres Einkommen als Ingenieurwissenschaftler erzielen (vgl. Spezifikation 1 in Tabelle 
4.3).30  
                                                          
30 Zusätzlich haben wir eine Intervallregression für die gruppierten Einkommensgrößen durchgeführt, die unsere 
Ergebnisse aus dem Schätzverfahren der kleinsten Quadrate bestätigt hat (Ergebnisse auf Anfrage von den 
Autoren erhältlich). 
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Abbildung 4.1: Einkommensverteilung 2005 
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Quelle: Mikrozensus, eigene Berechnungen. 
 
Tabelle 4.3: Einflussgrößen auf das Nettomonatseinkommen in Deutschland, 2005 
Abhängige Variable: 
Log. Nettomonatseinkommen 
Spez. 1 Spez. 2 
Hauptfachrichtung (Basis: Ingenieurswissenschaften) 
Geisteswissenschaften -0,23 *** -0,12 *** 
Erziehungswissenschaften -0,02  0,05 *** 
Sozialwissenschaften 0,04 *** 0,12 *** 
6 weitere Hauptfachrichtungen ja ja 
Persönlicher Hintergrund (Basis: FH-Abschluss) 
Weiblich - -0,21 *** 
Alter - 0,06 *** 
Alter zum Quadrat - -0,00 *** 
Ausländer - -0,11 *** 
Uni-Abschluss - 0,10 *** 
Promotion - 0,26 *** 
Region (Basis: Westdeutschland) 
Berlin  - -0,13 *** 
Ostdeutschland - -0,26 *** 
Familiärer Hintergrund (Basis: keine Kinder) 
verheiratet - 0,07 *** 
1 Kind - 0,04 *** 
2 Kinder - 0,12 *** 
3 oder mehr Kinder - 0,22 *** 
Art der Beschäftigung 
Selbständig - 0,08 *** 
Öffentlicher Dienst - 0.02 ** 
Jobwechsel im letzten Jahr - -0,15 *** 
Betriebesgröße 
4 Kategorien - ja 
Wirtschaftszweig 
8 Kategorien - ja 
N 18.077 18.077 
R2 0,02 0,24 
Signifikanzniveaus: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
Quelle: Mikrozensus, eigene Berechnungen. 
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Wenn man zusätzlich auf den persönlichen Hintergrund kontrolliert, reduziert sich die 
Einkommensdifferenz auf 17%. Die einzelnen Variablen haben die erwarteten Vorzeichen 
und sind größtenteils auf dem 1% Niveau signifikant. So steigt das Einkommen konkav mit 
dem Alter, höherwertige Abschlüsse (Universitätsabschluss und Promotion im Vergleich zu 
Fachhochschulabschlüssen) spiegeln sich in einem höheren Einkommen nieder und Frauen 
und Ausländer erfahren die erwarteten Einkommenseinbußen. In Ostdeutschland und Berlin 
liegen die Nettoeinkommen unterhalb denen in Westdeutschland. Des Weiteren steigt das 
Nettoeinkommen für verheiratete Personen und mit der Anzahl der Kinder, was stark durch 
das Steuersystem begründet ist. Nach dem Hinzufügen weiterer Kontrollvariablen wie Art der 
Beschäftigung, Betriebsgröße und Wirtschaftszweig reduziert sich die Einkommensdifferenz 
zwischen Ingenieurwissenschaftlern und Geisteswissenschaftlern auf 12% (vgl. Spezifikation 
2 in Tabelle 4.3). Somit kann die Hälfte der ursprünglich festgestellten Einkommensdifferenz 
auf eine im Bezug auf das Einkommen schlechtere Verteilung der Geisteswissenschaftler 
innerhalb verschiedener Kontrollgrößen zurückgeführt werden. 
Tabelle 4.4: Einflussgrößen auf das Nettoeinkommen mit Interaktion, 2005 
Abhängige Variable: 
Log. Nettomonatseinkommen 
 
Hauptfachrichtung (Basis: Ingenieurwissenschaften) 
Geisteswissenschaften -0,05  
Persönlicher Hintergrund (Basis: FH-Abschluss) 
Weiblich -0,22 *** 
Weiblich * Geisteswissenschaften 0,09 *** 
Region (Basis: Westdeutschland) 
Berlin -0,14 *** 
Berlin * Geisteswissenschaften 0,16 *** 
Ostdeutschland -0,26 *** 
Ostdeutschland * Geisteswissenschaften 0,09 ** 
Familiärer Hintergrund (Basis: keine Kinder) 
Verheiratet  0,07 *** 
Verheiratet * Geisteswissenschaften -0,02  
Art der Beschäftigung 
Selbständig 0,12 *** 
Selbständig * Geisteswissenschaften -0,42 *** 
Öffentlicher Dienst 0,01  
Öffentlicher Dienst * Geisteswissenschaften 0,07 ** 
Betriebesgröße 
4 Kategorien ja 
4 Kategorien * Geisteswissenschaften ja 
Alle sonstige Variablen aus Spezifikation 2, Tabelle 3 ja 
N 18.077 
R2 0,24 
Signifikanzniveaus: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. 
Quelle: Mikrozensus, eigene Berechnungen. 
 
In einer weiteren Analyse werden zusätzlich in die Regression Interaktionsterme einiger 
erklärender Variablen mit den Ausprägungen Geisteswissenschaftler (0= nein, 1= ja) 
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aufgenommen, um den Effekt einzelner Merkmale auf das Einkommen getrennt für 
Geisteswissenschaftler und andere Akademikergruppen zu analysieren (vgl. Tabelle 4.4). 
Besonders auffallend ist hierbei der Effekt der Selbständigkeit. Während Selbständigkeit zu 
einem Einkommensanstieg von 12% führt, erfahren Geisteswissenschaftler zusätzlich einen 
Einkommensrückgang von 42%, so dass selbständige Geisteswissenschaftler in der Summe 
ein um 30% niedrigeres Einkommen hinnehmen müssen. Des Weiteren reduzieren sich die 
Einkommenseinbußen für Geisteswissenschaftler in Berlin bzw. verschwinden sogar ganz. 
Wenn Geisteswissenschaftler im öffentlichen Dienst beschäftigt sind, erhöht das ihr 
Einkommen, während für die übrigen Akademiker hier kein signifikanter Einfluss feststellbar 
ist. Ein Versuch einer dreifachen Interaktion von den Variablen „Geisteswissenschaftler“, 
„Berlin“ und „öffentlichen Dienst“ um z.B. für eine Beschäftigung im besonders ausgeprägten 
öffentlichen Sektor in Berlin zu kontrollieren, führt zu keinen signifikanten Ergebnissen. 
4.5 Europäischer Vergleich: Geisteswissenschaftler in Großbritannien und Deutschland 
Zur Evaluation der relativen Arbeitsmarktlage von Geisteswissenschaftlern führen wir 
zusätzlich einen Ländervergleich zwischen Großbritannien und Deutschland durch. Diese 
beiden Länder wurden bereits in vorangegangen Studien zum Einfluss der 
Fachstudienrichtung auf den individuellen Arbeitsmarkterfolg ausgewählt (u.a. Kim und Kim, 
2003; Machin und Puhani, 2003). Der Vergleich bietet sich an, um zu testen, ob die 
existierenden institutionellen und strukturellen Unterschiede zwischen Großbritannien und 
Deutschland einen Erklärungsbeitrag für die Arbeitsmarktlage von Geisteswissenschaftlern 
liefern können. 
Zum einen spielt die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des Bildungssystems in Form der 
Standardisierung und Stratifizierung der Abschlüsse eine Rolle. Während Deutschland durch 
ein standardisiertes und stratifiziertes Bildungssystem, sowie einer engen Verbindung 
zwischen Bildungssystem und Arbeitsmarktsystem in Form berufsspezifischer Arbeitsmärkte 
charakterisiert ist (Allmendinger, 1989; Shavit und Müller, 1998), hat Großbritannien eher ein 
weniger stratifiziertes System sowie eine schwache Verbindung von Bildung und 
Arbeitsmarkt, da firmeninterne Arbeitsmärkte dominieren, deren Zugang nur schwach über 
Bildung reguliert wird (Shavit und Müller, 1998). Van de Werfhorst (2004) argumentiert 
hingegen, dass diese Klassifikationen eher für die Sekundärbildung passend sind und durch 
zusätzliche Charakterisierungen der Tertiärbildung ergänzt werden müssen. So lässt sich die 
Stratifizierungsdimension durch drei Unterscheidungen ergänzen. Erstens ist bei beruflich 
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orientierten Tertiärbildungen eine besondere Wirkung der Bildungsfachrichtung zu erwarten 
(Breen, 2005). Hingegen stellt zweitens das Bachelor-Master-System ein alternatives Signal 
der Unterscheidbarkeit dar und drittens trägt die Existenz von Haupt- und Nebenfächern zur 
Verwischung des Effekts der Bildungsfachrichtung bei. Folglich ist in Deutschland im 
Gegensatz zu Großbritannien von einer stärkeren Wirkung der Bildungsfachrichtung, wie z.B. 
Geisteswissenschaften, auszugehen, da die Tertiärbildung der jetzigen 
Arbeitsmarktteilnehmer durch ein starkes berufliches Segment sowie noch nicht so stark 
durch das erst jetzt entstehende Bachelor-Master-System charakterisiert ist. Hingegen gibt es 
sowohl in Deutschland in den Magisterstudiengängen als auch in Großbritannien die 
Möglichkeit der Nebenfachbelegung. Ein alternatives Argument, das für eine stärkere Rolle 
der Fachrichtung in Großbritannien spricht, ist der hohe Tertiäranteil im Bildungsbereich. 
Wenn viele Absolventen über Hochschulbildung verfügen, dann müssen Arbeitgeber 
zusätzliche Selektionskriterien, wie z.B. die Fachrichtung, hinzuziehen (Kim und Kim, 2003). 
Zum anderen ist auch ein Effekt seitens der Regulierung des Arbeitsmarktes zu erwarten. So 
ist der Arbeitsmarkt in Großbritannien viel schwächer reguliert und offener als in 
Deutschland. In Kombination mit der in 2005 günstigeren wirtschaftlichen Lage in 
Großbritannien ist daher von größeren Arbeitsmarktchancen für Geisteswissenschaftler 
auszugehen. Hingegen spricht die Existenz eines größeren öffentlichen Sektors in 
Deutschland für eine bessere Arbeitsmarktintegration von Geisteswissenschaftlern, da der 
öffentliche Sektor ein klassisches Betätigungsfeld für Geisteswissenschaftler darstellt. 
Folglich ist der Gesamteffekt der institutionellen und strukturellen Länderunterschiede auf die 
Rolle der Bildungsfachrichtung und damit die relative Arbeitsmarktlage von 
Geisteswissenschaftlern unklar. Die folgende Analyse soll hierzu eine empirische Antwort 
liefern. 
Zur empirischen Überprüfung der Länderunterschiede verwenden wir neben dem 
Mikrozensus den britischen Labour Force Survey (LFS). Viele Variablen des britischen LFS 
sind mit denen des Mikrozensus direkt vergleichbar, was nicht zuletzt in den Bestrebungen 
der EU begründet liegt, die nationalen Arbeitskräfteerhebungen der Mitgliedsstaaten zu 
harmonisieren. Die verbleibenden Unterschiede zwischen den Datensätzen versuchen wir 
durch die Verwendung internationaler Klassifikationsschemata zu beheben. So haben wir 
beispielsweise analog zum Mikrozensus im britischen LFS die Bildungsfachrichtung in das 
international vergleichbare ISCED-97 Schema (UNESCO, 1997) transformiert. Tabelle 4.5 
gibt eine deskriptive Übersicht zur Verteilung der Tertiärgebildeten auf die einzelnen 
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Studienfachrichtungen. Im deutsch-britischen Vergleich zeigen sich deutliche Unterschiede in 
der Verteilung (vgl. Tabelle 4.3 und 4.5). So ist der Anteil der Ingenieurwissenschaften in 
Deutschland mehr als doppelt so hoch als in Großbritannien. Im Gegenzug dominieren die 
Naturwissenschaften stärker in Großbritannien. Während die Erziehungswissenschaften mehr 
Absolventen in Deutschland aufweisen, ergibt sich das umgekehrte Bild im 
Gesundheitsbereich.31 Besonders hervorzuheben ist die Tatsache, dass in Großbritannien die 
Gruppe der Geisteswissenschaftler einen ungefähr doppelt so großen Anteil an den 
Tertiärgebildeten repräsentiert als in Deutschland. 
Tabelle 4.5: Tertiäre Fachrichtungen in Großbritannien im Jahr 2005 und deren 
Einkommen und Arbeitslosenquote 
  Anteil Nettoeinkommen Arbeitslosenquote 
Alle 100,0% 2.800 1,9% 
Agrarwissenschaft 1,0% 2.496 1,1% 
Dienstleistungen 0,3% 1.379 1,9% 
Erziehungswissenschaft 7,7% 2.292 1,5% 
Geisteswissenschaft 15,4% 2.406 2,5% 
Gesundheit 17,8% 2.111 1,0% 
Ingenieurwissenschaft 9,9% 3.665 1,9% 
Naturwissenschaft 15,1% 3.417 2,3% 
Sozialwissenschaft 24,9% 3.119 2,2% 
Theologie - - - 
Kombinierte Studiengänge 7,8% 2.558 2,2% 
Bemerkungen: Im britischen LFS lässt sich die Theologie nicht von den Geisteswissenschaften trennen. Zudem 
werden kombinierte Studiengänge unterschiedlicher Fachrichtungen erfasst, so dass diese nicht einer einzelnen 
Fachrichtung zugeordnet werden können. 
Quelle: Britische LFS, eigene Berechnungen. 
 
Um die Vergleichbarkeit zwischen dem deutschen Mikrozensus und dem britischen LFS zu 
gewährleisten, wird analog zu den vorherigen Analysen die Stichprobe auf Erwerbspersonen 
im Alter zwischen 25 und 55 Jahren mit Tertiärbildung beschränkt. Tabelle 4.5 weist das 
durchschnittliche Nettoeinkommen sowie das Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko für 
Bildungsfachrichtungen in Großbritannien aus. Abgesehen von Niveauunterschieden zu 
Deutschland, die sich aus unterschiedlichen Systemen der Besteuerung und 
Sozialversicherung sowie durch unterschiedliche wirtschaftliche Lagen ergeben, ist die 
relative Positionierung der Geisteswissenschaftler in Großbritannien vergleichbar mit 
Deutschland (vgl. Tabelle 4.3 und 4.5). So liegen britische Geisteswissenschaftler unterhalb 
des Durchschnittswerts der Tertiärgebildeten, während Ingenieure, Sozialwissenschaftler und 
Naturwissenschaftler deutlich höhere Nettoeinkommen verbuchen können. Im Gegensatz zu 
                                                          
31 Allerdings können diese Verschiebungen zwischen relativ verwandten Fächergruppen auch durch die 
unterschiedlichen Originalklassifikationen in den einzelnen Ländern beeinflusst werden, die eine vollständige 
Vereinheitlichung gemäß ISCED behindern. 
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Deutschland verdienen jedoch Geisteswissenschaftler mehr als Absolventen des 
Gesundheitsbereiches, was durch die unterschiedlichen institutionellen Ausgestaltungen der 
nationalen Gesundheitssysteme erklärbar ist. In Übereinstimmung mit der Lage in 
Deutschland ist die Gruppe der Geisteswissenschaftler in Großbritannien am stärksten dem 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko ausgesetzt. 
Schließlich haben wir untersucht, ob die in der deskriptiven Analyse gefunden relativen 
Einkommenspositionen auch in multivariaten Analysen fortbestehen.32 Analog zur 
multivariaten Analyse mit dem Mikrozensus wird dazu das logarithmierte Nettoeinkommen 
auf die Bildungsfachrichtung, demographische persönliche Charakteristika, regionale 
Aspekte, familiären Hintergrund, sowie die Betriebsgröße und den Wirtschaftszweig 
regressiert. In die einfachste Spezifikation fließen nur die Hauptfachrichtungen ein, wobei 
insbesondere Geisteswissenschaftler neben Absolventen des Gesundheits- und 
Dienstleistungsbereichs die stärksten relativen Lohnabschläge im Vergleich zu den 
Ingenieurwissenschaftlern verbuchen müssen. Durch Kontrolle der individuellen und 
arbeitsmarktstrukturellen Charakteristika in einer zweiten Spezifikation reduziert sich der 
relative Lohnabschlag für Geisteswissenschaftler von 36% auf 9%, bleibt jedoch signifikant 
negativ fortbestehen. Dies ist im Einklang mit den Ergebnissen aus dem deutschen 
Mikrozensus. Folglich ergibt sich trotz der institutionellen Unterschiede im Bildungssystem 
und am Arbeitsmarkt als auch der wirtschaftlichen Lage eine ähnlich benachteiligte Position 
für Geisteswissenschaftler in Großbritannien. 
4.6 Schlussfolgerungen 
Im Mittelpunkt der Expertise steht die Situation von Geisteswissenschaftlern auf dem 
deutschen Arbeitsmarkt und im Vergleich zu Großbritannien im Bezug auf das monatliche 
Nettoeinkommen und das Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko. Als Datengrundlage hierzu dienen der 
Mikrozensus 2005 für Deutschland und der britische LFS 2005 für Großbritannien. 
In Deutschland erzielten Geisteswissenschaftler im Jahr 2005 niedrigere Einkommen als alle 
anderen Akademikern. So beträgt die Einkommenslücke zwischen Geisteswissenschaftlern 
und der größten Akademikergruppe, den Ingenieurwissenschaftlern, ohne Berücksichtigung 
persönlicher und institutioneller Eigenschaften, 23%, unter Berücksichtigung solcher 
Kontrollvariablen sinkt diese Differenz auf 12%. Insbesondere erfahren selbständige 
                                                          
32 Ergebnisse auf Anfrage von den Autoren erhältlich. 
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Geisteswissenschaftler hohe Einkommenseinbußen im Vergleich zu anderen Akademikern. 
Die Arbeitslosenquote der Geisteswissenschaftler ist im Jahr 2005 in Deutschland mit 6,8% 
die höchste Quote unter allen Akademikergruppen. 
Im deutsch-britischen Vergleich zeigt sich ein deutlicher Unterschied in der Verteilung der 
einzelnen Studienrichtungen. So ist der Anteil an Geisteswissenschaftlern in Großbritannien 
mit 15,4% etwa doppelt so hoch wie in Deutschland. Dennoch sind Geisteswissenschaftler in 
Großbritannien ebenfalls im unteren Bereich der Einkommensverteilung zu finden und haben 
mit 2,5% die höchste Arbeitslosenquote aller Akademiker. Unter Berücksichtigung 
individueller Merkmale und institutioneller Gegebenheiten sinkt die Einkommensdifferenz 
zwischen Geisteswissenschaftlern und Ingenieurwissenschaftlern in Großbritannien von 36% 
auf 9%. Trotz der institutionellen Unterschiede im Bildungssystem und am Arbeitsmarkt als 
auch der wirtschaftlichen Lage ergibt sich damit eine ähnlich benachteiligte Position für 
Geisteswissenschaftler in Großbritannien. 
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5. Wage Prospects for People with Migration Background in Germany 
This part is joint work with Alisher Aldashev and Stephan L. Thomsen and is published in a 
former version as ZEW Discussion Paper 07-031. 
Abstract: Less than half of the people with migration background living in Germany possess 
foreign citizenship. Hence, using citizenship to analyse economic issues of immigration may 
be problematic. This paper utilizes a wider definition covering all persons who immigrated to 
Germany to analyse the wage prospects for these people. To shed light on differences to the 
use of citizenship, estimates are presented in comparison to foreigners and German citizens. 
The results show that immigrants have similar wage prospects as foreigners. Moreover, wage 
prospects for native Germans do not differ much from those with German citizenship, so this 
provides an applicable approximation. 
Keywords: Immigration, Wage Prospects, Education, Germany. 
JEL-classification: J61, I12, J15  
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Oslo. The paper is part of the ZEW project “Returns to Education and Wage Inequality for 
Persons with Migration Background in Germany”. The usual disclaimer applies. 
5.1 Introduction 
People are said to have migration background if they themselves or their parents are foreign 
born or possess foreign citizenship or did so in the past. According to this definition, in 2005 
about 19 percent of Germany's population had migration background. More than half of the 
people with migration background i.e. about 10 percent of the population in Germany are 
German citizens. The share of foreigners living in Germany amounts to 9 percent 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). Two groups account for the vast majority of persons with 
migration background in Germany: The first group consists of persons from South European 
(including Turkey) and North African countries who were recruited from the 1950s to early 
1970s and their family members and descendants. Many of these people still possess a foreign 
citizenship (in the following denoted foreigners), but there are also quite a few who have been 
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naturalized (in the following denoted German citizens with migration background). The 
second group comprises ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European 
states who resettled mainly after the late 1980s (in the following denoted resettlers).33 Ethnic 
Germans (and their family members and descendants) are equal by law to native Germans, 
and are granted with German citizenship at the time of immigration to Germany or shortly 
after it. However, for a number of reasons, e.g. language difficulties, different education 
systems in the home countries, possible limited or non-transferability of skills acquired in the 
home country to the German labour market, or cultural differences, they are likely to have 
different wage prospects from native Germans. Moreover, with regard to the fact that for 
people aged 25 or younger the share of persons with migration background is about one 
quarter and for children below six even about one third (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006) it is 
of crucial relevance to analyse how people with migration background perform in Germany's 
economy. Moreover, the figures indicate that the share of people with migration background 
in the population of working age is going to rise. 
In this paper, we focus on wage prospects for people with migration background. The analysis 
is descriptive by nature. In contrast to U.S. studies that distinguish races or ethnics (see, e.g. 
Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview), many studies in Germany refer to citizenship only 
when analysing differences between immigrants.34 Two reasons may be responsible for this; 
on the one hand, until the year 2000 Germany had quite strict naturalization laws preventing 
foreigners to become German citizens even after residing for a long time in Germany. 
Therefore, it was possible to approximate the issue of immigration quite well by citizenship. 
On the other hand, most available data sources report information on citizenship instead of 
immigration. Thus, identifying persons with migration background is not straightforward. 
However, comparison of wage prospects of foreigners and German nationals only could be 
limited for a number of reasons. There may be substantial differences between native 
Germans and German citizens with migration background; hence, pooling of both groups by 
citizenship may exhibit different results on the outcomes of interest. A question that arises in 
this respect is whether the results obtained by studies comparing German citizens and 
foreigners could be generalised to the comparison of native Germans and persons with 
migration background. In the context of wages, this question is relevant if there is a 
                                                          
33 Further groups that have to be mentioned are asylum-seekers, refugees and Jewish immigrants from Eastern 
Europe. In addition, there was a huge resettlement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe shortly after World 
War II. These groups are not identifiable in our data. 
34 To name only a few see e.g. Aldashev et al. (2009), Dustmann and van Soest (2002), Fertig and Schmidt 
(2001), Gang and Zimmermann (2000), Riphahn (2005). 
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systematic and significant variation between the wage profiles of foreigners and people with 
migration background, or between the wage profiles between foreigners and German citizens 
with migration background. In addition, it has to be analysed how much wage profiles 
between native Germans and German citizens differ. 
There are a number of empirical studies that focus on wage prospects for foreigners and 
immigrants in Germany.35 In an early study, Licht and Steiner (1994) test the assimilation 
hypothesis distinguishing permanent and temporary immigrants in Germany. Their results 
show that the remuneration of labour market experience is higher for natives than for 
foreigners and therefore no support for the assimilation hypothesis is established. Riphahn 
(2003a) analyses the educational attainment of the whole population of foreigners in 
Germany. Her results show that returns to degree are smaller compared to natives of the same 
age. The studies of Riphahn (2003b, 2005) provide additional analyses for second generation 
immigrants. Her results confirm the findings of the earlier study for that particular group. In 
line with these results are the findings of Constant and Massey (2005) studying wages of 
German guest-workers36 with regard to the segmentation of the labour market. The results 
indicate that guest-workers are not capable of translating their human capital into a good first 
job and, therefore, the status gap between Germans and guest-workers is widening with the 
time spent in the labour market. In all of these studies citizenship is used to distinguish natives 
and non-natives. However, the figures from the first paragraph above elucidate that it is 
reasonable to utilize a more comprehensive definition of immigrants to take account of recent 
changes in Germany’s immigrant population. 
The empirical analysis is based on the waves 1995 to 2005 from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) for West Germany. The results show that persons with migration background 
earn lower wages compared to natives independently of gender or skill level. Moreover, the 
wage profiles of persons with migration background are fairly similar to those of foreigners 
what implies that data on foreigners could provide a proxy for the population of people with 
migration background. A further finding supports this result: For the years analysed here, the 
wage profiles of German citizens provide a good approximation of those of native Germans 
except for the high-skilled. Hence, using citizenship to approximate natives and non-natives 
seems to be reasonable when analysing wage issues – at least in the period under observation 
from 1995 to 2005. 
                                                          
35 All the studies cited use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). 
36 Guest-workers are foreigners who were temporarily recruited to mitigate labour supply shortages in Germany 
during the late 1950s to early 1970s and who resided permanently in Germany thereafter. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the identification of people with 
migration background in the population of Germany. In section 5.3, we sketch the empirical 
model used for the estimation of the returns to education. The dataset and selected descriptive 
statistics are described in section 5.4. The results are shown in section 5.5. Finally, the last 
section provides the main conclusions. 
5.2 Migration Background in Germany 
Analysing the labour market perspectives of people with migration background requires a 
clear definition of this group in first place. Restricting the definition to foreigners and drawing 
the comparison of wage prospects between foreigners and German nationals could be limited 
if there are substantial differences between native Germans and German citizens with 
migration background, because the reference group (German citizens) would be rather 
heterogeneous. One possible definition of persons with migration background has been 
suggested by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt): 
People are said to have a migration background if they themselves or their parents were 
born abroad and the persons themselves or their parents possess the citizenship of the 
foreign country, or did so in the past.37  
This definition seems to be quite appropriate for the German case as it attributes migration 
background to ethnic Germans and their family members, and encompasses naturalized 
foreigners as well.38 Thus, we will use this definition in this paper. 
Although the use of migration background relaxes the limitations of using only citizenship to 
study differences between natives and non-natives one has to consider that persons with 
migration background are not homogenous as a group. We take account of this heterogeneity 
by separately analysing the wage prospects for certain groups of persons with migration 
background. More precisely, we apply two levels of comparison. Table 5.1 summarizes the 
definition of groups in analysis. On the first level, we distinguish between native Germans (1) 
and people with migration background (2) only. On the second level, we consider three 
groups within people with migration background: (2a) Foreigners, i.e. people possessing 
citizenship other than German, (2b) People with migration background possessing German 
citizenship (but not resettlers), and (2c) resettlers. 
                                                          
37 Translation of the definition provided in Statistisches Bundesamt (2006). 
38 Third generation immigrants are not incorporated if their parents possessed German citizenship at birth. 
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It may be worth noting that resettlers would belong to category (2b) with respect to the 
definition of migration background. However, to identify possible differences in the estimates 
for this particular group, using (2b) and (2c) as exclusive concepts seems reasonable. 
Table 5.1: Definition of Groups in Analysis 
1. Native Germans Persons and their parents were born in Germany and possess 
German citizenship at birth. 
2. Persons with migration background  
 2a. Foreigners Persons possessing citizenship other than German. 
 2b. German citizens Naturalized persons (but not resettlers) and their 
descendants. 
 2c. German resettlers Ethnic Germans, descendants and family members who 
possess German citizenship from the day of immigration. 
 
Figure 5.1 provides a graphical illustration of the shares of the three sub-groups of persons 
with migration background distinguished here (for the year 2005). The whole pie represents 
all persons with migration background in Germany (19 percent of the population living in 
Germany). About 47 percent of those are foreigners. The remaining 53 percent are persons 
possessing German citizenship, 12 percent thereof are resettlers. 
Figure 5.1: Groups of People with Migration Background, 2005 
2b. German citizenship
2c.German resettler
2a. Foreigners
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), own view. 
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5.3 Estimating the Wage Equation for People with Migration Background 
The standard model to estimate the wage equation has been proposed by Mincer (1974). In his 
model, log wages are modelled as an additive function of years of a linear schooling term and 
a quadratic term of experience. However, assuming proportional effects of years of schooling 
may be to some extent unrealistic in heterogeneous educational systems like in Germany 
where credentials may be more important than years of schooling. This is the so-called 
“sheepskin effect” (see, e.g. Weiss, 1995), which basically means that, for example, returns to 
one year of university education differ from returns to a year of high school. This finding also 
holds for the difference between completed school degrees and years of schooling, i.e., 
leaving high-school without graduation after 13 years has a different value than graduating 
after this duration (for a detailed discussion see Card, 1999). We account for such non-
linearities by a set of dummies for different types of completed education. 
A problem which goes hand in hand with measuring education is identification of experience 
of individuals. In empirical applications, it is common to use potential rather than actual 
experience due to missing information or observability of actual experience. Since we do not 
have the information on the actual duration of schooling and the standard durations for 
different education types may not necessarily be applicable to immigrants having received 
education in their home countries, we use age (and age squared) instead of potential 
experience. In addition, we consider age-education interaction effects to estimate flexible 
education type specific wage profiles over the life-cycle. 
We distinguish three skill groups in the analysis. The low-skilled are defined as persons 
belonging to the categories “no schooling”, “schooling (regular school system)”, or 
“schooling (non-regular school or abroad)”. Persons with “professional training 
(apprenticeship system)/civil servant” or “other professional training” are defined as medium-
skilled; the high-skilled are defined as having “college or university degree” or “college or 
university degree (abroad)”. 
The empirical analysis relies on the following panel model: 
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where yit is the log hourly wage of person i in period t, β0 is a constant, β1 and β2 are the 
coefficients of age and age (squared). γj, κj and λj are the parameters for the returns to 
education category j to be estimated. Xit is the matrix of further covariates regarded in the 
estimation (to be described below) and α is the corresponding coefficient vector. itu  is the 
error term which can be decomposed into itiitu ευ += . Here, υi represents a time-fixed 
component capturing individual heterogeneity and εit is the residual i.i.d. error term. We 
assume that υi is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and, hence, equation (5.1) can be 
estimated by the random effect panel method. This is similar to DeNew and Zimmermann 
(1994) who also apply random effect methods to estimate the effect of the share of foreign 
labour on German wages using SOEP. Fixed effects would not be as good because education 
as one of the explaining variables is more or less constant over time.39 Building on the 
estimated coefficients we calculate counterfactual wages for every age and show wage 
profiles over the life-cycle. 
Matrix X contains variables which are expected to affect the wage level and that also 
characterize differences between persons with migration background and native Germans. In 
detail, the variables comprise economic sectors, indicated by six categories (agriculture, 
industry, transportation, construction, trading services, social services and health), a dummy 
variable for self-employment and a dummy variable for part-time work (as being equal to 1 if 
the person works less than 30 hours a week). Moreover, we consider fixed year and regional 
effects (dummies for north, central and south) to take account of possible macroeconomic 
year-specific changes of the regional economy.40 Relevant for the wage position of persons 
with migration background seems to be time of residence in Germany. With enduring time of 
residence potential experience increases as well and migrants’ economic situation could be 
expected to become more similar (or assimilated) to native Germans. Therefore, we 
incorporate time of residence and its square (only used for persons with migration 
background) in our wage equation. To take account for gender effects, we run the regression 
in equation (5.1) separately for males and females.41 
                                                          
39 In that context, Wooldridge (2002: 252) mentions that “with a large number of random draws from the cross 
section, it almost always makes sense to treat the unobserved effects […] as random draws from the population”. 
Thus, using the random effect panel method seems to be adequate. 
40 Considering fixed year effects for macroeconomic conditions differs from calculating cohort effects 
conditional on year of birth. 
41 The final specification was due testing of different sets of variables in order to improve precision of the 
estimates. 
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5.4 Dataset and Selected Descriptives 
5.4.1 Dataset 
For the empirical analyses we use 11 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
from 1995 to 2005.42 The SOEP was launched in 1984 and is a wide-ranging representative 
longitudinal study of private households. It provides information on all household members, 
consisting of Germans living in all Federal Laender, foreigners, and recent immigrants to 
Germany. In 2005, there were nearly 12,000 households, and more than 21,000 persons 
sampled. Several features make the SOEP preferential to other datasets in Germany for the 
purpose at hand. 
The SOEP offers individual information on country of birth, citizenship and whether or not 
the person has resettled, amongst others. In addition, a parental identifier is offered if the 
parents of the interviewed person have participated in any of the waves of the SOEP. In these 
cases, parental information can be added to the individual's information. This allows to define 
(and to identify) three mutually exclusive groups of persons with migration background in the 
analysis: First, foreigners are all persons who possess a non-German citizenship. Second, 
German citizens with migration background are naturalized foreigners or their dependents and 
third, resettlers are ethnic Germans or their dependents who were naturalized by law when 
they arrived in Germany. Finally, the remaining persons are defined as native Germans. 
Moreover, the SOEP is not restricted to persons covered by the social security system, i.e. 
public officials and self-employed persons are included as well. It provides information on 
wages and hours worked. A minor disadvantage of the SOEP concerning migrants is the fact 
that illegal immigrants are not covered in the sample. However, for the purpose of analysing 
the wage prospects for persons with migration background this limitation could be assumed to 
be irrelevant. The SOEP is representative for migrants with the exception of the years 
between the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s when many new migration groups arrived in 
Germany. The survey expansion in 1994/95 of the SOEP takes this new development into 
account and, therefore, our analysis (starting in 1995) is not affected by the missing 
representation. 
We limit our analysis to West Germany due to a small number of immigrants in East 
Germany. In addition, the sample is restricted to employed persons (dependent as well as the 
                                                          
42 For further details on SOEP see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) and Wagner et al. (2007). 
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self-employed) aged 15 to 65 who report a wage. Further, to reduce the risk of measurement 
error from extreme values we trim the highest two percent and the lowest two percent 
observations on hourly wages. The outcome variable (real gross hourly wage) is obtained for 
all workers including the self-employed by dividing the gross wages in the month prior to the 
interview by the reported working hours of the last week that are extrapolated to monthly 
hours. Wages are deflated using the consumption price index based on the year 2000 to get 
real consumption wages of comparable purchasing power (source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2008).43 
5.4.2 Selected Descriptives 
To characterize the situation of people with migration background, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide 
means of selected variables for the years 1995 and 2005 distinguishing males and females as 
well as the different groups according to Table 5.1. For males, the average hourly wage is 
highest for native Germans (13.99 Euro in 1995, 15.70 Euro in 2005) while resettlers earned 
the lowest wages (10.64 Euro in 1995, 12.37 Euro in 2005). For all groups except for German 
citizens with migration background, real wages increased between 1995 and 2005 on average. 
In that group, wages remained fairly stable. In analogy to males, female native Germans 
earned the highest wages (10.77 Euro in 1995, 12.19 Euro in 2005) while in 1995 resettlers 
(8.62 Euro) and in 2005 foreigners (9.72 Euro) earned lowest wages. 
Why are wages higher for native Germans than for the other groups? Clearly, differences in 
composition and educational attainment have to be expected. Native Germans seem on 
average to be higher educated compared to any of the immigrant groups. For foreigners and 
resettlers there is a general trend towards higher education. For German citizens with 
migration background the picture is more mixed. While the share of males with professional 
training decreased from 56 percent in 1995 to 41 percent in 2005 in this group, shares of 
persons with a lower but also with a higher education have increased. The share of people 
with migration background who completed professional training doubled between 1995 and 
2005. Especially the group of resettlers experienced a large increase. Resettlers also have a 
larger share of persons with a college degree compared to native Germans even though these 
are mostly received abroad.44 In addition, we observe average earnings to be higher for the 
                                                          
43 It should be noted that the reported gross earnings in the month prior to the interview have not been adjusted 
for end-of-year bonuses, overtime-payments, holiday allowances etc. 
44 There is some empirical evidence for Germany that educational attainment differs substantially between the 
native population and persons with migration background. Schnepf (2006) compares a number of surveys on 
educational performance for selected OECD countries participating in PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS. She finds that 
differences in performance between native and migrant students are particularly high in Germany. The results of 
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groups possessing larger shares of persons with education in Germany. This could mean that 
returns to degrees obtained in Germany are higher – what is the case as shown e.g. by 
Aldashev et al. (2008). Concerning education levels, males and females show similar 
composition of the labour force across groups. 
Table 5.2: Means of Selected Characteristics - Males 
 People with migration background 
 
Native 
Germans   thereof: 
    Foreigners With 
German 
citizenship  
Resettlers 
Variable 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
Hourly Wage 13.99 15.70 11.69 13.34 11.64 13.61 13.43 13.46 10.64 12.37 
Age 38.88 42.54 37.40 40.13 37.74 40.73 35.83 39.21 36.92 39.89 
Time of Residence - - 19.73 25.86 21.79 27.77 24.84 29.03 5.58 15.40 
Education           
No schooling 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Schooling (regular school 
system) 
0.12 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.12 
Schooling (abroad) 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.04 
Professional training 
(apprenticeship system)/ 
civil servant 
0.65 0.61 0.22 0.43 0.20 0.43 0.56 0.41 0.08 0.45 
Professional training 
(abroad) 
0.01 0.01 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.51 0.04 
College or University degree 0.19 0.27 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.10 
College or University degree 
(abroad) 
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.25 
Part-time work 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.05 
Self-employment 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.01 
Economic Sectors           
Agriculture 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Industry 0.24 0.32 0.39 0.55 0.40 0.53 0.31 0.49 0.40 0.68 
Transportation 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.04 
Construction 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 
Trading services 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.30 0.17 
Social services and health 0.25 0.22 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.03 
Regiona           
North 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.31 0.27 
Centre 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.47 0.43 
South 0.44 0.47 0.53 0.49 0.59 0.57 0.50 0.49 0.22 0.30 
No. of obs. 1,969 3,070 974 684 721 358 109 200 144 130 
a North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre comprises the Federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South 
contains Hesse, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Schnepf (2006) are in line with the findings of Ammermüller (2007). See also OECD (2006). Moreover, the 
educational level of native Germans increases stronger over time than for the immigrants (Riphahn, 2005). In 
line with this, the share of foreigners in high-skilled labour amounts only to 3.3 percent in 2000 reported by 
Bauer and Kunze (2005). In addition, Gang and Zimmermann (2000) argue that the longer the immigrants stay in 
Germany the more likely they attain better education.  
 100
Table 5.3: Means of Selected Characteristics - Females 
 People with migration background 
 
Native 
Germans   thereof: 
    Foreigners  With 
German 
citizenship  
Resettlers 
Variable 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005 
Hourly Wage 10.77 12.19 9.06 9.92 9.03 9.72 9.69 10.31 8.62 9.80 
Age 37.47 41.53 37.16 40.05 36.84 40.75 36.72 38.58 39.24 40.63 
Time of Residence - - 19.86 24.71 21.41 26.51 27.70 27.53 5.85 16.98 
Education           
No schooling 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 
Schooling (regular school 
system) 
0.20 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.11 0.13 
Schooling (abroad) 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.09 
Professional training 
(apprenticeship system)/ 
civil servant 
0.65 0.64 0.21 0.36 0.18 0.31 0.55 0.44 0.06 0.37 
Professional training 
(abroad) 
0.02 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.43 0.02 
College or University degree 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.17 
College or University degree 
(abroad) 
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.22 
Part-time work 0.34 0.42 0.26 0.39 0.23 0.40 0.32 0.39 0.38 0.36 
Self-employment 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Economic Sectors           
Agriculture 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.18 
Transportation 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Construction 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Trading services 0.29 0.37 0.16 0.39 0.16 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.35 
Social services and health 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.41 0.29 0.51 0.35 0.64 0.42 
Regiona           
North 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.27 
Centre 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.36 0.41 0.47 0.39 
South 0.46 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.62 0.57 0.46 0.28 0.35 
No. of obs. 1,451 2,780 583 573 418 269 76 177 89 127 
a North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre comprises the Federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South 
contains Hesse, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
 
On average, native Germans are older than persons with migration background. This could 
also explain higher wages of the natives due to higher levels of experience or seniority wage 
payment. Time of residence is shortest among the persons with migration background for 
resettlers (5.58 years in 1995 and 15.40 years in 2005). In addition, this group has the lowest 
wages on average, too, while it is highest for naturalized foreigners. These persons have on 
average lived for three fourth of their life in Germany. Unlike native Germans, people with 
migration background, especially resettlers, are more concentrated in the industrial sector. 
Moreover, foreigners and German citizens with migration background are overrepresented in 
the south while resettlers are overrepresented in the centre of Germany compared to native 
Germans. Compared to males, females and in particular females with migration background 
work less often in the industrial sector; in contrast, female participation rates are higher in 
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trading services and social services and health. The share of self-employed is largest for 
native Germans and German citizens with migration background (6 percent in 1995 and 9 
percent in 2005); only a small share of resettlers is self-employed. 
5.5 Results 
Regarding the substantially larger numbers of persons with migration background compared 
to people possessing a foreign citizenship in the population of Germany, there may be doubts 
on the transferability of results obtained from a distinction by citizenship to the whole 
population of persons with migration background. In that context, one has to bear in mind that 
the reference group contains naturalized immigrants, i.e. naturalized foreigners and ethnic 
Germans, which exhibits effects on the empirical estimates.45 Hence, the first issue we want to 
analyse is how comparable are the wages of persons with migration background and 
foreigners. To answer this question, we construct the wage profiles with 95 percent 
confidence limits (shaded grey) for the average individual46 aged 25 to 60 with a distinction 
for gender for the following groups: persons with migration background compared to native 
Germans (Figure 5.2) and persons with migration background compared to foreigners (Figure 
5.3).47 The profiles are constructed based on the estimation results presented in Tables 5.A1 
and 5.A2 in the appendix, using the group-means of the explanatory variables. 
The underlying estimates of the wage regressions are in line with expectation.48 There is a 
positive, but decreasing effect of age on wages independently of gender. An analogue figure 
could be established for time of residence in Germany. In addition, there are positive returns 
to educational levels. With regard to economic sectors, the highest wages are paid in the 
industrial sector. Regional differences indicate that highest wages are paid in the south of 
Germany. 
                                                          
45 Although naturalized immigrants possess all rights and duties as every German citizen, their economic 
integration may differ due to language difficulties, different education, or cultural differences for instance. 
46 Another possibility would be to calculate profiles for a single representative worker. The problem with this 
approach is that we only have at most 11 yearly observations for a single worker, which is too low to show the 
wage development over the life-cycle from the end of the education period till retirement (35 years). To solve 
this problem we had to calculate counterfactual representative workers. We decided not to do so and instead use 
the definition at hand. 
47 As noted above, native Germans are a sub-group of German citizens. The age interval has been chosen to 
exclude apprenticeship training or time of studies at university on the left side and early retirement issues on the 
right side. For the sake of completeness, Figure 5.A1 in the appendix compares the wage prospects of foreigners 
to that of native Germans. 
48 In addition, we have also estimated a number of different specifications of the wage regressions, for example, 
without interaction terms or with age effects and interaction terms only. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates of 
the coefficients do not change much but the overall fit of the model presented here is better. 
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It becomes evident from Figure 5.2 that persons with migration background independently of 
gender and skill level have significantly lower wage prospects than native Germans over the 
life-cycle. These differences are particularly strong for the low- and the high-skilled. In 
contrast to that differences for the medium-skilled are clearly smaller; for females, only small 
differences beginning in the late 30s could be established. The estimated differences within 
skill-groups could be determined by differences in composition of persons with migration 
background and native Germans. For example, persons with migration background work more 
often in industry and are located in the south (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Moreover, the longer 
the persons live in Germany (variable time of residence) the higher are the wage prospects. 
Figure 5.2: Wage Profiles: Native Germans vs. Persons with Migration Background 
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Solid Line (-) refers to native Germans, dashed line (- -) refers to persons with migration background. 95 percent 
confidence limits are shaded grey. 
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Figure 5.3: Wage Profiles: Persons with Migration Background vs. Foreigners 
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Solid Line (-) refers to persons with migration background, dashed line (- -) refers to foreigners. 95 percent 
confidence limits are shaded grey. 
 
Given the differences between persons with migration background and native Germans, the 
question is how people with migration background differ from foreigners. Figure 5.3 
compares the wage profile of the average foreigner to the average individual with migration 
background. The wage profiles of both groups are very similar in all six classes displayed. 
Neither gender nor skill differences could be established between foreigners and persons with 
migration background. The wage similarities between both groups indicate that when 
analysing wages one could possibly pool both groups into one. Moreover, it also implies that 
we could generalise mean wage prospects of foreigners to be valid for the whole group of 
persons with migration background – at least in our period of observation from 1995 to 2005. 
However, the robustness of this finding has to be checked for future periods due to 
demographic change. 
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The second issue we want to analyze in this context is the possible bias of the reference 
group. The wage profile of the average native German could possibly differ from that of the 
average German citizen since the latter contains additional effects of naturalized immigrants. 
In analogy to the figures shown so far, we study this question by comparison of the wage 
profiles with respect to gender and the three different skill levels (Figure 5.4).49 Except for the 
high-skilled, the wage profiles of natives do not differ from those of German citizens. Hence, 
the group of German citizens provides a reasonable proxy for native Germans when analyzing 
wages of low- and medium-skilled individuals in West Germany. However, for the high-
skilled the graphs point towards a slightly downward biased wage profile for males and 
females of German citizens compared to native Germans. Although not strong, this difference 
is significant.  
The graphs of Figure 5.4 compare the wage profiles of native Germans to all German citizens, 
i.e. the sum of native Germans, naturalized immigrants as well as resettlers. Although there 
are no overall differences observable between those groups (except for the high-skilled), it 
may be interesting to know whether those naturalized persons are more similar to native 
Germans or to foreigners. To study this issue, Figures 5.5 and 5.6 compare the wage profiles 
of the average native German and average foreigner to the average naturalized immigrant 
(excluding resettlers). The graphs of Figure 5.5 clarify that, except for low- and medium-
skilled females, wage prospects of naturalized Germans differ from that of natives. For low- 
and medium-skilled males, the gap in the wage profiles starts widening in the early 40s. In 
contrast to that, for high-skilled males (and females) the same picture could be revealed nearly 
from the beginning. Figure 5.6 provides the analogous estimates for foreigners compared to 
naturalized Germans. It is evident from the graphs that wage prospects of foreigners are not 
significantly different from those of German citizens with migration background (except for 
high-skilled males at the age between 40 and 53 years). These similarities in wages between 
foreigners and German citizens with migration background indicate that when analyzing 
wages we could possibly pool foreigners and German citizens with migration background into 
one group. 
 
                                                          
49 The estimation results for German citizens are available on request by the authors. 
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Figure 5.4: Wage Profiles: Native Germans vs. German Citizens 
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Solid line (-) refers to native Germans, dashed line (- -) refers to German citizen. 95 percent confidence limits are 
shaded grey. 
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Figure 5.5: Wage Profiles: Native Germans vs. German Citizens with Migration 
Background 
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Solid line (-) refers to native Germans, dashed line (- -) refers to German citizen with migration background. 95 
percent confidence limits are shaded grey. 
 
To test the sensitivity of the estimates we carried out estimations using the panel for the years 
2000 to 2005 only. Figure 5.A2 and 5.A3 in the appendix provide the wage profiles for native 
Germans compared to German citizens and for foreigners compared to German citizens with 
migration background. Again, we find no differences between natives and German citizens 
for low- and medium-skilled individuals. For high-skilled, there are some minor statistical 
significant differences for females. The comparison of the wage profiles for foreigners and 
German citizens with migration background results in a fairly similar picture, too. 
Unfortunately, no significant differences could be established between the groups. However, 
the lower number of observations in the reduced panel coincides with a larger variance of the 
estimates. Hence, although estimates are not completely robust, the alternative estimations 
tend to support the findings based on the 11 waves, or in other words, effects tend to be stable 
over time. 
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Figure 5.6: Wage Profiles: German Citizens with Migration Background vs. Foreigners 
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Solid line (-) refers to German citizen with migration background, dashed line (- -) refers to foreigners. 95 
percent confidence limits are shaded grey. 
 
Finally, Table 5.4 presents the wage differences between skill categories within the groups 
under study at selected ages (25, 40 and 60 years) separately by gender. The upper panel 
shows the difference between medium- and low-skilled workers, the lower panel provides the 
difference between high- and low-skilled persons. It becomes clear from the calculations that 
there are substantial skill-wage differences in particular for younger and older people. In 
summary, the findings show that for native Germans and naturalized immigrants the wage gap 
between high- and low-skilled increases with age, whereas the gap between medium- and 
low-skilled decreases up to a certain age and then increases again.50 
                                                          
50 One issue elided in the text is the gap between males and females. In line with the literature, the results 
throughout all estimations establish lower wages for women compared to men. However, as there are no 
substantial differences within gender for the migrant and non-migrants groups, we refrain from a self-contained 
discussion. 
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Table 5.4: Differences in Returns to Education for Selected Age Cohorts 
 Difference in Euro per 
hour 
Difference in percent 
Age 25 40 60 25 40 60 
 Males 
 medium-skilled vs. low-skilled 
Native Germans 3.06 -0.32 2.29 49.14 -2.34 20.66 
People with migration background 2.97 0.16 1.28 43.60 1.36 14.14 
Foreigners 2.78 0.19 1.02 39.76 1.68 11.08 
German citizens with migration background 2.93 -0.20 1.79 41.59 -1.51 21.88 
German resettler 3.35 -0.34 2.40 61.75 -3.10 35.90 
 high-skilled vs. low-skilled 
Native Germans 2.91 3.56 7.42 46.72 26.41 66.92 
People with migration background 2.68 1.14 2.65 39.36 9.48 29.22 
Foreigners 2.66 1.57 1.95 38.13 13.67 21.09 
German citizens with migration background 1.41 2.02 4.00 20.01 15.36 48.88 
German resettler 4.17 -0.51 4.33 76.80 -4.59 64.79 
 Females 
 medium-skilled vs. low-skilled 
Native Germans 2.53 0.03 1.70 49.15 0.36 24.75 
People with migration background a 2.37 0.76 0.96 48.05 9.84 14.89 
Foreigners a 2.18 0.70 1.07 44.23 9.43 16.45 
German citizens with migration background - - - - - - 
German resettler - - - - - - 
 high-skilled vs. low-skilled 
Native Germans 2.69 3.56 5.39 52.26 38.74 78.70 
People with migration background 2.06 1.48 1.96 41.62 19.27 30.32 
Foreigners 1.92 1.66 1.19 39.00 22.37 18.28 
German citizens with migration background a - - - - - - 
German resettler a - - - - - - 
Calculations are based on parameter estimates displayed in Tables 5.A1 and 5.A2 in the appendix. 
a Differences in return to education are not computed for these groups due to infeasible numbers of observations. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The share of persons with migration background in Germany's population has increased 
during the past decades. A considerable number of these persons possess German citizenship. 
On the one hand, former guest-workers, their family members, and descendants were 
naturalized. On the other hand, a large number of ethnic Germans and family members 
returned from Eastern Europe and received German citizenship at the date of (re)immigration. 
Many studies use citizenship to analyse economic issues of immigration. However, in light of 
the empirical situation this approach may be problematic as more than half of the population 
with migration background is neglected and, moreover, the effects for the reference group 
(native Germans) may exhibit effects of naturalized and ethnic Germans who possibly differ 
from natives, too. In this paper, we utilize a wider concept of migration background to analyse 
wage prospects of immigrants in Germany. To give evidence on possible bias when using 
citizenship instead of migration background, we compare the estimates of persons with 
migration background to those of foreigners. Moreover, to see how strong a potential bias 
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affects analyses of wages, we compare the wage profiles of native Germans with those of 
German citizens. Our empirical analysis is based on data from the SOEP using the waves 
1995 to 2005 for West Germany. 
The results show that persons with migration background have on average lower wage 
prospects compared to native Germans independently of skill level or gender. Compared to 
foreigners, their expected wages are fairly similar except for the high-skilled. A further 
finding is that wage prospects for native Germans do not differ much from those of German 
citizens. Hence, the potential bias of the reference groups is not that problematic, and using 
citizenship to approximate natives and non-natives when analysing wage issues seems to be 
reasonable. However, the exception for high-skilled people has to be regarded. 
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5.8 Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table 5.A1: Estimation Results: Males 
 People with migration background 
 
Native 
Germans  thereof: 
   Foreigners with 
German 
citizenship 
German 
resettler 
Age 0.1651 *** 0.1340 *** 0.1148 *** 0.1634 *** 0.1839 ***
Age (squared) -0.0017 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0021 ***
Education (Base: Low-skilled)      
Medium-skilled a 2.2140 *** 1.7753 *** 1.5970 *** 1.9488 *** 2.7939 ***
High-skilled b 1.3125 *** 1.4305 *** 1.1091 *** 0.6880 * 3.5535 ***
Interaction with age      
Medium-skilled x Age -0.1003 *** -0.0774 *** -0.0688 *** -0.0889 *** -0.1290 ***
High-skilled x Age -0.0542 *** -0.0614 *** -0.0430 *** -0.0312  -0.1682 ***
Interaction with age (squared)      
Medium-skilled x Age(squared) 0.0011 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0015 ***
High-skilled x Age(squared) 0.0007 *** 0.0007 ** 0.0005 *** 0.0004 * 0.0020 ***
Economic Sectors (Base: Industry)      
Agriculture -0.1257 *** 0.0207  0.0039  0.0964 -0.0465  
Transportation -0.0461 *** -0.0395 *** -0.0235  -0.0570 * -0.0932 ***
Construction -0.0532 *** -0.0619 *** -0.0820 *** -0.0291  -0.0226  
Trading services -0.0465 *** -0.0768 *** -0.0992 *** -0.0059  -0.0972 ***
Social services and health -0.0649 *** -0.1178 *** -0.0924 *** -0.1525 *** -0.1357 ***
Self-employment -0.0537 *** 0.0860 ** 0.1022 *** 0.0674  0.1724 ** 
Part-time work 0.0456 *** 0.0475 ** -0.0049  0.0834 * 0.2210 ***
Time of residence in Germany  0.0051 *** 0.0057 *** 0.0043  0.0187 ** 
Time of residence in Germany (squared)  0.0000 * 0.0000  0.0001  -0.0002  
Region c (Base: South)      
North -0.0700 *** -0.0664 *** -0.0809 *** -0.0031  -0.0591  
Centre -0.0206 ** -0.0559 *** -0.0343 * -0.0917 ** -0.0564  
Year Dummy (Base: 1995)      
1996 0.0224 *** 0.0257 ** 0.0239 * -0.0033  0.0679 ***
1997 -0.0112  0.0067  0.0137  -0.0195  0.0083  
1998 -0.0265 *** -0.0040  0.0030  -0.0316  -0.0013  
1999 -0.0071  -0.0068  0.0002  -0.0155  -0.0167  
2000 0.0002  -0.0216 * -0.0156  -0.0202  -0.0367  
2001 -0.0022  -0.0191  -0.0115  -0.0071  -0.0486  
2002 0.0145 ** 0.0086  0.0232  -0.0139  -0.0073  
2003 0.0315 *** 0.0459 *** 0.0605 *** 0.0530  -0.0080  
2004 0.015 ** 0.0150  0.0358 ** 0.0119  -0.0533  
2005 0.0044  -0.0111  0.0095  -0.0242  -0.0660  
Constant -1.0802 *** -0.5283 *** -0.1447  -1.0603 *** -1.5522 ***
σu 0.310  0.286 0.274 0.303 0.261  
ρ 0.702  0.620 0.612 0.613 0.625  
No. of persons 6,587  1,976 1,265 532 339
No. of observations 29,379  9,069 5,594 1,940 1,535  
Stars denote significance on the 1 percent level (***), 5 percent level (**) and 10 percent level (*). 
a Medium-skilled are people with completed professional training. 
b High-skilled are people with advanced technical college or university degree. 
c North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre are the federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises 
Hesse, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
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Table 5.A2: Estimation Results: Females 
 People with migration background 
 
Native 
Germans  thereof: 
   Foreigners with 
German 
citizenship 
German 
resettler 
Age 0.1375 *** 0.1001 *** 0.0901 *** 0.1343 *** 0.1029 ***
Age (squared) -0.0015 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0011 ***
Education (Base: Low-skilled)    
Medium-skilled a 2.1254 *** 1.5228 *** 1.4413 *** 1.9661 *** 1.6138 ***
High-skilled b 1.1141 *** 1.0879 *** 0.7360 * 2.0245 *** 0.6693  
Interaction with age    
Medium-skilled x Age -0.0957 *** -0.0610 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0847 *** -0.0700 ***
High-skilled x Age -0.0412 *** -0.0409 *** -0.0211  -0.0865 *** -0.0277  
Interaction with age (squared)    
Medium-skilled x Age(squared) 0.0011 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0008 ***
High-skilled x Age(squared) 0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0002  0.0010 *** 0.0004  
Economic Sectors (Base: Industry)    
Agriculture -0.1266 *** 0.0517  -0.0020  -0.2662  0.2785 ** 
Transportation -0.0294 ** -0.0061  -0.0107  -0.0056  -0.015  
Construction 0.0031  0.0179  0.0129  -0.0162  0.0100  
Trading services -0.0592 *** -0.0551 *** -0.0542 *** -0.0912 ** -0.0511  
Social services and health 0.0285 *** 0.0137  -0.0307  0.0437  0.0595  
Self-employment -0.0277 ** 0.0317  0.0870 ** 0.0636  -0.3940 ***
Part-time work -0.0002  0.0134  0.0100  0.0241  0.0204  
Time of residence in Germany  0.0141 *** 0.0111 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0464 ***
Time of residence in Germany (squared)  -0.0001 *** -0.0001 * -0.0001 * -0.0007 ***
Region c (Base: South)    
North -0.0286 ** -0.0797 *** -0.0792 ** -0.0756 * -0.0894 * 
Centre -0.0242 ** -0.0737 *** -0.0558 ** -0.1042 ** -0.0472  
Year Dummy (Base: 1995)    
1996 0.0200 ** 0.0201  0.0516 *** 0.0210  -0.0962 ** 
1997 0.0080  0.0042  0.0030  0.0344  -0.0583  
1998 0.0219 ** 0.0052  0.0261  -0.0271  -0.0956 ***
1999 0.0304 *** 0.0191  0.0453 ** 0.0119  -0.1350 ***
2000 0.0279 *** 0.0204  0.0293  0.0513  -0.1268 ***
2001 0.0196 ** 0.0210  0.0399 * 0.0454  -0.1525 ***
2002 0.0604 *** 0.0569 *** 0.0757 *** 0.0827 * -0.1397 ***
2003 0.0733 *** 0.0573 *** 0.0661 *** 0.1038 ** -0.1653 ***
2004 0.0781 *** 0.0570 *** 0.0672 *** 0.0710  -0.1452 ** 
2005 0.0739 *** 0.0288  0.0174  0.0623  -0.1608 ***
Constant -0.7225 *** -0.2777 *** -0.0509  -0.9242 *** -0.4206 * 
σu 0.339 0.298 0.311 0.280 0.277
ρ 0.664 0.607 0.648 0.552 0.575
No. of persons 5,937 1,504 889 442 298
No. of observations 24,324 6,183 3,452 1,510 1,221
Stars denote significance on the 1 percent level (***), 5 percent level (**) and 10 percent level (*). 
a Medium-skilled are people with completed professional training. 
b High-skilled are people with advanced technical college or university degree. 
c North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre are the federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises 
Hesse, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
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Figure 5.A1: Wage Profiles: Native Germans vs. Foreigners 
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Solid line (-) refers to native Germans, dashed line (- -) refers to foreigners. 95 percent confidence limits are 
shaded grey. 
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Figure 5.A2: Wage Profiles: Native Germans vs. German Citizens (2000-2005 Panel) 
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Solid line (-) refers to native Germans, dashed line (- -) refers to German citizen. 95 percent confidence limits are 
shaded grey. 
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Figure 5.A3: Wage Profiles: German Citizen with Migration Background vs. Foreigners 
(2000-2005 Panel) 
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Solid line (-) refers to German citizen with migration background, dashed line (- -) refers to foreigners. 95 
percent confidence limits are shaded grey. 
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6. The Immigrant Wage Gap in Germany 
This part is joint work with Alisher Aldashev and Stephan L. Thomsen and is published in a 
former version as ZEW Discussion Paper 08-089. 
Abstract: Immigrants consist of foreigners and naturalized immigrants. Based on data from 
the SOEP, we decompose the wage gap between each of these two groups and natives in 
Germany. To consider unequal sets of variables in the estimation, we provide an extension of 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique. The results show a substantial gap in earnings 
for both immigrants' groups compared to natives mainly driven by “price effects”. Discarding 
immigrants who completed education abroad reduces much of the immigrants’ wage gap. 
Hence, educational attainment in Germany is an important component of economic 
integration of immigrants and degrees obtained abroad are valued less. 
Keywords: Immigration, Wage Gap, Decomposition, Educational Attainment, Germany, 
SOEP. 
JEL-classification: J61, J31, J15 
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comments. The paper is part of the ZEW project “Returns to Education and Wage Inequality 
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6.1 Introduction 
Immigrant-native wage differentials exist in many countries. For example, Adsera and 
Chiswick (2007) show that differences in earnings of immigrants relative to natives of the 
same gender vary widely across countries, e.g. from about 12% (6%) for non-EU men 
(women) in Germany to 81% (69%) in Sweden. In a study for the Netherlands, Kee (1995) 
reports observed wage differences between native Dutch males and Antilleans (11.8%), 
Surinamese (22.9%), Turks (36.9%), and Moroccans (42.9%). Starting with Chiswick (1978) 
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the initial differences in earnings at time of migration and the possible convergence of 
immigrants’ earnings have been studied for various countries; comprehensive overviews are 
provided by Altonji and Blank (1999) and Borjas (1994). It is important to analyse the wage 
gap in detail to be able to identify whether the differentials are due to differences in human 
capital endowment that could be mitigated by training, schooling, etc., or due to unobserved 
influences comprising cultural identity or ethnic discrimination. 
For Germany, earnings’ differentials have been analysed in a number of studies. In an early 
paper for the year 1989 based on register data of the Institute of Employment Research 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung), Velling (1995) analyses the immigrant-
native wage gap in Germany considering immigrants with a foreign citizenship. His results 
show that much of the observable difference in earnings could be attributed to differences in 
human capital. Differences in wages have also been analysed based on data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), for example by Constant and Massey (2005), Lang (2005), 
Peters (2008) or Riphahn (2003). Similar to Velling (1995), Constant and Massey (2005), 
Peters (2008) and Riphahn (2003), consider only foreigners as the immigrant population. The 
results of Constant and Massey (2005) show that much of the differential could be attributed 
to initial occupational segmentation, but there is also a significant ethnic discrimination in the 
process of occupational attainment. Moreover, by using longitudinal information they 
establish a convergence in immigrants’ earnings after 23 years of residence in Germany. 
Peters (2008) decomposes the immigrant-native wage gap using quantile regression 
techniques. In contrast to the earlier studies, his results show an increase in the native-
immigrant wage gap mainly due to coefficient effects. In the study of Lang (2005), the 
difference between wages and the wage potential of immigrants is analysed. He uses a wider 
definition of the immigrant population than the other studies covering ethnic Germans as well. 
However, he pools the different groups of immigrants in the analysis although differences 
between ethnic Germans and foreigners may exist. In addition, naturalized immigrants are 
contained in the group of natives. His results show that convergence in earnings is achieved 
after 17 years of residence. 
Except Lang (2005), the studies for Germany take account of foreigners only; such 
approximation is reasonable if immigrants have a high probability to keep the citizenship of 
their home country, or, put it in other words, naturalization is not very likely. However, the 
immigrant population in Germany is characterized by an increasing share of naturalized 
immigrants (almost 10% of the population living in Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
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2007). Therefore regarding only foreigners as immigrants could lead to biased estimates since 
a substantial share of immigrants are considered as Germans. 
The study at hand extends the knowledge about the immigrant-wage gap in Germany in two 
important directions: First, we explicitly distinguish foreigners and naturalized immigrants in 
the analysis. Therefore, we provide the first empirical evidence on the immigrant-native wage 
differential for the latter group. The results are important as they provide information on the 
relative economic position of this group, i.e. whether the naturalized immigrants are more 
similar to foreigners or to native Germans. Second, a possible reason for an immigrant-native 
wage gap could be the imperfect international transferability of human capital and a less 
successful job matching of the immigrants, see Blackaby et al. (2002), Chiswick and Miller 
(2009) or Constant and Massey (2005) among others.51 For that reasons, even formally 
equivalently qualified workers may earn less than natives. If a part of the wage gap is 
determined by the imperfect transferability of human capital, one could expect a reduction of 
the differential when considering immigrants who completed education in Germany. To 
evaluate the extent of this cause, we estimate a separate decomposition regarding only persons 
who completed education in Germany. 
To analyse the wage differential we apply a variant of the Oaxaca (1973) - Blinder (1973) - 
decomposition. As time of residence is important for convergence of immigrants’ earnings it 
should be considered in the estimation. For the decomposition, however, this results in 
unequal sets of covariates for immigrants and natives since natives’ time of residence is equal 
to age and hence it could neither be regarded in the estimation of the earnings’ equation nor in 
the decomposition for this group. To deal with this issue, we therefore provide a 
methodological extension of the decomposition to account for unequal numbers of regressors 
and the necessary correction of the decomposition variance-covariance matrix in this paper. 
By explicitly regarding two immigrant groups (foreigners and naturalized immigrants), our 
estimates clearly establish the existence of an immigrant-native wage gap independently of 
citizenship. The gap is of similar size for both groups, but a bit more pronounced for 
naturalized immigrants. It persists despite similarity in other characteristics like age, 
employment type, economic sector, place of residence or formal education. This finding has 
two important implications: Naturalization is not necessarily related to assimilation and 
economic integration of immigrants. With regard to the economic situation, naturalized 
                                                          
51 Blackaby et al. (2002) report rates of return ranging from 0.028 for years of schooling abroad to 0.052 for 
schooling in the UK for black males. 
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immigrants are more similar to foreigners than to native Germans. The results of the 
estimations of the immigrant-wage gap considering persons with an educational attainment in 
Germany show a strong reduction of the wage gap. This indicates that imperfect 
transferability of human capital plays an important role in explaining the immigrant wage gap. 
From a methodological perspective, the small difference in the results for both immigrant 
groups could be viewed to partly support the usage of citizenship to approximate immigration 
that is common in the empirical literature for Germany so far. However, the accuracy of this 
proxy is limited: On the one hand, the reference group (i.e. Germans) contains the group of 
naturalized immigrants as well. On the other hand, the ongoing demographic change will 
make a frequent re-calibration of the proxy necessary. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the situation of immigration to 
Germany that motivates the distinction of foreigners and naturalized immigrants when 
analysing the immigrant-native wage gap. Section 6.3 provides details on the SOEP data used 
for the empirical analysis. The econometric methodology with the extension of the 
decomposition method is introduced in section 6.4. The results of the empirical analysis are 
presented in section 6.5. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings. 
6.2 Immigration to Germany 
Since the Second World War until recently, Germany experienced continuing immigration 
that could be characterized by four movements according to Dustmann and van Soest (2002). 
Whereas the first of these movements between 1945 and 1960 was characterized by the after-
war's effects with a strong East-West migration of native Germans, the second movement was 
economically motivated. Starting in the mid 1950s, Germany experienced a strong boom of 
the economy associated with a shortage of low-skilled labour. For this reason, in contrast to 
traditional immigration countries, like the U.S. or Australia, Germany adopted a rather ad-hoc 
immigration policy that centred predominantly on recruitment of temporary workers (Bauer et 
al., 2007). The main inflow of immigrants arrived from Southern European countries, Turkey, 
and North Africa. At the turning point of the economic development in the early 1970s 
earmarked by the oil-price shock in 1973, Germany’s government stopped actively recruiting 
foreign workers. Although Germany’s immigration policy was initially considered as 
temporary, a substantial share of the immigrants decided to stay permanently (Schmidt and 
Zimmermann, 1992). The third movement starting after 1973 is characterized by family 
immigration and family reunification (as well as asylum migration). Due to quite strict laws 
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on naturalization until 2000, most of the immigrants did not receive German citizenship. Over 
the years, the number of foreigners living in Germany has been constantly increasing from 
686.000 in 1961 to 2.7 million in 1970, 5.6 million in 1990, reaching 7.3 million in 2006 
(Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2008). In 2000, a new naturalization law was 
passed in Germany which relaxed barriers to naturalization. From 2000 to 2006 more than 1 
million foreigners became German citizens. The fourth movement was caused by the changes 
in the political situation of Europe in the late 1980s that resulted in a strong increase of 
immigrants to Germany, namely refugees and ethnic Germans from Eastern European 
countries. Whereas refugees had only limited access to the labour market, ethnic Germans 
received German citizenship at the time or shortly after immigration to Germany. From 1990 
to 2006 about 2.5 million ethnic Germans immigrated, with the peak in the early 1990s and 
sharply decreasing afterwards.52 
Associated with the movements, the fraction of immigrants’ descendants who were born in 
Germany has also increased over the last decades and affected the share of naturalized 
immigrants in particular. In 2005, one fifth of the population had an immigration background, 
i.e. they had immigrated to Germany themselves or were descendants of former immigrants. 
But, less than half of these people possessed foreign citizenship (about 47%, Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2007). It becomes obvious that immigration is an important issue for Germany. 
Schmidt and Zimmermann (1992) have shown that Germany experienced more immigration 
per capita than the U.S. in almost all years after the Second World War. However, in 
particular the rising share of naturalized immigrants should be regarded when analysing issues 
of immigration. Given the present situation, approximation of an immigration background by 
citizenship seems to be quite imprecise. 
6.3 Data and Descriptives 
For the empirical analysis, we use the 2005 wave of the SOEP data. Started in 1984, the 
SOEP is a representative longitudinal study of almost 12,000 private households with more 
than 21,000 persons in Germany.53 The comprehensive set of socio-demographic variables 
included in the SOEP allows to identify whether the person herself or one of her parents 
immigrated to Germany (immigration background). To identify these persons, we use 
information on citizenship, country of origin and year of immigration to Germany of the 
                                                          
52 The rules for the admission of ethnic Germans were tightened after that peak; in 2007 only 5,792 persons 
arrived (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2008). 
53 See Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) and Wagner et al. (2007) for a detailed description. 
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person. In addition, we are able to identify the parents of an individual if they have 
participated in any of the SOEP waves since 1984. In these cases, we merge parental data 
with those of the individual. 
We define three groups considered in the analysis as follows: First, foreigners are all persons 
who possess a non-German citizenship in 2005. Second, naturalized immigrants are 
naturalized former foreigners or ethnic Germans and their dependents (who are naturalized by 
law). Finally, the remaining persons are defined as native Germans. 
For homogeneity reasons, we impose some restrictions on our sample. We exclude second-
generation immigrants, i.e. descendants of immigrants who were born in Germany.54 The 
study is limited to West Germany because the number of immigrants in East Germany is very 
small. In addition, only employed persons aged 15 to 65 who report a wage are considered. 
The outcome variable (gross hourly wage) is obtained for all workers including the self-
employed by dividing the gross wage in the month prior to the interview by the reported 
working hours of the last week that are extrapolated to monthly hours. 
The final sample contains 3,035 (2,810) native German males (females), 300 (231) male 
(female) foreigners and 260 (252) naturalized male (female) immigrants. Table 6.1 provides 
some descriptive statistics by gender. Starting with the gross hourly wage, natives earn on 
average more than both immigrant groups irrespective of gender. With respect to variables 
expected to affect the wage, time of residence may affect individual’s wage due to 
assimilation effects (see e.g. Constant and Massey, 2005 or Lang, 2005). Immigrants who 
reside in the destination country long enough may have a better command of the language and 
may be more accustomed to the country which in turn can affect productivity (see e.g. 
Aldashev et al., 2009; Chiswick and Miller, 2007). The descriptives show that the time of 
residence of foreigners is longer on average than of naturalized immigrants. The main reason 
may be that the latter group encompasses ethnic Germans who mainly arrived in the late 
1980s to early 1990s. 
 
                                                          
54 One could argue that second-generation immigrants could be systematically different from the first generation. 
First, they are younger. Second, being born in Germany, they may be more familiar with the language, cultural 
values, etc. However, due to a small number of observations it is difficult to conduct a separate analysis for this 
group. 
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Table 6.1: Means of Selected Characteristics 
 Males Females 
 Natives Foreig-
ners 
Natural- 
ized 
Natives Foreig-
ners 
Natural- 
ized 
Hourly Wage 16.23 14.72 14.01 12.76 10.51 11.04 
Age 41.98 43.16 41.48 41.16 43.03 41.79 
Time of residence - 27.34 21.36 - 26.06 21.80 
Part-time work 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Self-employment 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02 
Education       
Low-skilled 0.12 0.35 0.18 0.14 0.52 0.27 
Medium-skilled 0.63 0.45 0.48 0.65 0.27 0.41 
High-skilled 0.25 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.20 0.32 
Out of which completed in Germany - 0.71 0.74 - 0.55 0.76 
Economic Sectors       
Agriculture 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Industry 0.32 0.54 0.58 0.14 0.30 0.19 
Transportation 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Construction 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Trading services 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.37 0.40 0.36 
Social services and health 0.22 0.06 0.08 0.42 0.26 0.38 
Region a       
North 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.20 
Centre 0.34 0.29 0.42 0.33 0.26 0.40 
South 0.46 0.57 0.37 0.45 0.62 0.40 
No. of observations 3,035 300 260 2,810 231 252 
a North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre are the Federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises 
Hessen, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
 
Education is considered in three levels. People without a formal professional training are 
regarded as low-skilled, persons with professional training are medium-skilled, and those with 
college or university degree are the high-skilled. The raw descriptives show that the share of 
low-educated is clearly higher in both immigrant groups. In contrast, the largest share of 
formally high-skilled could be observed in the group of naturalized immigrants. The majority 
of the immigrants in the sample completed their education in Germany (between 55, female 
foreigners, and 76 percent, naturalized females). Naturalized immigrants have the largest 
shares of persons with German education. Given the skills’ composition of the two 
immigrants’ groups, one would expect foreigners to be paid less on average than naturalized 
immigrants. However, taking a look at the average hourly wage for males shows that this is 
not the case. 
6.4 Methodology 
To quantify underlying causes of the wage differences between the natives and each of the 
two immigrants’ groups, we apply a variant of the Blinder (1973) - Oaxaca (1973) -
decomposition technique suggested by Daymont and Andrisani (1984). The basic idea is that 
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differences in wages could be explained by differences in characteristics (endowments) and 
by different returns to characteristics (coefficients) of groups. Daymont and Andrisani (1984) 
augment the decomposition equation by an interaction term capturing the perception of past 
discrimination (threefold-decomposition). Considering two arbitrary groups N and I (with N 
denoting natives and I denoting the immigrant group of interest respectively), the individual 
wage equation for each group is 
(6.1)  INjXY ijjijij ,, =+= εβ , 
where Yij is the log hourly wage of individual i of group j, Xij is a vector of individual 
characteristics, βj is the vector of the corresponding coefficients for group j and εij is the 
residual. 
The threefold decomposition is then 
(6.2)  ))(()()( INININIIININ XXXXXYY βββββ −−+−+−=− , 
where the “bar” denotes the sample averages. The first term on the right hand side captures 
differences in wages due to characteristics (endowment effect), the second term are 
differences in the coefficients (price effect). The last term is the interaction effect, i.e. a 
positive interaction effect implies that the returns of the natives (N) tend to be greater for 
those characteristics for which the natives have higher means and vice versa. 
For the estimation of the earnings’ regressions, we consider the effects of age, age squared, 
three skill levels, dummy variables for industry, dummy variables for part-time and self-
employment and regional dummy variables.55 Moreover, interactions between the skill levels 
and age (and age squared) are considered. Since we use cross-section data for the analysis, we 
have to consider possible effects of the dynamics of immigration over time. If this is not 
regarded, estimated effects may misguide interpretation. To mitigate the problem, cohort 
effects could be considered, as discussed by Borjas (1985, 1994). Therefore, we distinguish 
four birth cohorts in the analyses: born before 1950, 1950-59, 1960-69, and after 1970. In 
addition, we include time of residence (and its square) in the wage equations of foreigners and 
naturalized immigrants. For naturalized immigrants and foreigners time of residence in 
                                                          
55 A further variable of interest could be tenure. As shown in chapter 2, tenure may have a potential influence on 
wages. We tried to add this variable but draw back because there are some shortcomings in the data concerning 
persons with migration background where we observe implausible high levels of tenure. 
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Germany is a potentially important factor affecting wages as it might proxy assimilation and 
integration of immigrants (Chiswick (1978) advocated the Immigrant Assimilation 
Hypothesis).56 
For native Germans time of residence is indistinguishable from age and therefore does not 
enter the wage regression. Due to this, the wage equation of natives contains fewer covariates. 
This entails a tricky part about the decomposition of the wage gap between natives and 
immigrants as the sets of covariates for the groups are unequal. One could in principle 
disregard the time of residence variable guaranteeing that the wage regression for each group 
contains the same set of variables. In fact, the total wage gap is thereby unaffected. However, 
excluding this variable leads to an omitted variable bias, which affects the coefficients in the 
wage regression. As a result the decomposition of the total wage gap into price and 
endowment components would be biased. This will give misleading conclusions as to whether 
the differential is caused by differences in the endowment composition or remuneration. 
Blackaby et al. (2002) for example analyse the wage gap between ethnic groups/races. They 
pool foreign and native whites together thereby guaranteeing that the arrival year is not 
always equal the birth year within the group. However, this approach would not work if one 
of the interest groups are German born natives and the other groups are foreigners or 
naturalized immigrants who were born outside of Germany. In this case, the problem of 
unequal set of covariates remains. To address the problem adequately, we modify the Oaxaca 
(1973) - Blinder (1973) - decomposition as follows. 
Let the wage equation of the native Germans (reference group) be 
(6.3)  NNNNN XY εββ ++= 0 , 
where β0 denotes the coefficient of the constant and X is the matrix of the covariates 
considered in the estimation. For each of the two immigrant groups, the corresponding wage 
equation is given by: 
(6.4)  IIIII ZXY εγββ +++= 0 , 
                                                          
56 In an early study, Licht and Steiner (1994) test this hypothesis for Germany distinguishing foreigners who stay 
temporarily and permanently in Germany. Their results tend to reject the assimilation hypothesis. However, one 
could expect naturalization to be more correlated with assimilation than the decision to stay permanently. On the 
other hand, later studies like Blackaby et al. (2002) report that the year of arrival contributes substantially to the 
wage gap between the whites and ethnic minorities in the UK. 
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with Z denoting time of residence and its square and γ as the corresponding vector of 
coefficients. If we estimate equation (6.4) we obtain γββ ˆˆˆ)|( 0 ZXXYE IIIII ++= . Given the 
estimated coefficient vector Iβˆ , we reestimate 
(6.5)  IIIII tsXY ββζβδ ˆ..,0 =++= . 
Since 
(6.6)  IIIIII XZXYE βδγββ ˆˆˆˆˆ)( 00 +=++= , 
the constant term 0δ  in equation (6.5) captures the effect of average time of residence (and its 
square) on wages. As a result, in the decomposition the endowment effect would capture the 
differences in the covariates excluding time of residence and time of residence (squared), and 
the average effects of these variables are included in the price effect. 
To summarize, the decomposition procedure applied comprises the following steps. First, we 
regress wages of foreigners or naturalized immigrants on the set of covariates X and Z. This 
produces the estimates of the coefficients β , γ, and the constant term I0β . In the second step, 
a constrained regression of wages on X only is estimated, with the vector Iβ  restricted to the 
values obtained in step one (as in equation (6.5)). The new constant term in the constrained 
regression is then 0δ . It should be noted that since Iβ  was imposed as a constraint, the 
variance-covariance matrix of Iβ  is zero by definition. Hence, to make meaningful inferences 
one has to modify the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient vector. 
The variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient vector of the equation 
εγββ +++= ZXY 0  (suppressing the superscript I to save notation) is of the form: 
(6.7)  
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The variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient vector of the equation ζβδ ++= XY 0  is 
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very similar. In fact, all elements except for the first and last rows and columns are identical. 
Thus, we need to trim the first row and column, i.e. coefficients corresponding to a variable 
which enters only the equation for immigrants. The last row and column, i.e. elements 
corresponding to the constant term have to be changed. Knowing that 00 ˆˆˆ βγδ += Z  we could 
calculate the variance and covariance terms corresponding to 0δ . For example: 
(6.8)  ),cov(2)var()var()var( 00
2
0 βγβγδ ZZ ++= , 
and 
(6.9)  ),cov(),cov(),cov( 00 iii Z βγβββδ += . 
These can be calculated from the elements of the first and last rows and columns of the 
original variance-covariance matrix. Having constructed the variance-covariance matrix of the 
coefficient vector one could estimate standard errors of the decomposition terms in a 
straightforward way (see e.g. Jann (2008) for further details). 
6.5 Empirical Findings 
In this section, we will first analyse the immigrant wage gap in Germany distinguishing 
foreigners and naturalized immigrants as the two immigrant groups. However, as mentioned 
above, differences with respect to the place where education is obtained may play a role. 
Therefore, in a second step we will decompose the gap for persons with education in 
Germany only. 
The results of the decomposition of the wage gap between the two immigrant groups and the 
natives are given in the upper panel of Table 6.2. The corresponding coefficient estimates of 
the underlying wage equations are in line with expectations and are not discussed here (see 
Table 6.A1 in appendix). It becomes obvious that the predicted wage gap between foreigners 
and natives is quite substantial with 9.1% (men) and 18.7% (women). About one third of the 
gap (32%) for men can be explained by differences in endowments, but the estimate is 
statistically insignificant. Differences in endowments do not explain the wage gap of foreign 
women either; here, the price effect accounts for about 90% of the gap. The wage differential 
between natives and immigrants is mainly driven by price effects. However, this price effect 
should not necessarily be dubbed “discriminatory”. The price effect of the wage gap could 
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well stem from the differences in unobserved characteristics. 
Table 6.2: Decomposition of Log Real Gross Hourly Wage  
 Foreigners Naturalized Immigrants 
 Males Females Males Females 
Full Sample     
Predicted difference 0.091*** 0.187*** 0.112*** 0.120*** 
Endowment effect 0.029 
(32%) 
0.017 
(10%) 
-0.040 
(-36%) 
0.017 
(14%) 
Price effect 0.112*** 
(123%) 
0.154*** 
(87%) 
0.169*** 
(151%) 
0.143*** 
(119%) 
Interaction effect -0.051 
(-56%) 
0.007 
(4%) 
-0.017 
(-15%) 
-0.040 
(-33%) 
Education in Germany     
Predicted difference 0.022 0.124* 0.088* 0.096* 
Endowment effect 0.030 
(136%) 
0.058 
(47%) 
-0.029 
(-32%) 
0.033 
(34%) 
Price effect 0.054 
(243%) 
0.110* 
(89%) 
0.094 
(107%) 
0.071 
(74%) 
Interaction effect -0.062* 
(-280%) 
-0.044 
(-35%) 
0.022 
(25%) 
-0.008 
(-8%) 
Reference Group: Native Germans. 
Stars denote significance on 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**) and 10%-level (*). 
Covariates considered in the estimation are: age, age squared, three skill levels, dummy variables for industry, 
dummy variables for part-time and self-employment, regional dummy variables, terms for the interaction 
between skill levels and age (and age squared). Birth cohorts are considered: born before 1950, 1950-59, 1960-
69 and after1970. Time of residence (and its square) is considered for the immigrant groups only. See text for 
details. 
 
The results for naturalized immigrants differ somewhat from the results for foreigners. Again, 
the wage gap with respect to native Germans is substantial with 11.2% (men) and 12.0% 
(women). Thus, naturalized male immigrants are even worse off than foreign men. Again, 
differences in endowments do not contribute significantly to the wage gap of naturalized male 
immigrants. For women we observe a different picture. Here the wage gap between 
naturalized immigrants and natives is smaller than between foreigners and natives. Similar to 
the wage gap between foreigners and natives, price effects are important for the naturalized 
immigrants independently of gender. In the latter group, the price effect of the gap is even 
larger. 
The low endowment effect remains stable irrespective of which wave we used (we have also 
redone the same analysis using the waves 2002, 2003, and 2004). This is different to the 
results obtained by Kee (1995) for the Netherlands. He establishes a discrimination share of 
35% for the wage gap between native Dutch and migrants from the Antilles and 15% for 
migrants from Turkey while the gap is nearly completely explained by differences in 
endowments for Surinamese and Moroccans. In contrast to that and similar to our findings, 
Blackaby et al. (2002) found for the UK that the wage gap between the whites and ethnic 
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minorities is mostly driven by the price effect. A similar result is established by Peters (2008) 
for Germany. His comprehensive decomposition analysis does not reveal any significant 
endowment effect either. The low endowment effect may still look somewhat surprising given 
clear differences in certain characteristics like for example education level which are plain to 
see from Table 6.1. It implies that if immigrants are disadvantaged in certain characteristics 
(like education) than they should have an advantage in other characteristics; for example, 
immigrants are more concentrated in the South of Germany, where wages are on average 
higher. So in the end these effects are balanced out causing a low endowment effect. 
Following this logic, if we had only education level as a regressor in the wage equation we 
should get a larger endowment effect because of the differences in education between the 
groups. We did this exercise and obtained larger and statistically significant endowment 
effects as expected. 
From the results presented so far it becomes obvious that immigrants are paid less than 
natives for observationally equivalent characteristics irrespective of citizenship. Some 
important implications of these findings should be emphasized. First, evidence for the 
expected economic integration of naturalized immigrants could not be established from the 
data. On the contrary, the results tend to show a larger wage gap for naturalized immigrant 
males compared to that of foreign men. Consequently, analysing the native-immigrant wage 
gap based on citizenship alone leads to an underestimation of the true gap. In that case, the 
average wage of the reference group (native Germans) would be downward biased, because it 
is the mean of native Germans' and naturalized immigrants' wages, where the latter group 
makes up about 10% of the population living in Germany. 
Besides discrimination, a further reason for differences in the valuation of endowments may 
be that observationally equivalent educational degrees attained in different countries are not 
necessarily comparable.57 Even if contents of education are comparable, skills acquired may 
be not applicable in the destination country for different reasons, e.g. a lack of demand or 
differences in technology. Thus, immigrants may be less able than natives to transfer their 
human capital (measured by the degree obtained) into good jobs or that the value of human 
capital differs with regard to educational attainment in Germany or abroad. For example, 
Chiswick and Miller (2009) note an imperfect transferability of skills acquired on the job 
through formal schooling in the country of origin and that the earnings increments (in a 
human capital-earnings-function) associated with pre-immigration labour market experience 
                                                          
57 Blackaby et al. (2002) report substantial differences between rates of return to schooling in the UK and abroad. 
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are only very modest for the U.S. To analyse the value of educational attainment we redo the 
analysis regarding only persons who completed their education in Germany. The share of 
immigrants who completed their education in Germany is more than 70% (except for foreign 
females with about 55%), see Table 6.1. The results of the decomposition are presented in the 
lower panel of Table 6.2.58 
It becomes clear that the wage gap shrinks significantly for foreigners59 compared to the 
results of the full sample. The earnings' differential for foreign males is reduced by about 7 
percentage points from 9.1% down to 2.2%. The predicted wage gap for naturalized 
immigrants drops, too, if one considers persons with educational attainment in Germany only. 
In this group, the negative (but insignificant) endowment effect for males should be noted 
which means that naturalized immigrants have more favourable labour market characteristics 
than the reference group. Hence, one would expect that they earn higher wages than the 
reference group. However, their worse wage position implies that the more favourable 
characteristics are overcrowded by price effects. It indicates that this group would have 
earned more than the natives had the remuneration been the same. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The paper analyses the wage differentials between native Germans and two immigrant 
groups: foreigners and naturalized immigrants. To gain more insight into the native-
immigrant wage gap we perform the Oaxaca (1973) - Blinder (1973) - decomposition of the 
wage differential into three effects: endowment, price, and interaction effect. The underlying 
wage regression for the reference group (native Germans) contains fewer regressors than for 
the comparison groups. Namely, time of residence being an important factor affecting wages 
of the immigrant population is indistinguishable from age for the native German population. 
Therefore, we modify the decomposition technique to account for unequal regressor sets and 
respective variance-covariance adjustment. 
Our decomposition results show that there is a considerable wage gap between immigrants 
and natives in Germany. Much of the gap is due to the fact that immigrants are paid less than 
natives for observationally equivalent characteristics. Relative wages of foreigners and 
naturalized immigrants (with respect to native Germans) do not differ much. Thus, citizenship 
                                                          
58 Corresponding coefficient estimates of the underlying wage equations are given in Table 6.A2 in appendix. 
59 The wage gap is always considered with respect to the reference group, the native German population. 
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alone does not necessarily guarantee economic integration. However, discarding persons who 
completed education abroad reduces the wage gap for immigrants. Educational attainment in 
Germany is thus an important component of economic integration and degrees obtained 
abroad are valued less in the German labour market. 
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6.8 Appendix to Chapter 6 
Table 6.A1: Wage Equation: Estimation Results for Full Sample 
 Males Females 
 Natives Foreigners Naturalized Natives Foreig-
ners 
Natura-
lized 
Time of residence -  0.0275 *** -0.0030  -  0.0036  0.0147 * 
Time of residence 
(squared) 
-  -0.0003 ** 0.0002  -  0.0001  -0.0002  
Age 0.1256 *** 0.1024 *** 0.1361 *** 0.1136 *** 0.0285  0.1070 ***
Age (squared) -0.0012 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0001  -0.0011 ** 
Birth Cohort  
(Ref. Before 1950) 
     
1950-1959 0.0309  -0.1422  -0.0284  0.0267  0.1381  0.0133  
1960-1969 0.1115 * -0.1309  0.0565  0.1073  0.3552  0.1553  
1970 or later 0.1387 * -0.0001  0.1025  0.1894 ** 0.3962  0.4508  
Education  
(Ref. Low) 
     
Medium 1.5808 *** 0.7940  1.7407 ** 1.3798 *** -0.1249  0.2006  
High 0.8131 ** 3.4027 ** 1.1158  0.9495 ** 1.1338  1.5778  
Medium*Age -0.0649 *** -0.0300  -0.0866 ** -0.0528 *** 0.0237  -0.0087  
High*Age -0.0210  -0.1410 ** -0.0638  -0.0241  -0.0392  -0.0654  
Medium*Age(squar
ed) 
0.0007 *** 0.0003  0.0011 ** 0.0006 *** -0.0004  0.0002  
High*Age(squared) 0.0003  0.0015 ** 0.0009  0.0003  0.0004  0.0007  
Economic Sector 
(Ref. Industry) 
     
Transportation -0.1123 *** -0.2333 *** -0.2395 *** -0.0786 * 0.0437  0.0496  
Construction -0.1072 *** -0.1006  -0.1443  -0.0822  -0.4004  -0.0890  
Trading Services -0.0964 *** -0.2763 *** -0.1258 ** -0.1803 *** -0.1466 ** -0.0788  
Social Services and 
Health 
-0.0711 *** 0.1018  -0.1770 * -0.0126  0.0396  0.0689  
Regiona  
(Ref. South) 
     
North -0.0509 *** 0.0239  -0.1132 * -0.0582 *** -0.2452 *** -0.0969  
Centre -0.0097  0.0069  -0.0869 * -0.0254  -0.0508  -0.0249  
Part-time work -0.1210 *** -0.2679 *** -0.1703  -0.0878 ** -0.1591 *** -0.1022 * 
Self-employed -0.1477 *** 0.2982 *** 0.0944  -0.2070 *** -0.1416  -0.3050 * 
Constant -0.5311 *** -0.0642  -0.2811  -0.3648  0.7768  -0.6763  
No. of observations 2,717  259  230  2,534  197  236  
Stars denote significance on 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**) and 10%-level (*). 
a North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre are the Federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises 
Hessen, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
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Table 6.A2: Wage Equation: Sample with Education in Germany 
 Males Females 
 Foreigners Naturalized Foreigners Naturalized 
Time of residence 0.0446 *** -0.0044  0.0270 * 0.0277 ** 
Time of residence (squared) -0.0006 *** 0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0004 ** 
Age 0.0337  0.1753 *** 0.0261  0.1075 ** 
Age (squared) -0.0004  -0.0021 *** 0.0000  -0.0011 * 
Birth Cohort (Ref. Before 1950)    
1950-1959 -0.3255 ** -0.1149  -0.1158  -0.0446  
1960-1969 -0.3893 * -0.0523  -0.0550  0.0012  
1970 or later -0.4025  -0.0727  0.0204  0.2728  
Education (Ref. Low)    
Medium -0.6944  2.7346 *** -0.9191  0.1834  
High 1.6411  0.3790  0.5019  2.1110  
Medium*Age 0.0441  -0.1372 ** 0.0693  -0.0065  
High*Age -0.0542  -0.0284  -0.0118  -0.0799  
Medium*Age(squared) -0.0006  0.0017 ** -0.0010  0.0002  
High*Age(squared) 0.0006  0.0006  0.0001  0.0009  
Economic Sector (Ref. Industry)    
Transportation -0.2635 ** -0.2696 *** 0.0545  0.0674  
Construction -0.1069  -0.0904  -0.1117  -0.1034  
Trading Services -0.2356 *** -0.0934  -0.0331  -0.0360  
Social Services and Health 0.0246  -0.2873 ** 0.2726 ** 0.0705  
Regiona (Ref. South)    
North 0.0077  -0.0781  -0.2158 * -0.0972  
Centre -0.0397  -0.0689  -0.0509  0.0625  
Part-time work 0.3644 *** 0.0719  0.1236  -0.3865 ** 
Self-employed -0.2289  -0.0580  -0.1556 * -0.0630  
Constant 1.5612  -0.8490  0.8615  -0.7056  
No. of observations 160  156  97  171  
Stars denote significance on 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**) and 10%-level (*). 
a North contains the Federal Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. 
Centre are the Federal Laender North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises 
Hessen, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
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7. Language Usage, Participation, Employment and Earnings – Evidence 
for Foreigners in West Germany with Multiple Sources of Selection 
This part is joint work with Alisher Aldashev and Stephan L. Thomsen and is published in 
Labour Economics 16, 330-341. 
Abstract: Language proficiency may not only affect the earnings of the individual, but the 
probability to participate in the labour market or becoming employed as well. It may also 
affect selection of people into economic sector and occupation. In this paper, the effects of 
language proficiency on earnings are analysed for foreigners in Germany with joint 
consideration of up to four types of selection. The results show that language proficiency 
significantly increases participation and employment probability and affects occupational 
choice. When selection into economic sector and occupation is regarded, we do not find an 
impact of language ability on earnings thereby implying an indirect effect. 
Keywords: Foreigners, Participation, Employment, Language Ability, Multiple Selection. 
JEL-classification: J61, J24, J15, C35 
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7.1 Introduction 
A core topic of the migration literature are earnings’ differentials between immigrants and 
natives that have been explored in numerous studies since the seminal paper of Chiswick 
(1978). A well-established finding of many studies is that migrants' earnings lack behind 
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those of the equally-qualified and experienced native population. In addition, catching up at a 
later stage depending on the duration of residence is documented in the literature leading to 
the so-called assimilation hypothesis. One explanation for the gap in earnings between 
foreigners and natives is language deficiency of the immigrants that may hamper productivity. 
From a policy perspective, language effect is interesting as language learning could be 
stimulated through language courses or similar activities. Consequently, the impact of 
immigrants' language ability on earnings has been studied by many authors. Whereas some 
early studies, see, e.g. Carliner (1981) or Reimers (1983, 1985), could not establish significant 
positive effects of language proficiency on earnings, the majority of later studies revised that 
finding presenting clear positive effects, see, e.g. Chiswick and Miller (1995), Dustmann 
(1994), McManus et al. (1983) or Tainer (1988).60 Given these studies are not directly 
comparable due to differences with respect to the analysed questions, the formulation of the 
estimation equations and sample selection criteria, makes this common positive effect of 
language on earnings even more remarkable. 
Despite the large number of studies on language effects on earnings, the context of 
employment or job type have been scarcely considered. McManus et al. (1983) argue that if 
economy consisted of one-person producing units and impersonal products, communication 
would have no effect on earnings. If, alternatively, products were personal, so that the value 
of the service may depend on a producer's ability to communicate and convey the product to a 
consumer, communication ability would affect earnings. More practically, Kossoudji (1988) 
argues that jobs are extremely heterogeneous in their use of language. Although 
communication is necessary in most jobs, its contribution to productivity clearly varies by 
occupation. In a similar vein, Tainer (1988) argues that language proficiency is an important 
communication factor, and communication is a vital aspect of any job. For that reason, 
language deficiency could, on the one hand, prevent someone from getting a job. On the other 
hand, even if the person finds a job, it could be below the skill level depending on the degree 
of the deficiency and the communication skills of the co-workers. Nevertheless, 
characteristics of occupation are not regarded in the majority of studies and earnings are used 
to reflect the communication inability. 
                                                          
60 Further studies establishing positive effects, amongst others, are Berman et al. (2003), Chiswick (1991), 
Chiswick and Miller (1999), Dustmann (1999), Dustmann and Fabri (2003), Dustmann and van Soest (2001, 
2002), Grenier (1984), Kossoudji (1988), Rivera-Batiz (1990) and Shields and Price (2002). Chiswick and Miller 
(1995) provide a comparison for adult male immigrants (aged 25-64 years) in Australia, the U.S., Canada, and 
Israel. For all countries they find significant positive effects of host-country-language fluency, with the largest 
effect for the U.S. 
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An early attempt to include occupation is given by Kossoudji (1988) who explicitly analyses 
the effect of language on occupation-specific earnings and occupational mobility in the U.S. 
Language ability is measured in terms of English language deficiency. Estimating a mixed 
simultaneous model the results indicate that English language deficiency has no effect on 
earnings in either of the two highest productivity occupations (managers and professionals). 
The explanation provided by the author is that immigrant professionals may possess unique 
skills highly demanded in the labour market that employers are willing to ignore language 
deficiencies. With regards to other occupations English language deficiency alters access to 
jobs. Very recently, Chiswick and Miller (2009) pick up the topic for the U.S. again. They 
argue that occupation provides information about the channels through which earnings gains 
are achieved. Similar to education, language can be viewed as having both direct and indirect 
effects on earnings, where indirect effects operate via occupational attainment. In their 
empirical analysis, they include occupations as further regressors in the earnings equation, 
implicitly assuming that occupation is independent of language usage. Their results show that 
inclusion of occupation reduces the earnings gap, and the effect is strongest for the low-
skilled. In that sense, the authors conclude that some of the earnings disadvantage of the 
immigrants could be attributed to their occupational choice. 
Further reasons may complicate the evaluation of the impact of language proficiency on 
earnings. On the one hand, the endogeneity of language proficiency of immigrants may 
induce further issues of self-selection beyond occupational choice. Time of residence and age 
at migration may affect language proficiency (e.g. Bleakley and Chin, 2004) in a way that 
persons who stayed longer in the host country accumulate better language skills and, 
therefore, earn higher wages.61 Moreover, language proficiency may depend on country of 
origin (e.g. Espenshade and Fu, 1997) or linguistic distance (e.g. Beenstock et al., 2001; 
Chiswick and Miller, 2007;). This indicates that we would expect language proficiency not 
only to have an impact on earnings, but also on the selection processes in the labour market. 
Ignoring these impacts may lead to biased estimates. On the other hand, interpretation of the 
effects of language proficiency on earnings could be hampered due to measurement or 
misclassification errors in the language proficiency variable. Dustmann and van Soest (2001, 
2002) analyse the bias due to time-varying and time-persistent misclassification errors in self-
reported language indicators in German data.62 The results show that potential measurement 
errors lead to downward biased estimates of coefficients of language proficiency on earnings 
                                                          
61 It should be noted that Beenstock et al. (2005) reject this so-called Immigration Assimilation Hypothesis. 
62 A similar analysis is provided by Dustmann and Fabri (2003) using data for the UK. 
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in that sense that individuals over-report their language abilities. Controlling for this leads to 
larger effects of language proficiency on earnings and also to a higher standard deviation. 
Charette and Meng (1994) examine the nature and potential measurement error resulting from 
self-assessed measure of literacy using Canadian data including subjective and objective 
measures of literacy. Their results show that the measurement error in the self-assessed 
literacy variable does not have a serious effect on the estimates of the wage determination 
equation. 
The study at hand contributes to the existing literature in a number of aspects. Based on a 
theoretical model that provides a link between language proficiency and the various selection 
processes in the labour market, individuals with better language skills are more likely to 
participate and to be employed even in the absence of a language premium in wages. In the 
empirical analysis, we explicitly regard these different selection processes. Namely, we take 
account of self-selection into participation as well as of self-selection into employment. In 
addition, more proficient individuals could be expected to end up working in higher-paying 
firms or in higher-paid occupations. Therefore, we extend the model to estimate the effect of 
language proficiency on earnings regarding additional patterns of self-selection into economic 
sector and occupation, which is a major difference to the previous literature. In contrast to 
Chiswick and Miller (2009) who regard occupation as a further regressor, we take account of 
the potential endogeneity due to language proficiency by including a further selection 
equation. Moreover, we extend the set-up of the analyses of Kossoudji (1988) and Chiswick 
and Miller (2009) by considering selection processes prior to occupation as well. In addition, 
besides occupation we also take account of economic sector choice that has not been done 
before. To consider skill heterogeneity and capture the potential relationship between 
language proficiency and skill level, we estimate skill-specific effects. Finally, by addressing 
these issues we add to the scarce literature on effects of occupation (so far available only for 
the U.S.) with first results for Germany.63 
The empirical analysis is based on data from the SOEP. To mitigate problems of measurement 
error in the language proficiency variable, we use information on language usage in the 
                                                          
63 There are number of studies exploring the effects of language usage on earnings in Germany. Dustmann 
(1994), e.g. analyses the determinants of German language ability and the effects on earnings testing the 
assimilation hypothesis. However, he addresses potential self-selection bias for women only and neglects 
potential occurrence for men. In addition, Dustmann (1999) studies the incentives to invest in language capital 
conditional on the expected duration of stay, i.e. comparing temporary and permanent immigration. Finally, 
Dustmann and van Soest (2001, 2002) focus on the potential bias of estimates due to measurement or 
misclassification errors. All studies establish positive effects of language on earnings but self-selection with 
regards to the stages discussed here is not regarded. 
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household as a proxy for individual language command, which supposedly suffers less from 
measurement error than the self-reported language proficiency information. To test the 
sensitivity of the results we also present the estimates using the self-assessed language 
proficiency variable. In that sensitivity analysis, we use language usage in the household and 
time of residence as instruments to capture measurement error. The estimates are robust 
irrespective to which variable is used to approximate language proficiency. The results show 
that language proficiency significantly increases participation and employment probability of 
foreigners in Germany. Moreover, earnings are clearly higher for persons speaking mainly or 
at least partly German in the household compared to people using mainly their native 
language. When additional selection into economic sector and type of occupation is 
considered, foreigners with better language proficiency appear more likely to be white-collar 
workers. With regards to earnings, once selection into occupation and economic sector is 
taken into account, no significant effect of language usage on earnings for blue-collar workers 
can be observed. For white-collar workers no conclusive evidence is found. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 7.2 presents the estimation strategy starting with 
the outline of a theoretical model with flat wages within each firm and the econometric 
methodology afterwards. Details on the data and some selected descriptives are given in 
section 7.3. The empirical estimates of the effects of language usage on the selection 
processes and earnings are discussed in section 7.4. In addition, details of the sensitivity 
analysis using different measures of language proficiency are provided. The final section 7.5 
concludes. 
7.2 Estimation Strategy 
7.2.1 Theoretical Background 
Assuming language proficiency to be related to productivity and through this affecting 
earnings, participation and employment, a useful theoretical framework for analysing the 
central question of the paper is given by a variant of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model 
(see also Manning, 2003 and Mortensen, 2003). This model provides argumentation for 
controlling for self-selection even if an employer pays the same wage for workers with 
different language abilities. 
Consider an economy consisting of three types of individuals with productivities p0, p1, and 
p2, such that p0<p1<p2. Suppose that there is a guaranteed minimal income b (for example 
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welfare assistance or minimum wage). The lowest possible wage a firm can set is thus b. 
Suppose that p0<b. This implies that no firm employs individuals with productivity p0 and 
they do not participate. Assume the inflow of job offers to unemployed workers happens in 
continuous time according to a stationary Poisson process so that each worker receives only 
one offer at maximum during an infinitesimal short time interval. Employed workers may 
search on the job for higher paid vacancies. The arrival rates of job offers to employed and 
unemployed workers are assumed to be equal. Since the arrival rates are the same for out-of-
job and on-the-job search, it is optimal for a worker to accept the first offer he receives and to 
continue searching on the job for a better offer (if returns to search are higher than the search 
costs). As a result in equilibrium there will still be a fraction of highly productive workers 
employed at low-wage firms. 
For simplicity, suppose further that there is a flat wage policy in any firm, so that a firm that 
hires both p1 and p2 workers pays equal wages to them. A firm offering a wage lower than p1 
can hire both p1 and p2 individuals, but a firm with a wage above p1 can hire only p2 workers. 
Consider an arbitrary firm 1, which offers a wage equal to b and has a profit of 
П1=(p1-b)L1(p1)+(p2-b)L1(p2), where L1(p1) is the labour supply of p1 workers to firm 1 and 
L1(p2) is the labour supply of p2 workers to firm 1. A firm 2, offering a wage w greater than 
p1, has a profit of П2=(p2-w)L2(p2), where L2(p2) is the labour supply of p2 workers to firm 2. 
Then, as in a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, there exists an equilibrium such that both 
firms are equally profitable. Firm 2 pays a higher wage, but at the same time has a larger 
workforce of p2 workers as it would “steal away” some of the workers from firm 1 attracted 
by a higher wage. Ultimately, more p2 workers would be concentrated in high-wage firms. 
The model implies that even in the presence of a flat wage policy within a firm, the observed 
wages in the sample between p1 and p2 workers would be different due to differences in 
employment probabilities. When estimating the effect of p on wages one has to keep in mind 
that p1 workers are more likely to be unemployed than p2 workers. Moreover, participation 
rates differ with p as p0 individuals do not participate. This implies that the estimated effect of 
p on wages based on the sample of employed individuals is biased as the sample of employed 
wage-earners is self-selected and a distribution of p in a sample of employed individuals is not 
a correct estimate of the distribution of p in the population. 
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7.2.2 Econometric Model and Selection Issues 
Suppose that worker's productivity cannot be observed by a firm, but a firm knows that 
language proficiency is related to productivity as  
(7.1)  υψ += )(Hp  
where H is language proficiency, ψ is some arbitrary function and υ includes other factors 
affecting productivity including a random component. Language proficiency then signals the 
potential productivity. 
The theoretical model is constructed in such a way to allow a flat-wage policy, i.e. a firm pays 
the same wage to workers with different productivities. In reality, this would mean that firms 
pay the same wage independent of language proficiency. The rationale is although persons 
with better language proficiency are more productive, on average paying different wages 
based on language spoken may be deemed overtly discriminatory. Nevertheless, sorting with 
respect to employment might be present. 
Thereby, we would expect a higher participation probability and higher employment chances 
of foreigners with a better command of German language in case of an equal pay policy 
within firms. On the other hand, according to theory, there is a critical level of productivity 
for participation, b. Persons with productivity below this value do not participate. Therefore, 
the participating individuals with a good language command could have lower values of υ as 
higher values of H compensate for this to reach the critical level of productivity. Alternatively 
higher values of υ may compensate lower values of H. Moreover, one needs to keep in mind 
that the most productive workers are more likely to be employed in high-paid firms raising 
out another source of self-selection. 
In the theoretical model above it was shown that participating and employed individuals may 
be non-random samples of the population. Thus, to estimate the earnings equation we have to 
control for self-selection modelling participation and employment decision simultaneously. 
The approach could be interpreted as a variant of the classical Heckman-Lee method, 
following Heckman (1976) and Lee (1976) that is applied when one source of self-selection is 
present. In our case, we have to regard two sources (participation and employment) in a first 
step, requiring certain adjustments that are discussed below. Here, the participation equation 
is given as: 
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(7.2)  111
*
1 εγ += ZI ,  
where Z1 is a matrix of exogenous variables, γ1 is a parameter vector, and ε1 is a random 
component. I1* is latent, instead we observe I1=1 (in case of participation) if wR≥b and I1=0 
(in case of nonparticipation) otherwise where wR denotes the reservation wage. The 
employment equation is specified analogously as: 
(7.3)  222
*
2 εγ += ZI , 
where Z2 is a matrix of exogenous variables, γ2 is a parameter vector, and ε2 is a random 
component. I2* is latent, instead we observe I2=1 (in case of employment) if w≥wR and I2=0 
(for unemployed individuals) otherwise. Both I1* and I2* depend on the reservation wage. If Z1 
and Z2 contain all variables which determine wR, ε1 and ε2 are independent. If some of these 
variables are not observed (or not contained) in the data they will be included in the error 
term, which could result in the correlation between ε1 and ε2. Hence, it might be advisable to 
allow for this correlation and estimate equations (7.2) and (7.3) jointly. 
Finally, the wage offer equation is of a standard Becker-Mincer type, w=Xβ+u, where w is the 
log wage, X is a matrix of exogenous variables, β is a parameter vector, and u is an error 
component, which is normally distributed with mean zero. Wages are observed if both I1=1 
and I2=1. Hence, expected observed wage is given by: 
(7.4)  )1,1|(ˆ)1,1|( 2121 ==+Β=== IIuEXIIwE . 
Define the covariance between the error terms of the participation and the earnings equation 
as σu1=cov(u, ε1), and analogously between employment and earnings σu2=cov(u, ε2). 
Moreover, let var(u)=σ2u. In order to estimate the selection model, variances of the error terms 
have to be standardized as var(ε1)=var(ε2)=1 and cov(ε1, ε2)=ρ1. Following Mohanty (2001) 
(see also Maddala, 1983), E(u|I1=1,I2=1)=σu1λ1+σu2λ2, where λ1=ø(Z1γ1)Φ(A)/F(Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ1) 
and λ2=ø(Z2γ2)Φ(B)/F(Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ1), A=(Z2γ2-ρ1·Z1γ1)/ )1(( 21p− , 
B=(Z1γ1-ρ1·Z2γ2)/ )1(( 21p− . ø is the univariate standard normal density function, Φ is the 
univariate standard normal distribution function, and F is the bivariate standard normal 
distribution function. 
It is worth noting that the λ's are the inverse Mill's ratios adjusted for the bivariate case. In 
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fact, if participation and employment decisions are unrelated, i.e. if ρ1 is not statistically 
significant, then F(Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ1)=Φ(A)·Φ(B) (conditional probability of independent events) 
and hence λ1=Φ(Z1γ1)/Φ(Z1γ1) and λ2=Φ(Z2γ2)/Φ(Z2γ2) which are the inverse Mill's ratios in a 
standard two-stage Heckit model (see Heckman, 1979). 
The conditional wage in equation (7.4) can be rewritten as: 
(7.5)  2211ˆ)|( uuXXwE σλσλβ ++= . 
To estimate equation (7.5), in a first step equations (7.2) and (7.3) have to be estimated 
jointly. Estimates obtained at the first stage (γ1, γ2, ρ1) are used to construct λ1 and λ2 as 
defined above. At the second stage, wage is regressed on X, λ1 and λ2 by OLS which produces 
the parameter estimates of β, σu1, and σu2. 
The theoretical model attributes a higher probability of better jobs to workers with a higher 
productivity. Consequently, even having controlled for self-selection into participation and 
employment, earnings may be affected by worker's occupation and economic sector choice (in 
the subsample of employed individuals). In the empirical analysis, we take account of self-
selection into economic sector modelled as the probability of working in basic or high tech 
industry and manufacturing and of self-selection into occupation modelled as the probability 
of being a qualified/highly-qualified white-collar worker. Analogously to the basic model, 
both choices have to be considered as joint decisions in a first step. Assuming joint normality 
of the errors, estimation is carried out using a bivariate probit model. However, since the 
participation-employment decision is a double-hurdle, i.e. the employment decision is 
observed only for participating individuals and is a precondition for occupational and 
economic sector choice, this has to be regarded in the estimation procedure. A detailed 
explanation is given in the appendix. 
7.3 Data and Selected Descriptives 
7.3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on data from eight waves of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) for the years 1996 to 2005 excluding 2002 and 2004 due to missing 
information on the variable of interest (language usage at home). The SOEP is a wide-ranging 
representative longitudinal study of private households carried out since 1984 in Germany. It 
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provides information about all household members covering Germans, foreigners and recent 
immigrants to Germany. In 2005, there were almost 12,000 households and more than 21,000 
persons sampled in SOEP. An advantage of the SOEP is that it contains an over-sample of 
migrants to provide a sufficient data base for statistical analyses of the immigrant minorities. 
For homogeneity reasons, we impose some restrictions on the sample. First, we use only data 
on male foreigners in West Germany who have a personal migration experience (first 
generation immigrants). Foreigners who arrived before 1948 are not considered. Second, we 
only regard persons from so-called guest-worker countries. We define persons as guest-
workers if their country of origin is one of the traditional German recruiting countries from 
the mid 1950s to 1970s.64 The countries comprised by our sample are: Turkey (48 percent), 
Former Yugoslavia (11 percent), Greece (11 percent), Italy (23 percent), Spain (7 percent) 
and Portugal (1 percent). These persons are a large group of all foreigners in Germany (about 
80 percent). Moreover, guest-workers seem to be more homogeneous as a group by definition. 
On the one hand, we exclude persons who came as refugees, e.g. from Africa or the Middle 
East, and, on the other hand, we exclude persons who came from highly advanced countries 
like the U.S., Western and Northern Europe, or Austria. Third, the analysis takes account of 
people aged 25 to 55 years to avoid bias due to education or early retirement decisions (those 
in education are explicitly discarded from our data). In addition, we exclude individuals who 
do not report the language usage in the household from the sample (less than 2 percent). 
Finally, information on wages is symmetrically two percent trimmed to exclude extreme 
values. 
Variables for language proficiency may be prone to measurement error due to self-assessment 
of the respondents in many surveys. For example, Dustmann and van Soest (2001, 2002) 
show that reliability of the self-assessed language proficiency variable in the SOEP may be 
limited in terms of inter-personal and intra-personal comparability.65 In addition, in about half 
of the observations self-assessed language proficiency is missing in our sample. Language 
usage at home of the respondents contains of three categories: 1) speaking mainly German, 2) 
speaking partly German and partly the mother tongue, or 3) speaking mainly the language of 
the home country. As it could be expected that reporting the type of the language used in the 
household is easier than assessing language proficiency in terms of written or oral skills, we 
suppose the variable to be less prone to measurement errors. 
                                                          
64 The goal of the guest-worker program was to solve labour supply shortages in West Germany in the industrial 
sector that emerged during the strong economic development of that time. 
65 The language spoken in the household is also not free from inter-personal variation. 
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Raw descriptive statistics reveal a strong relationship between self-assessed language 
proficiency and language usage in the household, suggesting that language spoken in the 
household could be a good proxy for language proficiency. For example, 51 percent of people 
who speak mainly German at home report to have very good speaking ability (in German) and 
more than 90 percent report at least good speaking ability. More than 60 percent of those who 
speak partly German at home report to have at least good speaking ability and over 30 percent 
report satisfactory speaking ability. Persons speaking mainly mother tongue at home mostly 
report satisfactory (about 45%) and poor (about 30%) speaking ability. Although these 
descriptive statistics tend to support the use of language usage as a proxy for self-assessed 
language proficiency, differences in interpretation may remain. For that reason, we check the 
robustness of the results by estimating the effects of self-assessed language proficiency in 
section 7.4.4. 
Even with the information on labour market states of non-participation, employment and 
unemployment of SOEP at hand, modelling the two-stage self-selection process requires some 
further treatment of the variables. Respondents are asked two separate questions, whether they 
are registered unemployed and whether they are non-participants. However, non-participation 
is not necessarily understood by respondents as being out of the labour market in an economic 
sense (some people mix up non-participation and registered unemployment). For that reason, 
we define people as non-participants if they responded not in the labour market and not 
registered as unemployed simultaneously. It has to be noted that this group may still include 
some active participants who are not registered at the labour office.66 A further complication 
could arise from the fact that respondents do not necessarily understand employment and 
unemployment as exclusive labour market states. For example, a person having a low-paid 
job67 is eligible for receiving additional subsistence allowance. Officially registered 
unemployed are allowed to hold a minor job or work part-time and earn up to a certain 
threshold. In the empirical application, unemployed people who are registered at the labour 
office but earn more than 1,000 Euro per month are counted as employed. The outcome 
variable (real gross hourly wage) is obtained for all employees by dividing the gross earnings 
in the month prior to the interview by the reported working hours of the last week that are 
extrapolated to monthly hours. Wages are deflated using the consumption price index based 
on the year 2000 to get real consumption wages of comparable purchasing power (source: 
                                                          
66 Potential reasons could be, for example, expiration of unemployment benefits eligibility or benefit sanctions. 
67 With earnings below the subsistence level. 
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Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008).68 
In the SOEP, foreigners could leave the sample for two reasons. First, there is some common 
panel mortality, i.e. persons decide not to participate in subsequent interviews or they change 
their place of residence and interviewers lose track of them. Second, foreigners could be 
naturalized. As there is considerable return migration from Germany this may cause non-
random panel attrition. Dustmann and van Soest (2002) have analysed the extent with respect 
to language ability and earnings. Their results do not show any significant estimates on 
language ability or on earnings. Therefore, we could assume panel mortality to be random. In 
contrast, naturalization could be expected to be non-random. Performing distribution tests of 
equality of language usage for nationality changers and non-changers showed no significant 
differences. Overall, about 5 percent from our sample of foreigners changed nationality (76 
persons out of 1,282). Hence, we refrain from controlling for selection into German 
citizenship explicitly in the analysis. Persons who were naturalized are not considered in the 
estimations after the date of naturalization. 
7.3.2 Selected Descriptives 
Before presenting the empirical application and the estimation results, it is useful to take a 
closer look at the data available. Table 7.1 provides means of selected variables used in the 
empirical model with a distinction between non-participants (first column), persons who 
participate but are not employed (second column) and employed persons (third column). 
Instead of discussing the single figures in the table, we will concentrate on findings that are of 
primary interest for our analysis. Although we use language usage in the household in the 
empirical analysis, we additionally include self-assessed language proficiency for comparison. 
First, compared to the other groups employed individuals are more likely to speak mainly 
German at home. Whereas about 32 percent of the employed persons speak German in the 
household, the shares in the group of non-participants are 22 percent and in the group of the 
unemployed 14 percent only. Vice versa, non-participants (38 percent) and unemployed 
persons (44 percent) speak mainly their mother tongue at home compared to the employed (22 
percent). With respect to self-assessed language proficiency the picture is similar. As about 63 
percent of the employed persons report a good or very good proficiency this group tends to 
have a clearly better command of German language as unemployed persons (42 percent) or 
non-participants (54 percent). All in all, employed persons report better language ability than 
                                                          
68 It should be noted that the reported gross earnings in the month prior to the interview have not been adjusted 
for end-of-year bonuses, overtime-payments, holiday allowances etc. 
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the other groups. 
Table 7.1: Means of Selected Variables 
 Part.=0 Part.=1 
  Emp.=0 Emp.=1 
Language usage in the household    
Mainly German 0.22 0.14 0.32 
Mainly mother tongue 0.38 0.44 0.22 
Partly German 0.40 0.42 0.46 
Self-assessed language proficiency    
Very good 0.22 0.09 0.21 
Good 0.32 0.33 0.42 
Satisfactory 0.32 0.38 0.28 
Poor 0.12 0.19 0.10 
Not at all 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Level of education    
Low skilled 0.60 0.66 0.51 
Medium skilled 0.35 0.28 0.41 
High skilled 0.05 0.06 0.08 
Socio-demographic variables    
Age 38.79 41.41 39.18 
Time of residence 22.89 22.78 23.55 
Married 0.75 0.83 0.86 
Child 0.80 0.75 0.78 
Economic sector    
Manufacturing - - 0.65 
Transportation - - 0.05 
Construction - - 0.13 
Trading services - - 0.14 
Social services and health - - 0.03 
Firm size    
Fewer than 20 employees - - 0.18 
20-199 employees - - 0.28 
200-1999 employees - - 0.32 
2000 and more employees - - 0.20 
Observations 255 290 2,285 
Source: Samples from SOEP 2005; own calculation, see text. 
 
A major determinant of productivity is the skill level. We consider it in the analysis in three 
different categories. Low-skilled are people who lack professional training. This group could 
be expected to be most strongly disadvantaged in the labour market, in particular in a high-
developed country with a regulated labour market as Germany. Medium-skilled comprise 
people who completed a professional training (not necessarily in the German apprenticeship 
system, but comparable to it). Finally, high-skilled persons are those who graduated from 
advanced technical college (Fachhochschule) or university. The shares of the low-skilled are 
particularly large in the group of non-participants (60 percent) and the group of unemployed 
persons (66 percent). In contrast, the share is lower in the group of employed persons (51 
percent) but still considerable. With regard to the socio-demographic characteristics further 
heterogeneity could be obtained. The non-participants are, on average, about half a year 
younger than the employed; unemployed persons, in contrast, are more than two years older 
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than the employed. The time of residence is comparable between groups but employed 
persons have lived in Germany longer than the other groups. Finally, taking a look at the 
economic sectors and firm sizes of the employed persons shows that the majority works in 
manufacturing, trading services and construction and more than half are employed at firms 
with at least 200 employees. 
Table 7.2: Distribution of Language Ability across Skill Groups 
 Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
Language usage in the household    
Mainly German 0.24 0.34 0.43 
Partly German 0.32 0.20 0.18 
Mainly mother tongue 0.45 0.46 0.39 
Self-assessed language proficiency    
Very good 0.14 0.25 0.31 
Good 0.38 0.44 0.31 
Satisfactory 0.34 0.22 0.30 
Poor 0.13 0.08 0.07 
Not at all 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Source: Samples from SOEP 2005; own calculation, see text. 
 
The last point we want to present descriptively is the correlation between language ability and 
level of education (Table 7.2). In general, language ability increases with the skill level. Low-
skilled persons show the lowest language proficiency irrespective if it is measured by 
language usage or self-reported ability. High-skilled workers have a higher variance in self-
reported language ability compared to medium-skilled. While more high-skilled workers 
report very good language ability this is also true for satisfactory language ability, which 
could imply that high-skilled are too heterogeneous as a group. 
7.4 Empirical Results 
7.4.1 Participation and Employment 
To answer the question what impact language ability has on foreigners' earnings, we will start 
our discussion with the effects of language proficiency on the decisions on participation and 
employment. As shown in the set-up of the empirical model, individual's decisions on 
participation and employment may be correlated. Hence, in a first step we estimate both 
decisions jointly using full-information maximum likelihood. For identification purposes not 
to solely rely on distributional assumptions, we choose marital status (married) and children 
(children) as the exclusion restrictions that enter the participation equation, but not the 
employment equation. Marital status has a statistically significant effect, thereby, justifying 
the choice of exclusion variables. The correlation between the errors was statistically 
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insignificant and, therefore, we estimate both equations separately. 
The variables of language usage are included in both equations. Effects are estimated with 
dummies for speaking mainly German language and for speaking partly German language at 
home relative to speaking mother tongue (the reference group). Moreover, to improve 
explanatory power, a number of socio-economic variables are added into the models. In 
particular, person's age and time of residence (i.e. the years the individual lives in Germany) 
as well as the squares are considered in both equations. We do not include immigration cohort 
effects in the model as they are a perfect linear combination of age, time of residence and year 
dummies. Therefore, we refrain from interpreting effects of age or time of residence as we 
cannot identify them separately from cohort effects. It should be noted that the effect of 
language proficiency is unaffected by the exclusion of cohort effects. Those are absorbed in 
the parameter estimates for the constant term. As productivity is closely related to 
qualification, we estimate the effect of medium- or high-qualification in reference to low-
qualification. 
Another issue, which one has to deal with, are differences in requirements of language 
proficiency across jobs. It may be possible that low-skilled workers mainly supplying manual 
labour are less likely to need a good language command in order to perform their tasks, unlike 
their high-skilled counterparts who need the language of the host country on a daily basis for 
communication and decision-making. For that reason we interact language usage with skill 
dummies. As a result the effect of language usage on earnings for each skill group is a sum of 
the coefficients of language usage and the respective skill dummy. The effects of language 
usage on participation and employment across skill groups are given in Table 7.3.69 The 
estimates of the language variables clearly point towards a positive effect of usage of the host 
country's language on both the decision to participate in the labour market and the 
employment chances. Although the coefficients in the table cannot be interpreted as marginal 
effects, it becomes obvious from the relative scale that speaking mainly German has an even 
stronger effect than using it only partly. Surprisingly, no significant effect is found for high-
skilled workers. However, given that the share of non-participants and unemployed among the 
high-skilled is only about 5%, the overall number of high-skilled workers is relatively low in 
the sample, and given possible heterogeneity of this group one should be cautious in 
interpreting insignificance as non-existence of the effect. The scale of the point estimates 
                                                          
69 The complete estimates are given in Table 7.B1 in the appendix 7B. 
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supports this argument.70 
With regard to other variables (see Table 7.B1 in the appendix), most findings are in line with 
the expectations. Considering the level of education, medium-skilled people experience a 
higher propensity to participate than the low-skilled. Maybe due to the small number of 
foreigners who are high-skilled and possible heterogeneity of this group, estimations do not 
provide evidence that those differ in their behaviour from the low-skilled in terms of 
participation. 
Table 7.3: Language Usage Effects on Participation and Employment across Skill 
Groups 
 Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
Participation a    
Mainly German 0.3511 * 0.6010 # 0.7771 * 
Partly German 0.3248 # 0.3277 ** 0.5769  
Employment b 
Mainly German 0.5653 # 0.9404 # 0.1461  
Partly German 0.3193 ** 0.4711 # -0.0576  
#- significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at 10% level. 
a The complete estimations are given in Table 7.B1 (first column) in the appendix. 
b The complete estimations are given in Table 7.B1 (second column) in the appendix. 
 
7.4.2 Impact of Language Usage on Earnings 
Having established selection patterns into participation and employment conditional on 
language usage, we want to analyse the effects on earnings in the next step. As a starting point 
we estimate the effects of language usage on earnings without controlling for self-selection. 
These results are summarized in the upper panel of Table 7.4.71 Without controlling for 
selection, foreigners speaking mainly German earn about 5 percent more than foreigners 
speaking their mother tongue at home. For high skilled workers the gap is as large as 39 
percent. Speaking partly German has a significant effect for high skilled and is smaller in 
magnitude (about 17 percent compared to speaking mother tongue). 
                                                          
70 At this point, one should bear in mind that with respect to language ability high-skilled workers are a more 
heterogeneous group (see Table 7.2) than the other skill groups. 
71 Complete results are given in model 1 of Table 7.B2 in the appendix 7B. 
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Table 7.4: Language Usage Effects on Earnings across Skill Groups 
 Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
Earnings (no selection control) a    
Mainly German 0.0531 * 0.0709 ** 0.3857 # 
Partly German -0.0226  0.0525 * 0.1706 ** 
Earnings (employment, participation selection) b    
Mainly German 0.0750  0.0855  0.3618 # 
Partly German -0.0171  0.0617 * 0.1431 * 
#- significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at 10% level. 
a The complete estimations are given in Table 7.B2 (model 1) in the appendix. 
b The complete estimations are given in Table 7.B2 (model 2) in the appendix. 
 
To consider self-selection of participation and employment, we calculate both inverse Mill's 
ratios based on the results from Table 7.B1 in the appendix. As shown in the set-up of the 
econometric model (section 7.2.2) both terms are plugged into the earnings equation as 
additional regressors. The corresponding estimates of the effects of language usage are 
summarized in the lower panel of Table 7.4.72 Controlling for selection into participation and 
employment increases the earnings gap between foreigners speaking mainly German and 
foreigners speaking mainly their mother tongue by about 2 percentage points for the low 
skilled and by about 1.5 percentage points for the medium-skilled. In contrast, the effect for 
the high-skilled is reduced by about 2.5 percentage points. 
These results so far point out at a wage premium for language proficiency even after 
controlling for selection into participation and employment. This result is not new and has 
already been discussed in the literature. For example, Dustmann (1994) notes a 7.3 percent 
wage increase for males who report to have good or very good writing abilities in German. 
Chiswick and Miller (1999) report higher wages by about 8 percent for migrant males who are 
proficient in both speaking and reading English using the 1989 Legalized Population Survey 
(LPS) for the U.S. For Great Britain Shields and Price (2002) establish that language fluency 
increases the mean occupational wage by about 16.5 percent. Chiswick et al. (2005) find out 
that immigrants who are proficient in English have 19 percent higher earnings than those with 
limited English language skills using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia 
1993-1995. For Israel Berman et al. (2003) predict a 23 percent earnings' increase for 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union who fluently speak Hebrew in 1994. Nevertheless, 
the results presented here clarify that neglecting self-selection of employed immigrants leads 
to biased estimates of the earnings effects. 
                                                          
72 Model 2 of Table 7.B2 in the appendix B contains the complete estimation results. 
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7.4.3 Considering Self-Selection into Economic Sector and Occupation 
However, selection into occupation and industrial sector was not regarded explicitly in earlier 
studies. Put it in other words, are immigrants with better language proficiency paid better in a 
firm than immigrants with poorer language command or do they earn different wages because 
they work in different firms and do different jobs? Theory predicts that workers with higher 
productivity enter higher paid jobs. Therefore, even having controlled for self-selection into 
participation and employment, earnings may be affected by worker's occupation and 
economic sector choice. Further, we distinguish between blue- and white-collar workers and 
basic/high-tech industry and other economic sectors. Table 7.5 presents descriptive statistics 
of the language ability variables and skills for these groups. As it becomes obvious, there is a 
substantial difference in language ability (independently whether measured in terms of 
language usage or self-assessed language proficiency) between blue-collar and white-collar 
workers. White-collar workers are more likely to speak mainly German in the household, be 
more fluent in German language and be high-skilled. In contrast, comparing basic and high-
tech industry with other industry establishes minor differences only. 
Table 7.5: Descriptives Statistics by Occupation and Economic Sector 
 Occupation Economic sector 
 White collar Blue collar Basic and high-
tech industry 
Other industry
Language usage in the household    
Mainly German 0.67 0.29 0.29 0.36 
Partly German 0.03 0.24 0.24 0.21 
Mainly mother tongue 0.29 0.47 0.48 0.44 
Self-reported German language proficiency    
Very good 0.58 0.17 0.17 0.25 
Good 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.40 
Satisfactory 0.01 0.30 0.31 0.24 
Poor 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.11 
Not at all 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Level of education    
Low skilled 0.21 0.54 0.54 0.49 
Medium skilled 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.41 
High skilled 0.42 0.05 0.06 0.10 
Source: Samples from SOEP 2005; own calculation, see text. 
 
Due to these differences, it is reasonable to estimate the separate earnings equations for each 
of the four groups: 1. white-collar in basic and high-tech industry, 2. blue-collar in basic and 
high-tech industry, 3. white-collar in other industry, and 4. blue-collar in other industry. Each 
of these groups is non-random and appropriate correction for self-selection is required (see 
section 7A in the appendix for a description). Estimation is carried out using bivariate probit 
models on choice of occupation type and economic sector. Complete estimates are given in 
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Table 7.B4 in the appendix. The estimate of the correlation coefficient (ρ) is highly 
significant, hence, both choices have to be estimated jointly to avoid selection bias. The 
estimates of language usage across skill groups in both equations are summarized in Table 
7.6. The results show that foreigners speaking mainly German at home have a clearly higher 
probability to be white-collar workers; speaking partly German is relevant for the probability 
of being a white-collar worker for medium-skilled persons. 
Table 7.6: Language Usage Effects on Occupation and Economic Sector Choice across 
Skill Groups 
 Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
Occupation choice    
Mainly German 0.7715 ** 0.7266 ** 1.9069 # 
Partly German 0.2800  0.5411 * 0.8115  
Economic sector choice    
Mainly German -0.2693  -0.0543 ** -0.8583 * 
Partly German -0.1739  0.1383  -0.4057  
#- significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at 10% level. 
The complete estimations are given in Table 7.B4 in the appendix. 
 
Having constructed appropriate inverse Mill's ratios we estimated earnings equations for each 
group restricting the β-coefficients to be equal across groups (Table 7.B2, model 3 in the 
appendix) and for two groups excluding white-collar workers who are a relatively small group 
(Table 7.B2, models 4 and 5 in the appendix). The effects of language usage and skills are 
summarized in Table 7.7. Consideration of all groups points out at a slightly significant effect 
of language usage on earnings especially for high-skilled workers. Excluding white-collar 
workers (156 observations out of 2,021) reduces the magnitude of the effect and its 
significance. In fact, none of the coefficients for the language effect on earnings are 
significant. This implies that language usage affects earnings of white- and blue-collar 
workers differently and occupational heterogeneity of workers should not be neglected. For 
blue-collar workers language proficiency does not seem to affect wages directly. It influences 
wages indirectly by affecting participation and employment probability as well as 
occupational choice (white- or blue-collar occupation). For white-collar workers the results 
tend to indicate that a wage premium for language proficiency exists, but given the small 
number of observations for white-collar workers we can neither prove it nor disprove. 
 153
Table 7.7: Language Usage Effects on Earnings across Skill Groups (Additionally 
Controlled for Occupation and Economic Sector) 
 Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled 
All groups 
Mainly German 0.0985 * 0.1116 * 0.2690 ** 
Partly German -0.0111  0.0854 * 0.1412 * 
Excluding white-collar workers    
Mainly German 0.0855  0.0905  0.0961  
Partly German -0.0116  0.0716  0.0932  
#- significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at 10% level. 
 
Although these results are not directly comparable due to differences in the selection criteria 
of the sample and the methods used to estimate the effects of occupation on earnings, it may 
be useful to discuss the findings in light of the results of Chiswick and Miller (2009) and 
Kossoudji (1988). In contrast to our results, Kossoudji (1988) finds significant negative effect 
of language deficiency on earnings of craft and service personnel (blue-collar occupations). 
However, the results are not directly comparable as she analyses Hispanics and East Asians in 
the U.S. labour market in the 1970s which is different to Germany. On the other hand, 
selection into participation and employment is not considered in Kossoudji (1988). Chiswick 
and Miller (2009) control for occupational choice by including dummy variables for different 
occupations. Their findings suggest that about one half of the typical earnings differential 
reported in the literature with respect to language ability can be attributed to occupational 
attainment, i.e. workers with better language command enter higher paid occupations. This is 
consistent with our finding that controlling for occupation reduces the observed wage 
premium for language proficiency. However, unlike Chiswick and Miller (2009) we find that 
for blue-collar workers in Germany the effect of language proficiency on earnings is to full 
extent attributed to higher participation and employment rates and better occupational 
attainment of persons with better command of the German language. 
7.4.4 Language Usage vs. Language Proficiency 
So far we have used the information on the language usage in the household as a proxy for 
actual language proficiency. However, there may be concerns about the validity of language 
usage in the household to approximate the effects of language proficiency. The problem of 
approximation of language proficiency by self-assessed variables is common in many studies. 
For that reason, different language variables are used (as single variables or combinations). 
For Germany, e.g. Dustmann (1994) uses speaking and writing fluency, Dustmann and van 
Soest (2001, 2002) use information on speaking fluency compressed by a dummy instead of a 
five-scale variable. Other examples are McManus et al. (1983) who construct a combined 
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indicator derived from answers to questions on language usage in the household and 
neighbourhood. In a similar fashion, Chiswick and Miller (1995) and Chiswick and Miller 
(2009) use combined information on language usage in the household and self-assessed 
speaking fluency. In contrast, Rivera-Batiz (1990) has access to data on objective test scores 
of literacy (see above). We have redone our analysis using information on self-assessed 
language proficiency to provide a sensitivity analysis of the results discussed so far. 
Unfortunately, as noted above self-assessed language proficiency is missing in about half of 
the observations in our sample. 
Denote the latent language proficiency by H. The self-assessed language proficiency is 
reported in 5 categories: not at all, poor, satisfactory, good, and very good. The probability 
that an outcome i is observed is given by: 
(7.6)  )Pr()Pr( 1 ii HiO κκ ≤<== −  
where κ are the cut-off points and O is the observed self-assessed language proficiency. 
Equation (7.6) could be estimated by ordered probit method.73 As a set of explanatory 
variables we choose age, time of residence (and the respective squares), skill and year 
dummies, and language usage in the household. The estimation results are presented in Table 
7.8. Not surprisingly, persons who speak mainly German in the household also have better 
command of German language. Speaking partly German also increases language proficiency. 
However, the effect is smaller in magnitude. 
Using the fitted values Hˆ  as a regressor instead of language usage in the household we re-
estimate equations (7.2), (7.3), (7.A1) and extended earnings equation (7.5). Given the 
parametric form ζη += QH  we also impute the missing values. Namely, O is observed in 
only about half of observations, and hence, ηˆ  is obtained from the regression in equation 
(7.6) using non-missing observations in O (half of the sample). However, once ηˆ  is estimated 
and given that Q is observed for the whole sample, ηˆˆ QH =  can be calculated for missing 
observations as well. 
                                                          
73 Bleakley and Chin (2004) use IV method to correct for measurement error in the self-assessed language 
proficiency variable. However, they fail to take into account the ordinal nature of the self-assessed proficiency 
variable. 
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Table 7.8: Ordered Probit Estimates on Proficiency in Spoken German Language 
Age -0.0195  
Age (squared) -0.0004  
Time of residence 0.1223 # 
Time of residence (squared) -0.0015 # 
Level of education  
Medium skilled 0.1880 ** 
High skilled 0.3897 ** 
Language usage  
Mainly German 1.8088 # 
Partly German 0.8159 # 
Year dummies Yes  
κ1 -2.1356  
κ2 -0.2985  
κ3 1.1160  
κ4 2.7256  
Pseudo R2 0.2338  
Observations 1,314  
#- significant at 0.1% level, *** - at 1% level, ** - at 5% level, * - at 10% level. 
 
The results for earnings are given in the appendix 7.B in Table 7.B3, the corresponding 
estimates for the selection models in Tables 7.B1 and 7.B4 in the appendix. Qualitatively the 
results are similar to the estimates using language usage in the household. Self-assessed 
language proficiency significantly increases participation probability and employment 
chances especially for the medium- and the high-skilled. Besides, foreigners with better 
language proficiency are more likely to be white-collar workers. Without controlling for 
selection language proficiency has a significant positive effect on earnings especially for 
medium- and high-skilled persons. Taking selection into participation and employment into 
account slightly increases the magnitudes of the effect. However, once additional selection 
into economic sector and occupation is considered, the effect of language proficiency on 
earnings becomes statistically insignificant for blue-collar workers. In that sense, it could be 
concluded that independently of the language variables used, language ability affects the 
selection processes in the labour market but a direct effect of language on earnings (as a kind 
of wage premium) could not be established. 
7.5 Conclusion 
There is quite comprehensive international evidence showing that foreigners speaking the 
language of the host country well are better off in terms of earnings than those with poor 
command. One of the explanations is a relationship between productivity and language 
proficiency, and more productive workers are paid a wage premium. However, this 
explanation is not easy to reconcile with the empirical findings due to self-selection of 
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workers. 
Put it in other words, are immigrants with better language proficiency paid better in a firm 
than immigrants with poorer language command or do they earn different wages because they 
work in different firms and do different jobs? To shed more light on this issue we analyse 
earnings of foreigners in Germany considering selection of workers into participation, 
employment, economic sector, and occupation. 
We begin our analysis by building a theoretical model which assumes no wage premium to 
productivity (and hence to language proficiency). We show that in the absence of wage 
premium, language proficiency heterogeneity would generate differences in participation and 
employment levels. Moreover, more proficient individuals end up working in higher-paid 
firms. In the empirical model, we show that without controlling for self-selection or 
controlling only for selection into participation and employment the estimates support the 
existence of wage premium for language proficiency. However, once selection into economic 
sector and occupation is controlled for, no significant effects of language proficiency on 
earnings of blue-collar workers are observed. For white-collar workers no conclusive 
evidence is found due to small number of observations. 
Language proficiency, however, plays an important role at different selection stages. For 
example, it significantly increases participation probability and employment chances, 
especially for the low- and medium-skilled. Moreover, foreigners with better language 
command are more likely to be white-collar workers. This implies that language proficiency 
only indirectly affects foreigners' earnings in Germany through higher participation rate and 
employment chances and higher likelihood of working in white-collar occupations. A wage 
premium per se or a direct effect could not be established. Using two different measures of 
language proficiency (language usage in the household and self-assessed language 
proficiency) does not change the results qualitatively. 
7.6 References for Chapter 7 
Beenstock, M., B. R. Chiswick, A. Paltiel (2005), Endogenous Assimilation and Immigrant 
Adjustment in Longitudinal Data, IZA Discussion Paper 1840. 
Beenstock, M., B. R. Chiswick, G. L. Repetto (2001), The Effect of Linguistic Distance and 
Country of Origin on Immigrant Language Skills: Application to Israel, International 
Migration 39 (3), 33-60. 
 157
Berman, E., K. Lang, E. Siniver (2003), Language-skill complementarity: returns to 
immigrant language acquisition, Labour Economics 10 (3), 265-290. 
Bleakley, H., A. Chin (2004), Language Skills and Earnings: Evidence from Childhood 
Immigrants, Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (2), 481-496. 
Burdett, K., D. Mortensen (1998), Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment, 
International Economic Review 39 (2), 257-273. 
Carliner, G. (1981), Wage Differences by Language Group and the Market for Language 
Skills in Canada, Journal of Human Resources 16 (3), 384-399. 
Charette, M., R. Meng (1994), Explaining language proficiency: objective versus self-
assessed measures of literacy, Economic Letters 44 (3), 313-321. 
Chiswick, B. R. (1978), The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-born Men, 
Journal of Political Economy 86 (5), 897-921. 
Chiswick, B. R. (1991), Speaking, Reading, and Earnings among Low-Skilled Immigrants, 
Journal of Labor Economics 9 (2), 149-170. 
Chiswick, B. R., Y. L. Lee, P. W. Miller (2005), Immigrant Earnings: a Longitudinal 
Analysis, Review of Income and Wealth 51 (4), 485-503. 
Chiswick, B. R., P. W. Miller (1995), The Endogeneity between Language and Earnings: 
International Analyses, Journal of Labor Economics 13 (2), 246-288. 
Chiswick, B. R., P. W. Miller (1999), Language skills and earnings among legalized aliens, 
Journal of Population Economics 12 (1), 63-89. 
Chiswick, B. R., P. W. Miller (2007), Modeling Immigrants’ Language Skills, in: B.R. 
Chiswick (ed.), Immigration - Trends, Consequences and Prospects for the United 
States, Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 27, Elsevier, Oxford, 75-128. 
Chiswick, B. R., P. W. Miller (2009), Earnings and Occupational Attainment among 
Immigrants, Industrial Relations 48 (3), 454 - 465. 
Dustmann, C. (1994), Speaking fluency, writing fluency and earnings of migrants, Journal of 
Population Economics 7 (2), 133-156. 
Dustmann, C. (1999), Temporary Migration, Human Capital, and Language Fluency of 
Migrants, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101 (2), 297-314. 
Dustmann, C., F. Fabbri (2003), Language Proficiency and Labour Market Performance of 
Immigrants in the UK, The Economic Journal 113 (489), 695-717. 
Dustmann, C., A. van Soest (2001), Language fluency and earnings: estimation with 
misclassified language indicators, Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (4), 663-674. 
Dustmann, C., A. van Soest (2002), Language and the Earnings of Immigrants, Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 55 (3), 473-492 
Espenshade, T. J., H. Fu (1997), An Analysis of English-Language Proficiency among U.S. 
Immigrants, American Sociological Review 62 (2), 288-305. 
Fishe, R., R. Trost, P. Lurie (1981), Labor Force Earnings and College Choice of Young 
Women: An Examination of Selectivity Bias and Comparative Advantage, Economics of 
Education Review 1 (2), 169-191. 
Grenier, G. (1984), The Effect of Language Characteristics on the Wages of Hispanic-
American Males, Journal of Human Resources 19 (1), 35-52. 
 158
Heckman, J. (1976), The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample 
selection, and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models, 
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 5, 475-492. 
Heckman, J. (1979), Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, Econometrica 47 (1), 
153-161. 
Kossoudji, S. (1988), English Language Ability and the Labor Market Opportunities of 
Hispanic and East Asian Immigrant Men, Journal of Labor Economics 6 (2), 202-228. 
Lee, L. F. (1976), Estimation of Limited Dependent Variables by Two-Stage Methods, 
Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University Rochester. 
Maddala, G. (1983), Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Manning, A. (2003), Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets, 
Princeton University Press. 
McManus, W., W. Gould, F. Welch (1983), Earnings of Hispanic Men: The Role of English 
Language Proficiency, Journal of Labor Economics 1 (2), 101-130. 
Mohanty, M. (2001), Determination of Participation Decision, Hiring Decision, and Wages in 
a Double Selection Framework: Male-Female Wage Differentials in the U.S. Labor 
Market Revisited, Contemporary Economic Policy 19 (2), 197-212. 
Mortensen, D. T. (2003), Wage Dispersion: Why Are Similar Workers Paid Differently? MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Reimers, C. (1983), Labor Market Discrimination against Hispanic and Black Men, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 65 (4), 570-579. 
Reimers, C. (1985), A comparative analysis of the wage of Hispanics, Blacks and non-
Hispanic Whites, in: G. Borjas and M. Tienda (eds.), Hispanics in the U.S. Labor 
Market, Academic Press, Orlando, 27-76. 
Rivera-Batiz, F. (1990), English Language Proficiency and the economic progress of 
immigrants, Economic Letters 34 (3), 295-300. 
Shields, M. A., S. W. Price (2002), The English language fluency and occupational success of 
ethnic minority immigrant men living in English metropolitan areas, Journal of 
Population Economics 15 (1), 137-160. 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2008), Statistisches Jahrbuch 2008 für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Wiesbaden. 
Tainer, E. (1988), English Language Proficiency and the Determination of Earnings among 
Foreign-born Men, Journal of Human Resources 23 (1), 108-122. 
7.7 Appendix to Chapter 7 
Appendix 7A: Modelling Selection into Economic Sector and Occupation 
Theory predicts that workers with higher productivity enter higher paid jobs. Therefore, even 
having controlled for self-selection into participation and employment, earnings may be 
affected by worker's occupation and economic sector choice. Therefore, we extend our model 
to explicitly control for selection through these channels. In the sub-sample of employed 
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persons, we take account of self-selection into the economic sector modelled as the 
probability of working in basic or high tech industry and of self-selection into occupation 
modelled as the probability of being a white-collar worker. Analogously to our empirical 
model discussed in section 7.2.2, we consider both choices as joint decisions in a first step. 
Assuming joint normality of the errors, estimation is carried out using a bivariate probit 
model. 
However, one needs to keep in mind that participation-employment decision is a double-
hurdle, i.e. employment decision is observed only for participating individuals. In case of 
occupation-industry decision all combinations are observed: 1. white-collar in basic and high 
tech industry, 2. blue-collar in basic and high tech industry, 3. white-collar in other industry, 
and 4. blue-collar in other industry. Let the two choices be modelled as: 
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with cov(ε3, ε4)=ρ and I3 being an indicator variable taking the value one if a person is a 
white-collar worker and I4 being an indicator variable taking the value one if a person is 
employed in basic or high-tech industry. There is an earnings equation defined for each group 
(see Fishe et al., 1981): 
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The Ms are Mills ratios adjusted for bivariate case. The general formula for calculating Ms is 
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The Ps can be interpreted as conditional expectations of errors in equation (7.A1) as 
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 and so on. Equation (7.A3) can still be 
evaluated numerically. In fact, the term M12 and M21 are calculated by the same token as λ1 
and λ2 for which the numerical evaluation is straightforward. Other terms are calculated in the 
same fashion. 
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Appendix 7B: Tables 
Table 7.B1: Selection Model: Results for Separate Estimation of Participation and 
Employment Decision 
 Language usage Language proficiency 
 Part. Emp. Part. Emp. 
Constant 0.5768  -0.0377  0.5887  -0.0094  
Age 0.0055  0.0401  0.0150  -0.0495  
Age (squared) 0.0001  -0.0006  0.0001  -0.0050  
Time of residence 0.0068  0.2750 ** -0.0251  0.0000  
Time of residence (squared) -0.0002  -0.0004 * 0.0001  -0.0003  
Level of education (ref. low skilled) a 
Medium skilled -3.7063 * -3.8598  -2.7681 * -3.9856 * 
High skilled -0.3958  3.8949  0.5533  -1.3900  
Language usage (ref. mainly mother tongue) b 
Mainly German 0.3511 * 0.5653 # - - 
Partly German 0.3248 # 0.3139 ** - - 
Language Proficiency - - 0.2124 ** 0.3193 # 
Exclusion restriction (participation) 
Married 0.4741 ** - 0.4835 *** - 
Children -0.2159  - -0.2172  - 
Interactions 
Medium skilled*age 0.1702 * 0.2222 * 0.1653 * 0.2160 * 
Medium skilled*age (squared) -0.0024 * -0.0029 * -0.0024 * -0.0028 * 
High skilled*age -0.0001  0.1138  -0.0704  0.1097  
High skilled*age (squared) 0.0003  -0.0016  0.0012  -0.0016  
Mainly German*medium skilled 0.2500  0.3752 * - - 
Mainly German*high skilled 0.4260  -0.4192  - - 
Partly German*medium skilled 0.0029  0.1518  - - 
Partly German*high skilled 0.2521  -0.3770  - - 
Language proficiency*medium skilled - - 0.0952  0.1969  
Language proficiency*high skilled - - 0.3106 * -0.1225  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 2,830  2,575  2,830  2,575  
Pseudo R2 0.0534  0.0770  0.0533  0.0784  
     
Linear combinations medium-skilled 
Mainly German 0.6010 *** 0.9404 # - - 
Partly German 0.3277 ** 0.4711 # - - 
Language proficiency - - 0.3076 *** 0.5162 # 
Linear combinations high-skilled 
Mainly German 0.7771 * 0.1461  - - 
Partly German 0.5769  -0.0576  - - 
Language proficiency - - 0.5230 *** 0.1968  
All estimates are displayed in terms of coefficients. Significance is indicated as follows: # denoting the 0.1%, *** the 1%, ** the 5% and * 
the 10% level. 
a Medium-skilled are people with professional training, high-skilled are people with advanced technical college or university degree. 
b Language proficiency is estimated by the ordered probit regression. See section 7.4.4 for details. 
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Table 7.B2: Earnings Equation and Language Usage in the Household 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant 1.6260 # 1.5633 # 1.4986 # 1.5469 # 1.5264 # 
Age 0.0280 *** 0.0306 ** 0.0310 ** 0.0307 ** 0.0301 ** 
Age (squared) -0.0003 ** -0.0004 ** -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.00004  
Time of residence 0.0135  0.0150 # 0.0188 # 0.0156 # 0.0182 # 
Time of residence (squared) -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0003 # -0.0003 # -0.0003 # 
Level of education a (ref. low skilled) 
Medium skilled -0.0085  0.0003  0.0003  0.0070  0.0018  
High skilled -0.0920  -0.0609  -2.0326  -0.0716  -0.0609  
Language usage (ref. mainly mother tongue) 
Mainly German 0.0531 * 0.0750  0.0985 * 0.0921 * 0.0855  
Partly German -0.0226  -0.0609  -2.0326  -0.0716  -0.0609  
Sector (ref. industry and  
manufacturing) 
Transportation -0.1264 # -0.1254 # -0.0596  -0.1423 # -0.0587  
Construction -0.0092  -0.0082 ** 0.0664 ** -0.0092  0.0725 ** 
Trading services -0.1218 # -0.1206 # -0.0763  -0.1536 # -0.0724 * 
Social services and health -0.0874 ** -0.0899 ** -0.0517  -0.1172 ** -0.0343 * 
Firm size (ref. <20 employees) 
20-199 employees 0.0996 # 0.0994 # 0.0983  0.1019 # 0.0991 # 
200-1999 employees 0.1917 # 0.1923 # 0.1822 # 0.1817 # 0.1730 # 
2000 and more employees 0.2466 # 0.2454 # 0.2311 # 0.2441 # 0.2311 # 
Location b (ref. south) 
North -0.0102  -0.0116  -0.0185  -0.0110  -0.0186  
Centre -0.0335 * 0.2868 * -0.0315  0.3560 * -0.0306  
Interactions 
Mainly German*medium skilled 0.0177  0.0106  0.0131  0.0016  0.0050  
Mainly German*high skilled 0.3326 # 0.2868 ** 0.1706  0.0331  0.0106  
Partly German*medium skilled 0.0750 ** 0.0789 ** 0.0965 ** 0.0737 ** 0.0832 ** 
Partly German*high skilled 0.1931 ** 0.1603 ** 0.1524 * 0.1216  0.1047  
Selection terms c 
λ1 (participation) - 0.2105  0.2732  0.2823  0.3023  
λ2 (employment) - -0.2263  -0.2704  -0.2498 * -0.2822 * 
M1 - - 0.0374  - - 
M2 - - -0.6780  - - 
M3 - - -0.2227  - -0.0162  
M4 - - 0.0763  - 0.0497  
M5 - - -0.0845  - - 
M6 - - 0.3124  - - 
M7 - - -0.1343  - 0.0130  
M8 - - -0.0509  - -0.0742 * 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,021 2,021 2,021 1,865 1.865 
R2 0.2894 0.2915 0.3264 0.2789 0.2908 
  
Linear combinations medium-skilled 
Mainly German 0.0709 ** 0.0855  0.1116 * 0.0937  0.0905  
Partly German 0.0525 * 0.0617 * 0.0854 * 0.0653  0.0716  
Linear combinations high-skilled 
Mainly German 0.3857 # 0.3618 # 0.2690 ** 0.1253  0.0961  
Partly German 0.1706 ** 0.1431 * 0.1412 * 0.1131  0.0932  
Significance is indicated as follows: # denoting the 0.1%, *** the 1%, ** the 5% and * the 10% level. 
Model 1 – no selection control; Model 2 – controlling for selection into participation and employment; Model 3 – additional controls for 
selection into economic sector and occupation; Model 4 –excluding white-collar workers, controlling for selection into participation and 
employment; Model 5 – excluding white-collar workers, additional controls for selection into economic sector and occupation 
a Medium-skilled are people with professional training, high-skilled are people with advanced technical college or university degree. 
b North contains the Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. Centre are the Federal States North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises Hessen, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
c λ1 and λ2 are calculated using estimates for the participation and employment given in Table 7.B1 in the appendix. 
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Table 7.B3: Earnings Equation and Self-Assessed Language Proficiency 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Constant 1.6306 # 1.6594 # 1.5863 # 1.6172 # 1.6215 # 
Age 0.0283 *** 0.0274 ** 0.0288 ** 0.0286 ** 0.0276 ** 
Age (squared) -0.0003 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0003 ** -0.0003 ** 
Time of residence 0.0073  0.0081  0.0109  0.0091 ** 0.0124 ***
Time of residence (squared) -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0002 ***
Level of education a (ref. low skilled) 
Medium skilled 0.0057  0.0137  0.0110  0.0134  0.0126  
High skilled -0.1412 ** -0.1255  -0.0846  -0.0473  -0.0413  
Language usage (ref. mainly mother tongue) 
Language proficiency 0.0297 ** 0.0315  0.0441 * 0.0346 * 0.0313  
Sector (ref. industry and manufacturing) 
Transportation -0.1286 # -0.1278 # -0.0601 * -0.1415 # -0.0567 * 
Construction -0.0110  -0.0097  0.0683 ** -0.0092  0.0743 ** 
Trading services -0.1230 # -0.1219 # -0.0744 * -0.1511 # -0.0691 * 
Social services and health -0.0746 * -0.0756 * -0.0411  -0.1514  -0.0299  
Firm size (ref. <20 employees) 
20-199 employees 0.1038 # 0.1041 # 0.1024 # 0.1057 # 0.1028 # 
200-1999 employees 0.1939 # 0.1946 # 0.1847 # 0.1862 # 0.1767 # 
2000 and more employees 0.2460 # 0.2453 # 0.2330 # 0.2473 # 0.2346 # 
Location b (ref. south) 
North -0.0081  -0.0099  -0.0168  -0.0103  -0.0177  
Centre -0.0348 * -0.0367 * -0.0323 * -0.0362 * -0.0325 * 
Interactions 
Language proficiency*medium skilled 0.0131 0.0088  0.0166  0.0088 0.0093  
Language proficiency*medium skilled 0.1401 # 0.1276 # 0.1167 * 0.0205 0.0150  
Selection terms c 
λ1 (participation) - 0.9590  0.1569  0.1578  0.1644  
λ2 (employment) - -0.1896  -0.2141  -0.2005  -0.2304  
M1 - - -0.1066  - - 
M2 - - -0.0649  - - 
M3 - - -0.2861  - 0.0041  
M4 - - 0.0602  - 0.0022  
M5 - - 0.1429  - - 
M6 - - -0.0992  - - 
M7 - - -0.1931 * - -0.0010  
M8 - - -0.0619  - -0.0899 * 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,021 2,021 2,021 1,865 1.865 
R2 0.2906 0.2921 0.3231 0.2728 0.2855 
  
Linear combinations medium-skilled 
Language proficiency 0.0428 ** 0.0403  0.0978 *** 0.0455  0.0406  
Linear combinations high-skilled 
Language proficiency 0.1699 # 0.1591 # 0.0608 * 0.0572  0.0463  
Significance is indicated as follows: # denoting the 0.1%, *** the 1%, ** the 5% and * the 10% level. 
Model 1 – no selection control; Model 2 – controlling for selection into participation and employment; Model 3 – additional controls for 
selection into economic sector and occupation; Model 4 –excluding white-collar workers, controlling for selection into participation and 
employment; Model 5 – excluding white-collar workers, additional controls for selection into economic sector and occupation 
a Medium-skilled are people with professional training, high-skilled are people with advanced technical college or university degree. 
b North contains the Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. Centre are the Federal States North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises Hessen, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
c λ1 and λ2 are calculated using estimates for the participation and employment given in Table 7.B1 in the appendix. 
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Table 7.B4: Selection Model: Results for Joint Estimation of Occupation Type and 
Economic Sector 
All estimates are displayed in terms of coefficients. Significance is indicated as follows: # denoting the 0.1%, *** the 1%, ** the 5% and * 
the 10% level. 
a Medium-skilled are people with professional training, high-skilled are people with advanced technical college or university degree. 
b Language proficiency is estimated by the ordered probit regression. See Section 4.4 for details. 
c North contains the Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower-Saxony, Bremen and Berlin. Centre are the Federal States North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. South comprises Hessen, Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
 Language 
usage 
Language 
proficiency 
Language 
usage 
Language 
proficiency 
 Type of occupation Economic sector 
Constant -2.8096  -2.2869  -1.6932 ** -1.6898 ** 
Age -0.0045  -0.0378  0.0663  0.0632  
Age (squared) 0.0002  0.0004  -0.0008  -0.0008  
Time of residence 0.1095 ** 0.0387  0.0380 * 0.0553 ** 
Time of residence (squared) -0.0012  -0.0003 * -0.0008 ** -0.0010 ** 
Level of education (ref. low skilled) a 
Medium skilled 0.1578  0.1192  -0.2533  -0.1560 * 
High skilled 0.9728  -0.1912 ** -0.0035  0.0113 * 
Language usage (ref. mainly mother tongue) b 
Mainly German 0.7715 ** - -0.2693  - 
Partly German 0.2800  - -0.1739  - 
Language proficiency - 0.3083 * - 0.1427 * 
Interactions 
Mainly German*medium skilled -0.0448  - 0.2150  - 
Mainly German*high skilled 1.1354 * - -0.5889  - 
Partly German*medium skilled 0.2610  - 0.3122  - 
Partly German*high skilled 0.5314  - -0.2317  - 
Language proficiency*medium skilled - 0.0400  - 0.0871  
Language proficiency*high skilled - 0.8473 *** - -0.1633  
Exclusion restriction (ref. north) c 
Centre 0.5218 ** 0.5174 ** - - 
South 0.2023  0.2008  - - 
ρ -0.4470 # -0.5521 # - - 
Observations 2,021 2,021 2,021 2,021 
     
Linear combinations medium-skilled 
Mainly German 0.7266 * - -0.0543 ** - 
Partly German 0.5411 ** - 0.1383  - 
Language proficiency - 0.3483 ** - -0.0727  
Linear combinations high-skilled 
Mainly German 1.9069 # - -0.8583 * - 
Partly German 0.8115  - -0.4057  - 
Language proficiency - 1.1557 # - 0.1598 * 
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